Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 322
Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Keppel) to the Coordinator of the Delegation (Johnson)
Subject:
- Recent Eesumption of “Negotiating” Attitude by Communists
In evaluating the meaning of the conciliatory gestures which the Communist side made yesterday in the Indochina discussions, I think that we should not overlook the influence which Eden’s sudden change of stance and the announcement of the forthcoming Churchill–Eisenhower conversations may have had on the Communists and, in particular, on the Soviets.
I personally am inclined to believe that the harshness of the position which Molotov took in the Indochinese discussions after his return from Moscow was probably primarily intended for its effect on the French political crisis and reflected real fear that EDC might after all go through if action were not taken fast. (As indicated in our memorandum of June 11 to General Smith,1 his harsh line probably also reflected an estimate that we were not likely to intervene to save the Delta.) The manner in which Molotov went about contributing to the fall of the Laniel Government had, I believe, a wholly unexpected violent effect on Eden which must have been interpreted by the Soviets as implying that the progress which had been made toward getting the UK into a neutral role had been jeopardized. The announcement of the forthcoming Churchill–Eisenhower talks coming on top of Eden’s change of position must have seemed to the Soviets like an alarming indication that the U.S. and British might agree on a practical policy to defend at least Laos and Cambodia if not also southern Vietnam.
In the light of this and in view of the fact that the Communists did not yesterday commit themselves publicly to anything of real significance, I think that we should be clear in our own minds that their performance might have been intended primarily as a tactical maneuver to forestall the serious consequences which might come out of the Churchill–Eisenhower talks. (The Communist performance probably also reflected a desire to repair damage done recently to their relations with Nehru.) It is, of course, probable that the Communists would accept a neutralized Laos and Cambodia if they got a relatively free hand in Vietnam and if by the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia our efforts to organize collective defense in Southeast Asia could be blocked.
- Not printed.↩