Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

154. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, April 29, 1955¹

Paris, April 29, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Edgar Faure
• Secretary of State Laforest
• M. Massigli
• M. Bérard
• Ambassador Dillon
• D.M. Bane

SUBJECT

• Political Situation in South Vietnam

REFERENCE

• Embassy’s telegram 4740 (Saigon 687) April 29²

The Ambassador opened the meeting by outlining in detail those points on which the United States Government would like clarification from the French Government prior to proceeding with the consideration of questions of procedure and personalities posed in the French Aide-Mémoire of April 17, as well as those assurances of wholehearted support for the future Vietnamese Government which the United States Government feels must be received from the French Government and Bao Dai in order to justify the continued support of the United States Government in South Vietnam. A detailed account of the Ambassador’s exposition, which was read and approved by the French, was contained in the reference telegram as well as the Ambassador’s comments to Prime Minister Edgar Faure regarding United States concern over the continuation of Jean Sainteny in the role of French Delegate General to North Vietnam. The following summary of the French reaction was read and approved by the French and is set forth here since it is in greater detail than the account given in the reference telegram.

Prime Minister Edgar Faure began by saying that he must tell us in all seriousness that the French Government felt constrained to review its policy vis-à-vis Vietnam in the light of recent developments, and to confirm that the French Government had no intention of intervening unilaterally with Bao Dai at this juncture.

He reminded us that for the past six months the French Government had made clear its conviction to the United States Government that the Diem Government did not possess the capability of effecting a stabilization of the political situation in South Vietnam, and that for the past month the French Government had endeavored to persuade the United States Government to enter into a joint review of the political situation at Saigon and to reach mutual agreement on a course of action to follow that might avert the outbreak of civil war. He added the personal comment that while holding the posts successively of Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and now Prime Minister, he had not met a single person who believed that Diem could succeed in stabilizing the situation at Saigon.

The Prime Minister emphasized, however, that while neither he nor anyone in the French Government shared the American point of view as regards Diem, he wished to make clear that neither he nor the French Government had any intention or desire to enter into conflict with the United States on this score. The fact that Diem is anti-French, he said, is and has always been a secondary consideration as far as the French were concerned. The Prime Minister reiterated once again that the French Government is not wedded to any particular formula for the solution of the crisis at Saigon and that it continued to hold the hope that it might be possible to reach, in consultation with us, a mutually satisfactory position.

In referring to the steps taken by Bao Dai yesterday to convoke Diem as well as certain Vietnamese personalities to Cannes, the Prime Minister expressed his very real fear that these steps had perhaps been taken too late to save South Vietnam from full-scale civil war. If Bao Dai’s action had been taken several weeks ago, he said, the chances of success would have been infinitely greater than those presented to us today. Although it may be too late to prevent the occurrence of full-scale civil war in South Vietnam, the Prime Minister said that France remains ready to do its utmost in conjunction with the United States to retrieve the situation. In this connection, the Prime Minister expressed the view that with the sole exception of the problem posed by our feeling that M. Sainteny not return to Hanoi, he foresaw no difficulty in the French Government’s accepting the views of the United States Government as outlined by the Ambassador. He said, however, that he would like Minister Laforest and other officials concerned to go over the points as outlined by the Ambassador and that he would confirm the French position shortly.

As regards United States concern over French policy towards North Vietnam, the Prime Minister said that he wished to underline in strongest terms that the French Government was not following an equivocal policy or playing “a double game” in Vietnam and that it had no intention of “playing the Vietminh card” to the detriment of the legally constituted Government of South Vietnam. He emphasized that the French Government had no illusions regarding Ho Chi Minh. However, he said, France needed a representative at Hanoi not with a view to cooperating with the Vietminh but solely for the purpose of protecting such French interests and influence as remain and to keep abreast of developments in that region. The Prime Minister made abundantly clear that for domestic political considerations it was out of the question for him to relieve Sainteny of his functions. However, he wished to assure the United States Government that the French Government had, as in the past, every intention of taking fully into account United States views in this regard. Minister Laforest at this juncture stated that the failure of the French Government to conclude the mixed company agreement with the Vietminh could be attributed in large measure to the unfavorable attitude taken by the United States Government toward the conclusion of such an agreement. The sale of the Charbonnages du Tonkin constituted, he said, a clear-cut illustration of the intention of the French Government to give maximum consideration to United States views. The person of Sainteny, however, Minister Laforest reiterated, posed a domestic political problem. The latter’s role, he said, was limited to that of an observer, and Sainteny had been selected for this post solely because he was considered to be the best qualified man for the job. The Sainteny mission as constituted today, the Prime Minister emphasized, represented a far more preferable approach than that of being placed in the position of having to accredit a consul to the Vietminh Government, a situation which the French Government has tried to avoid from the beginning. In conclusion, Mr. Faure stressed that with the sole exception of the recall of Sainteny, he could foresee no impediment to French acceptance of the points as outlined by the Ambassador pursuant to the Department’s instructions.

In response to the Ambassador’s inquiry concerning Bao Dai’s delegation of full military power to General Vy, Minister Laforest stated that Vy was the oldest Vietnamese General, that he was generally respected, and stressed the importance of the fact that General Vy had made clear that he did not wish to participate in a fratricidal civil war. He noted that Diem presently has perhaps approximately 10 battalions of Tonkinese troops, including elite parachute elements, presently engaged in supporting him in the present conflict at Saigon. Minister Laforest likened the situation to the Swiss support of Louis XVI. However, he said, while Diem might succeed in gaining control of the situation in Saigon–Cholon, unquestionably civil war would flare up and continue indecisively in the provinces. Many terrible things could occur in the next several weeks, he added, and irremediable damage inflicted. Prime Minister Faure intervened to point out that the Vietminh are deliberately keeping clear of the present conflict, “rubbing their hands in delight”, with full knowledge that civil war will ultimately deliver South Vietnam into their hands.

The Prime Minister at this juncture referred to his statement at his morning press conference to the effect that France would keep its engagements under the Geneva Accords as regards elections, and he expressed the fear that the scheduled elections had been passed over (depasse) by events which very likely would deliver South Vietnam in fact into the hands of the Vietminh before July 1956.

The Prime Minister stressed, however, that it was perhaps not impossible to retrieve the situation and ultimately succeed in the test with the Vietminh if joint Franco-American action taken quickly. He underlined that the basic objective of France and the United States was the same, namely to maintain and safeguard a non-Communist Vietnam within the free world orbit. M. Faure made clear, however, that the next move was primarily up to the United States and, specifically, he expressed the hope that the United States would exert its influence on Diem to see that he returned to Cannes in accordance with Bao Dai’s request in an effort to salvage the situation and find a salutary solution.

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 207, Paris Talks—May, 1955. Top Secret. Drafted by Dillon and D.M. Bane of the political section of the Embassy.
2. In this telegram, Dillon described the manner in which he had carried out the instructions set forth in Document 149. (Ibid., Central Files, 751G.00/4–2955)