Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

123. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (O’Daniel) to the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins)¹

Saigon, April 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Force Structure for Vietnamese Armed Forces

1. This memorandum is presented with the object of providing a convenient written summary of my position relative to current planning on the structure and cost of the Vietnamese Armed Forces (VNAF).

a. Size of the VNAF by end-1955

(1) I advocate reduction from the present 196,000 strength (forecast at 200,000 by 1 May as the result of Sect integrations) to a strength of 150,000 by the end of 1955.

(2) This drop of 50,000 will impose an admittedly heavy burden on existing administrative machinery and on the ability of civilian economy to absorb the dischargees and their dependents, totaling at least 150,000 people.

(3) A drop of 75,000 to an end-year strength of 125,000 is, in my judgment, beyond the Vietnamese capability, and will produce grave economic and psychological problems at a time when we can ill afford the luxury of added complications. Such a drop totals at least 225,000 people including the 75,000 military.

(4) The need for increasing the emphasis on and means available for national security action and the prospect of added tension once election negotiations open this summer, as well as the Sect problem, all combine to convince me that not less than 150,000 troops should be retained by the close of this year. This number will not include conscriptees, since, as discussed in subparagraph c below, I feel that selective service inductions should be held in abeyance until 1 January 1957.

(5) A factor which is assuming increased proportions by the day is the magnitude and complexity of the program tasks confronting the VNAF. I am of the opinion that, based on experience of the past several months, the Vietnamese will simply have more than they can handle within the established time limits. In brief, we are expecting simultaneous accomplishment of the following major undertakings:

(a) Demobilization

(b) Reorganization

(c) National security action

(d) Retraining

(e) Selective Service

(f) Achievement of autonomy

(g) Resettlement of discharged personnel and dependents

b. Status of the VNAF in 1956

(1) I propose that the VNAF be retained at a strength of 150,000 throughout calendar year 1956. Apropos the preceding subparagraph, this number will include no conscriptees. Major unit structure would include 4 Field and 3 Light Divisions.

(2) My reasons for this position may be summarized as follows:

(a) Need for military strength during and after the critical election period scheduled for July 1956.

(b) Requirement for thorough preparations to absorb dischargees and their dependents into the civilian economy and indoctrination of the public concerning the need for reduction.

(c) Requirement for time to establish selective service machinery and to educate the population on the need for selective service.

(d) Continuing need for strong national security forces.

c. Selective Service

(1) The situation in this field amounts to absence of workable machinery and inability of the government to enforce conscription at the grass roots level. Furthermore, a major program of public education is required to “sell” the need for selective service. It goes without saying that if we attempt to induct the initial increment of 10,000 selective service personnel this year, we shall get in 10,000 individuals who do not want in, and we shall be forced to release 10,000 who do not want out.

(2) I consider that the remainder of 1955 and the whole of 1956 should be devoted to establishing an effective selective service system and to educating the population on the need for peacetime draft. With these projects well in hand, induction can begin on 1 January 1957 in accordance with the present scheme for reaching an inductee strength of 40,000 (10,000 trainees, 30,000 fillers) under an 18 month service requirement.

(d) Sect Integration

(1) As for unit integration, I propose 9–10 light (500 man) battalions only (one per Sect province). Remaining integration up to the number conforming to the percentage of Sect population to the total population of Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel should be on an individual basis.

(2) Integrated Sect battalions should not be charged against the 4 Field and 3 Light Divisions of the Vietnamese Army; rather, be incorporated in the General Reserves.

e. Reduction of Strength in 1957

Commencing 1 January 1957, the VNAF should initiate reduction on a phased basis so as to reach a strength of 125,000 by 1 July 1957 and 100,000 by 31 December 1957. This strength should be maintained thereafter for the active forces. The latter will gradually be augmented by reserves as the selective service system matures.

f. Reduction in VNAF Pay and Allowances

I urge most strongly that existing VNAF pay and allowances not be cut as part of our immediate program. Each soldier must support several dependents (a check of one regiment disclosed that each soldier represents 3.1 persons) and cost of living is high everywhere. Generally speaking, I have the impression that military personnel are getting barely enough to live on as matters stand now. A cut will not only contribute to a hardship situation, but will create an adverse pschological reaction within the ranks.

2. Recommendations

a. Reduction of the VNAF from its predicted 1 May 1955 strength of 200,000 to an end-1955 strength of 150,000. Major unit structure of the 150,000 force should be 4 Field and 3 Light Divisions.

b. Retention of the 150,000 force until 1 January 1957, at which time a preplanned reduction to 125,000 should be initiated for completion by 1 July 1957. Major unit structure of the 125,000 force should be 3 Field Divisions (Vietnamese), 1 Infantry Division of 8,500 (Nung) and 3 Light Divisions. Integrated Sect battalions should be incorporated in the General Reserves and not charged against the Field and Light Divisions.

c. Suspension of selective service induction until 1 January 1957, the interim period being used to establish selective service machinery and to educate the population on the need for the program in peace-time.

d. Commencing 1 January 1957, initiation of the present plan for inducting successive contingents of 10,000 for 18 months’ service, regular personnel being discharged in cadence with the rate of induction until the regular cadre attains a permanent strength of 54,000 and the inductee strength levels off at 40,000 by 31 December 1957.

e. Suspension of measures related to reduction of existing VNAF pay and allowances.

f. Integration into the VNAF this year of:

(1) 9–10 Sect light infantry battalions on the basis of one battalion per Sect province.

(2) Individual Sect personnel up to the number which, combined with those already integrated in light battalions, equals the ratio of Sect population to total population of Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel.

g. Assumption by the US of the following costs over and above those now planned for Calendar Years 1955 and 1956:²

	Planned Cost	Added Cost
CY 1955	$283,000,000	$74,000,000
CY 1956	180,000,000	120,000,000
	$463,000,000	$194,000,000

John W. O’Daniel
Lieutenant General, USA

1. Source: Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, O. Secret.
2. The following handwritten marginal note by Collins appears in the margin next to the figures under “Added Cost”: “Congress & U.S. Administration will not approve such increases. Collins”