Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/5–354

Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)¹

top secret

Geneva, May 3, 1954.

Subject:

• Outline of U.S. Position and Tactics on Indochina Question at Geneva

Presently Approved U.S. Policy

1. Approved NSC policy applicable to the Geneva Indochina negotiations is as follows (NSC 5405, para. 25–29 approved by the President January 16, 1954):²

25. “Employ every feasible means to influence the French government and people against any conclusion of the struggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. In doing so, the United States should make clear:

a. The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power.

b. The free world stake in Indochina.

c. The impact of the loss of Indochina.

26. Reiterate to the French:

a. That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.

b. That a nominally non–Communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom.

27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease–fire as a preliminary to negotiations, because such a cease–fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco–Vietnamese military position in Indochina.

28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29. If the French actually enter into negotiations with the Communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations.”

The Present Situation

2. With discussions on Indochina imminent at the Geneva Conference the essential elements of the present situation appear to be:

a. The military situation in Indochina is unfavorable. The fall of Dien Bien Phu though not in itself militarily catastrophic, will have an unsettling effect on the morale of French Union and particularly Vietnamese forces, and will expose the Delta to intensified Viet Minh activity.

b. The French Government, wobbly at best, is under heavy pressure to stop the fighting in Indochina and will spare no efforts to achieve this end. The Government may not survive the fall of Dien Bien Phu. If the present Government falls, a successor government will probably be even more willing to agree to unfavorable terms. The degree to which French concern with the French Union and France’s position as a world power, the value the French place upon U.S. cooperation and assistance, French interests in North Africa and Indochina, French pride, and the technical difficulties of arranging an armistice or withdrawal may operate to inhibit the French from entering into a disastrous agreement remains to be seen. At present there are indications that certain French elements are leaning toward the idea of a coalition government as a means of stopping the fighting although as yet the French have probably reached no firm position.

c. The British are obviously firmly opposed to military participation in Indochina at this stage, and appear to be most concerned to end the fighting in order to avoid any possibility of its expansion. The British appear to be in favor of partition of Indochina as a form of settlement, although there are indications that they also would not be averse to a simple cease–fire, particularly since the British are making every effort to work out a joint position with the Asian Commonwealth powers.

d. The degree to which the Vietnamese can or will effectively oppose French inclinations cannot be accurately foretold. They are obviously concerned over the Geneva negotiations and the likelihood of French weakness in these negotiations. They have tended to look to the United States to bail them out of any situation which such French weakness might lead them to. In the absence of evidence of U.S. willingness to undertake such a rescue it is possible that they may feel that they have no choice but to fall in with French inclinations. Thus far there is no firm evidence as to what type of settlement the Vietnamese would prefer, and it is clear that there may be differences of view between the Northern Vietnamese and the Bao Dai government.

e. It appears that the Communists, although aware of the local superiority of their military and political position, are still apprehensive over the possibilities of U.S. intervention, and the possibilities of a spreading of the war. Accordingly, while sacrificing nothing of their long term interests, it is possible that they will attempt to shift from a military to a political pursuit of their objectives in Indochina, and may in fact be willing to agree to some sort of settlement in the expectation that they will in any case eventually secure control of all the area.

f. The U.S. has thus far been unsuccessful in attempts to organize an effective ad hoc coalition for the defense of Southeast Asia. The U.S. position also suffers from widespread foreign feeling that the U.S., in the absence of such a coalition, will not use its own forces in Indochina. There remains, however, a valuable residue of uncertainty as to U.S. intentions, particularly on the part of the Communists.

U.S. Tactics

3. U.S. tactics in the first instance should be directed toward influencing the course of the negotiations to the end that no agreement will be reached which is inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. Toward this end the U.S. should adopt the following tactics:

a. Increase as feasible Communist and Allied uncertainty as to U.S. intentions with regard to U.S. action in Indochina, and exploit whatever successes may be achieved in the organization of U.S. and Allied cooperative action in Southeast Asia.

b. Continue to make it clear to the French that we will retain full freedom of action to refrain from any agreement at Geneva.

c. Continue to set forth and endeavour to obtain French, British and Associated States agreement to the general principles which we believe must be firmly adhered to in any solution of the Indochina problem, namely that any settlement with the Communists must not (1) result in or tend to result in a turning over of the politically important and strategic area of Indochina to Communist control; (2) jeopardize the security of the French Union forces; (3) jeopardize the freedom of the peoples of Indochina who have been loyally supporting the anti–Communist effort; (4) endanger the prestige and status of France or the U.K. or ourselves.

d. Be prepared to demonstrate to our Allies, and for that matter to the Communists, the ways in which various types of settlement that may be proposed by the Communists or by our Allies are incompatible with these general principles. To this end the Working Group is preparing detailed arguments on how such various types of proposals as (1) cease-fire, (2) partition, (3) coalition government, (4) plebiscite, or (5) immediate elections, would fail to meet our general principles and are therefore unacceptable.

e. Endeavour to place the French and the Associated States in the forefront of any negotiations with the Communists, toward the end that the French may experience to the fullest degree the difficulties, frustrations, and exacerbations of such negotiations.

f. Endeavour to stimulate the Communists to the adoption of harsh negotiating tactics and inflexible positions. The Working Group is preparing detailed suggestions of fruitful ways of playing on Communist and particularly Chinese Communist sensitivities.

g. Cultivate Associated States resistance to a sellout.

h. Wherever possible make use of possible British assistance in strengthening the resistance of the French to an unacceptable settlement.

4. The U.S. should decide whether or not it is desirable for the U.S. to put forward a proposal of its own. There can be points made for and against the U.S. putting forward a plan of its own. On the one hand the U.S. would gain something in initiative and leadership if it came forward with a concrete proposal. On the other hand a foolproof proposal which would have any chance of appearing reasonable to the French and the British is difficult to devise; the U.S. might have less freedom of action if its own proposal were made the basis for discussion; and the tactic of keeping the French in the forefront might be rendered more difficult by the U.S. making its own proposal. The Working Group is attempting to prepare a possible U.S. proposal so as to be prepared in the event it is decided to put one forward.

5. If the negotiations on Indochina reach a point where it is clear that an agreement is likely to be reached which is going to be unsatisfactory from the U.S. point of view, the U.S. will have to decide whether it should at that time disassociate itself from the negotiations or continue to be a party to them. Since such a decision would obviously have important U.S. domestic political implications, guidance from the highest level would be required. Some of the pros and cons, purely from the foreign affairs point of view, are listed below:

A. Disadvantages of U.S. Participation

1. U.S. participation in negotiations which seemed clearly to be leading toward an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement will be taken as evidence throughout Asia and the rest of the world that the U.S. has in effect backed down in the face of the Communist threat in a critically important area. As a result there will be an unavoidable loss of U.S. prestige.

2. U.S. participation in the negotiation of an unsatisfactory settlement will probably have particularly acute effects on U.S. prestige and influence in the remainder of Southeast Asia—notable in Thailand. The Thais will feel that the U.S. has marched up the hill and back again on the question of Indochina, and be tempted to believe that the U.S. would behave in similar fashion if a showdown came with respect to Thailand. Consequently the value of U.S. promises of protection and assistance may be severely depreciated in Siamese eyes.

3. U.S. readiness to participate in the negotiation of an unsatisfactory settlement might amount to relinquishment of the last available card that the U.S. has to play against French acceptance of such a settlement—French fear of provoking a profound breach between France and the United States.

B. Advantages of U.S. Participation

1. U.S. participation in negotiation of a settlement would keep the U.S. in a better position to play off the Associated States against the French, to stimulate the Communists to overreaching themselves, and in general to attempt to minimize the undesirable features of an Indochina settlement.

2. U.S. participation in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement, despite the undoubted loss of prestige involved, might place the U.S. in a better position to insert itself into the protection and shoring up of whatever remained of a Western position in Indochina and Southeast Asia after an unsatisfactory settlement. This would be particularly true in the case of a settlement involving territorial partition.

3. U.S. participation in the negotiations of an unsatisfactory Indochina settlement would assist in dispelling that fear of U.S. intransigeance and suspicion of U.S. eagerness for drastic action against Communist China which has quite evidently contributed to present U.S. difficulties both with its Allies and with the neutralist countries.

4. U.S. participation in the negotiation of a settlement would lessen the possibilities of a severe breach between the U.S. on the one hand and the British and the French on the other, and would make more promising the possibilities of united action to counter the damaging effects of the settlement in Southeast Asia, as well as improve prospects for Allied cooperation in Europe.

Summary

Decisions required

1. Whether or not the U.S. should put forward its own proposals.

2. Whether or not the U.S. should disassociate itself from the negotiations if they seem likely to lead to an unsatisfactory agreement.

1. Drafted by Charles C. Stelle, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation.
2. For the full text of NSC 5405, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia,” and related documentation, see volume xii.