794.5/11–954
No. 824
The Chargé in Japan (Parsons) to the Acting
Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)
secret
official–informal
Tokyo, November 9, 1954.
Dear Bob: MAAG has just
completed its third revision of the Country Statement for Japan. In view
of the limited number of copies sent back to Washington, I am attaching
one of the Embassy’s two copies for your use.1
The Country Statement contains a considerable amount of useful, factual
material. However, the most striking aspect of the
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Statement from our viewpoint is the
conclusion evidently drafted under Jerry Higgins’ personal hand, and the
covering memorandum which we would guess was written by General
Magruder personally.
Jerry’s conclusions represent in a sense the
military estimate underlying our “New Look” paper, whereas General
Magruder’s memorandum clearly is a defense of
our present policies in Japan.
General Magruder was probably most aroused by the
statement that the JCS force goals are
both unrealistic and misleading. As I believe I mentioned, before, both
the Deputy Chiefs of Staff have informally indicated to me their
agreement with the conclusions reached by Jerry. However, for the
present they are inhibited from making these views formally known.
Naturally, we would be interested in getting Pentagon reaction to the
conclusions reached in the Statement, since their reaction would give
some indication of Pentagon receptivity to a reappraisal of our defense
program in Japan.2
Yours sincerely,
[Attachment]
The Adjutant General, Far East Command
(Nelson) to the Department of the Army
Subject:
- Submission of Quarterly Review of Country Statement, Japan
FY 1955 (unclassified)
- 1.
- Reference letter, G–4/M–2 (72991), Department of the Army, 18
December 1953, subject: “Country Statement Non-NATO Countries, FY 1955 MDA Program”.3
- 2.
- In transmitting the attached report4 by the Chief, Military
Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, concerning matters related to
the responsibilities of MAAG-J
for the three months’ period ending 30 September 1954, and in
supplement thereto, the following comments are submitted for
your consideration:
- a.
- The islands of Japan provide the largest portion of a
complex of air and naval bases from which to conduct
military operations against Communist power in the Far
East. Current U.S. war plans
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and policies assign to Japan key
roles in the outer perimeter defense of the Western
Hemisphere, as a bastion of the free world in the Far
East and particularly as a source of military supply and
equipment for the forces of the free world in case of
future world conflict.
- b.
- As long as the current U.S. strategic concept
prevails, Japan will be defended by either U.S. forces,
her own forces or a combination of both. This defense
will include atomic retaliation on a massive scale and
must be assumed to be adequate to prevent annihilation
by atomic attack. Based on the assumption that
annihilation of U.S. and Japanese forces and complete
destruction of Japanese defense industries through
atomic attack is not possible of accomplishment by the
Communists, it is mandatory that defense industries be
created and maintained in Japan. These industries are
required to provide for the maintenance of such defense
forces as the Japanese may themselves develop, thereby
reducing their dependence upon U.S. aid for the
maintenance of these forces. In addition, these defense
industries are required to provide the necessary
mobilization base for rapid expansion in the event of
major world conflict, at which time Japan will be called
upon to become the arsenal of the free world in the Far
East. For these reasons, the creation of essential
defense industries must have a high priority in the
allocation of U.S. financial and economic aid to
Japan.
- c.
- The negotiation of next year’s Japanese defense budget
(and Japan’s share of USFJ local costs) will bring to the fore
perhaps the most important decision the U.S. has had to
make in Japan since the peace treaty went into effect.
The Japanese Government must be persuaded to provide for
the maximum self defense by Japan in consonance with her
economic capabilities and as rapidly as possible. We
must convince Japan that she cannot rely on U.S.
economic and military aid indefinitely—that she must not
only raise and maintain armed forces but must create at
the same time the industrial capacity to support those
forces. Japan must be made to understand that we will
assist her for a limited time in this effort provided
there is assurance on her part that she will maintain
the necessary security measures and military posture to
protect herself and her industrial plans from internal
subversion and Communist attack. Japan must be assured
that in the event of major conflict between the forces
of Communism and the free world, the free world will
assist in the defense of Japan and will rely heavily
upon Japan as a source of military supply and
equipment.
- d.
- Japan’s economic position is the most important and
potentially hazardous long range consideration. The
dominant factor in that position is her present
inability to export in sufficient volume to pay for
essential imports. So long as this condition continues
(and it can be improved only slowly) she must rely on
the U.S. economically as well as militarily. When the
condition is corrected she will be able to advance
toward her natural position as the industrial heart of
Asia. The energies and skills of her people may save
Japan if the industrial base can be modernized and
improved sufficiently to meet competition in world
markets. Such a program requires strong methods in Japan
and great assistance from outside Japan.
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Japan cannot improve her
economic position by her own unaided efforts and
simultaneously create and support large military
forces.
- e.
- There appears to be no acceptable alternative
available to the U.S. but to press forward with a
coordinated and integrated economic and military aid
program wherein the military expenditures continue to
contribute to the economic build-up of Japan while at
the same time affording the maximum amount of
discouragement to Communist aggression.
- 3.
- It is also desired to refer to CINCFE message C 69863, October 1954,5 which deals with the
development of defense industries and offshore procurement in
Japan and to again emphasize that the development, equipment and
maintenance of military forces in Japan and other Far Eastern
non-Communistic nations, assisted by the Military Defense
Assistance Program, must be supplemented by the development of
defense industries in Japan to support these forces both in
peace and in event of hostilities. Maximum strategic and
logistic advantages accrue to the United States through offshore
procurement in the Far East of long lead time items and combat
critical items currently being issued which will be needed to
maintain U.S. equipped forces of Far Eastern friendly nations.
The production base resulting from offshore procurement in Japan
will, in the event of war, permit partial early supply and
maintenance of Far Eastern friendly forces from indigenous
sources and will reduce dependence on U.S. sources. This is
especially important during the early months of hostilities. The
development of Japanese defense industry becomes especially
important when examined in the light of U.S. industrial
mobilization plans. Such plans do not envisage an adequate
supply of critical items to our allies from U.S. production
during the first year of war. Moreover, transportation is not
expected to be available during that period in the volume
required to move such items to our Far Eastern allies because of
higher priority requirements. In addition to the strategic and
logistic advantages, offshore procurement in Japan of equipment
for friendly Far Eastern nations provides Japan with dollars
which she desperately needs to maintain economic stability. That
stability is essential to restrain the growth of Communist
elements in Japan. These dollars reduce the need for direct U.S.
economic aid to Japan. They make her more able to import needed
modern equipment and technical knowledge which contribute to her
ability to support herself economically and militarily. Finally,
U.S. funds may often be conserved by buying in Japan at prices
below ZI prices.
- 4.
- Request distribution be made of inclosed copies 1–216 to Department of
Defense agencies as indicated on subject Country
Statement.
For the Commander in Chief:
C.W. Nelson
Colonel, AGC
