Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/8–2952

No. 595
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington , 29 August 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to me dated 15 August 1952, submitted recommendations concerning U.S. policies in the Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcano Islands in the post-Treaty period. A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is attached for your information. The JCS memorandum is the result of questions raised by representatives of the Department of State at an informal discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after considering possible courses of action in connection with the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcano Islands, that there should be no change in the status of the islands “until such time as the politico-military situation in the Far East becomes stabilized in a way favorable to U.S. security interests.” I fully concur in this view.

National Security Council document 125/2 “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan”,¹ calls for recommendations by the Departments of State and Defense to the President concerning the long-term military requirements of the United States in and about the Ryukyus, Bonins, and other islands covered by Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan. In accordance with the required action in the NSC policy on Japan, it is suggested that the representatives of our respective Departments develop a recommended U.S. Government position on the islands for submission to the President. If you agree, I am prepared to designate appropriate Department of Defense representatives to work on this problem.

Sincerely yours,

William C. Foster

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington , 15 August 1952.

Subject:

• Future Post-Peace Treaty Disposition of Ryukyu and Bonin-Volcano Islands.

1. During a recent informal discussion between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question was raised by the Department of State representatives as to the advisability, from a political standpoint, of the United States signifying its intention to return some or all of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan, possibly retaining only Okinawa under United Nations trusteeship. After some discussion, it was agreed that representatives from the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should meet to analyze the problem and submit recommendations as to the future disposition of the islands in question.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly held that strategic control of the Nansei Shoto south of 29° N latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands and the Volcano Islands), Parece Vela, and Marcus Island is vital to the security interests of the United States, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not concur in action to return these islands to Japan, and that no change in United States policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established in the Far East.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered:

a. The most recent trends and events in the Far East;

b. The recently approved United States policy toward Southeast Asia (NSC 124/2); and

c. The uncertainties of a United Nations trusteeship over this strategic area in the event that Japan becomes a member of the United Nations.

In the light of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now of the opinion that, for the foreseeable future, a trusteeship would not provide adequate assurance that the long-term military objectives in connection with these islands will be realized. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that there should be no change in the status quo of the islands in question until such time as the politico-military situation in the Far East becomes stabilized in a way favorable to United States security interests.

4. It is recommended that, subject to your concurrence, the foregoing view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be conveyed to the Secretary of State, further stating that the Department of Defense is prepared to furnish representatives for a State–Defense working group, if it is considered necessary by the Department of State, to prepare a recommended U.S. Governmental position on this matter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a firm, early decision on the subject matter is necessary. If such a working group is formed, it is recommended that the attached “Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion,” developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be used by the Department of Defense representatives on the proposed working group as a basis for discussion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

1. On 17 October 1951, CINCFE recommended the following conclusions “be approved by the J.C.S. as a basis for implementing action at an appropriate later date”:² that the security of the strategically vital U.S. position along the offshore island chain in the Western Pacific is in no way dependent upon perpetuation of U.S. political control over the Ryukyu Islands; that such political responsibility would serve not only to burden the United States with an economic liability but will stand as a denial to the principle of self determination and might at a later date develop into an irritant to the Japanese; that a U.S. sponsored movement for the return of control over the Ryukyu Islands to the Japanese would constitute an additional step toward cementing U.S.-Japanese security objectives; that action should be deferred until the treaty has been ratified; and that a firm agreement should be reached with Japan to retain our exclusive control of military facilities. The recommendation of CINCFE was signed by Lt. Gen. Hickey, Chief of Staff, and added that the conclusions are also applicable to Parece Vela, Marcus Island and Nanpo Shoto.

2. On 21 January 1952, acting on CINCFE’s recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their consistently held position that “strategic control of the Nansei Shoto has been and continues to be vital to the security interests of the United States”, that they “could not concur in action to return these islands to Japan”, and that “no change in U.S. policy in regard to Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto, Marcus Island and Parece Vela should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established in the Far East”.³ CINCFE was informed⁴ that action with respect to his recommendations should not be undertaken now or in the foreseeable future.

3. The policy of the United States has been expressed in the following:

a. Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”.⁵

b. The President in a broadcast on 6 [9] August 1945: “… though the United States wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.”⁶

c. The President on 6 November 1946: “The United States is prepared to place under Trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumes responsibility as a result of the second World War.”⁷

d. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan: “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”

4. In Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced right, title and claim to Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Mandated Islands, Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It may be inferred that ultimate Japanese sovereignty was recognized over the islands she agreed to place in trusteeship. This conception was conceded by Mr. Dulles (page 78, Dept. State Publication 4392)⁸ and by Mr. Younger, the U.K. delegate (page 93, Dept. State Publication 4392). Mr. Dulles speaks of the current Japanese position as “residual sovereignty”.

5. The following facts and opinions were expressed in an interview with Brig. Gen. J.M. Lewis, U.S. Army, U.S. Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands:

a. A spot survey of one of the northern islands in the Amami Group indicated that 99 per cent of the people desired return to Japanese sovereignty. In view of the facts that these islands were formerly an integral part of the Kagoshima province of southern Kyushu and that the people were closely related culturally, economically and ethnologically to the mainlanders, and considered themselves higher socially than the people of more southern islands, the results of the poll were not unexpectedly in favor of return to Japan. Recently there has been no concrete evidence of a determined movement for the return of the area to Japan, possibly because of removal of many previous restrictions. This feeling for return to Japan diminishes generally in a southerly direction and inland to rural areas amongst the islands south of the Amami Group. Although no over-all poll of the islands has ever been made, it was estimated that not over 50 per cent desire immediate return to Japanese sovereignty.

b. The Amami group is distinct culturally and historically from the rest of the Ryukyu Islands. Economically and historically these people feel that they are more closely related to Japan, specifically Kogoshima Prefecture, than they are to Okinawa and the other southern islands. They resent the undisputed fact that Okinawa will exert a dominant control over government, banking, trade and education in the Ryukyu Islands of which they are now considered a part. The return of the Amami group to Japan would not create a serious economic dislocation in the Ryukyus although some 20,000 laborers have moved temporarily to Okinawa as a result of the military construction program there. The return of the Amami group to Japan would remove a difficult political and social problem in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands by the United States. From a political, governmental and social standpoint, it is desirable that this northern group be returned to the Japanese Empire.

c. General Lewis emphasized the importance of the United States publicly announcing its intentions with respect to the island groups. He indicated that the natives are definitely opposed to trusteeship which they associate with the former mandate status of more southern islands and regard as an unacceptable, degrading and despotic form of rule. An established U.S. definitive position would dispel a lot of conjecture and speculation on the part of Okinawans and facilitate the establishment of democratic governmental processes therein.

d. General Lewis also expressed the view that if the United States is planning to return the islands to Japan, the transfer should not be effected until (1) the Korean war is over, and (2) Japan is economically and militarily capable of assuming this added responsibility. Obviously neither of these conditions exist today. Even if the Korean war ends soon, it is unlikely Japan could provide for the defense and support of the outer-islands in addition to the home islands without materially decreasing the over-all security of the area.

6. Japanese national desires regarding the Ryukyu-Bonin Islands are believed to be generally those expressed in a letter dated 10 December 1951, subject “Practicable Arrangements for the Southern Islands,”⁹ which was passed informally by State Department to Department of Army and attached hereto as Appendix. This letter, which allegedly was presented to the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, visualizes the restoration by the United States of the previous sovereign relation between Japan and the Southern Islands so far as compatible with U.S. military requirements.

7. The maximum U.S. base requirements in the area will exist under conditions of war in the Far East with either USSR or Communist China, in which bases in Japan would not be available, and are estimated as follows:

a. Ryukyus

(1) Army—Present facilities to include those for 3 AAA Bns, 1 RCT and supporting units plus the additional defense and support requirements generated by the expanded requirements of the sister services.

(2) Navy—Present air facility on Air Force Field at Naha, Air Station at Yonabaru together with a fleet anchorage, secondary operating base and facility at Buckner Bay.

(3) Air Force—Continued use of four Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Group sites on outer-islands together with the requirement for 7 operating bases on Okinawa, only three of which are firmly located at present.

b. Bonin-Volcano Islands

(1) Army—Defense and support requirements generated by the requirements of the sister Services.

(2) Navy—Naval facility at Chi Chi Jima, air facility at Iwo Jima and an advanced base at Ha Ha Jima.

(3) Air Force—One refueling base and an AC&W site.

c. Marcus Island

(1) Army and Air Force—None.

(2) Navy—One naval air facility.

8. The fundamental issue boils down to whether or not security interests are sufficient to override the United States and United Nations policies of national self determination. (The economic costs of retaining the islands are considered minor in comparison with security advantages.) From a military standpoint, there is no question as to the great value of the subject islands as bases or bulwarks in stemming Communist aggression in the Far East, and ultimately in defending the United States. The United States must have bases that are not dependent upon the temporary political position of Japan, and which are relatively proof against Communist invasion.

9. On 30 Janurary 1952, the Secretary of State outlined the possible U.S. courses of action in the Ryukyus (DA IN 103951, 12 February 1952) as follows:¹⁰

• “(1) The United States, immediately after the effective date of the Treaty, may ‘exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters’. In this event, the Ryukyus would be considered as being under the ‘protection’ of the United States within the meaning of the Chicago Convention,¹¹ and thus would be considered to be ‘territory’ of the United States.
• “(2) The United States may propose to the United Nations to have the Ryukyu placed under the United Nations trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority. If such a trusteeship were granted, the island would probably be considered to fall within the above definition of ‘territory’ in as much as the United Nations ‘trusteeship’ system has succeeded the old League of Nations ‘mandate’ system.
• “(3) At some point in the future the United States may return the Ryukyus to Japan after a security arrangement has been made between the United States and Japan which would ensure that adequate protection is given to U.S. strategic interests in the Ryukyus. In this instance, the Ryukyus would be considered as territory of Japan within the definition of ‘territory’ in the Chicago Convention. This possibility should of course not be discussed publicly.”

10. Adding two additional courses, the following courses of action which retain U.S. base rights, are possible.

a. Maintain Status Quo

b. Trusteeship

c. Return with Base Rights Agreements

d. Joint Sovereignty with Japan

e. Annex to the United States

11. Maintain Status Quo

a. Advantages

(1) Would not require U.N. action which USSR could block.

(2) Affords complete military control.

(3) Continues present flexibility of U.S. policy (which allows U.S. full freedom of action in the disposition of these islands).

(4) Reserves decision at the present time (when no clear advantages would flow to the U.S. as a consequence of either requesting a U.N. mandate or returning these islands to Japanese political control).

b. Disadvantages

(1) An economic liability.

(2) Not in accord with Japanese nationalistic desires and hence an irritant to Japan.

(3) Leaves status of territory undefined—various decisions will be required to alleviate the current status of the inhabitants.

12. Trusteeship

a. Advantages

(1) Has been the announced U.S. policy.

(2) Subject to possible USSR veto in the UN Security Council, could be accomplished under existing treaties.

(3) Subject to effects of obstruction tactics by the USSR, would afford adequate military control.

(4) Firmly establishes status of territory with UN approval.

b. Disadvantages

(1) An economic liability.

(2) An approval required, which USSR might block.

(3) If Japan were subsequently admitted to the United Nations, would be subject to challenge under Art. 78, UN Charter, which states trusteeship “shall not apply to territories which have become members of the UN.” (Note: Challenge not likely to be upheld in the light of Article III of the Peace Treaty with Japan, considered in conjunction with Article 77 of the United Nations Charter.)

13. Unless the United States could accept as a long-term objective the development of these islands toward self-government or independence, an objective which is not likely to be acceptable from a military point of view within the foreseeable future, the seeking of a trusteeship would not be in accord with the spirit of Article 76^* of the United Nations Charter.

14. Because of the use which the United States, as administering authority, would intend to make of the islands, all or part of the area would undoubtedly be designated as “‘strategic” (Article 82^† of the United Nations Charter). Under the terms of Article 83^‡ of the United Nations Charter, all functions of the United Nations relating to the area so designated would be exercised by the Security Council and therefore subject to Russian veto. This consideration makes it doubtful that a request by the United States for a trusteeship over strategic areas of the islands would receive favorable action by the United Nations. Even if such a trusteeship were to be granted, it is foreseen that the United States would be constantly harassed in the administration of the trusteeship by the blocking tactics of the USSR in the Security Council.

15. Congress has always been reluctant to appropriate funds for the construction of base facilities on other than United States territory except in those cases where the continued availability on a long-term basis of the base area involved appears to be assured. A United Nations trusteeship which might be subject to challenge and annulment if and when Japan becomes a member of the United Nations would not appear to offer to the Congress the necessary assurance of long-term tenure. The fact that considerable funds are being spent by the Department of Defense for permanent construction in the islands under consideration points up the necessity for early decision in this matter.

16. Return to Japan with base rights agreements or joint sovereignty with Japan would be unsatisfactory, since the bases would be relatively useless in war if Japan were hostile, and might involve difficulties even if Japan were neutral.

17. Annex to the United States. Such a course of action is considered politically unacceptable in view of the fundamental and frequently expressed U.S. policy of self-determination; and is particularly so in the current situation in which the free nations are attempting to check Soviet aggression.

18. From the military point of view and in the light of the foregoing considerations, maintenance of the status quo is, for the foreseeable future, the only acceptable means for assuring the accomplishment of U.S. security objectives with respect to the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands. While a policy of maintenance of the status quo might, in the absence of preventive action to condition the Japanese public, constitute an irritant to friendly U.S.-Japanese relations, it does provide the major advantage of retaining U.S. freedom of action until such time, unlike the present, when concrete and important advantages may accrue to the U.S. from a decision affecting the disposition of these islands. This policy is considered preferable to taking a positive step at this time to request a U.S. trusteeship over this area with the United States as sole administering authority. All factors considered, the maintenance of the status quo is believed the best course of action to accomplish U.S. objectives for the foreseeable future.

1. Document 588.
2. Reference is to the study summarized in the first paragraph of Document 488.
3. The document quoted has not been found in Department of State files. However, the views of the Joint Chiefs are contained in the letter cited in footnote 4 below.
4. Letter dated Jan. 29, not printed, from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Army Staff for Operations, signed by Maj. Gen. C.D. Eddleman, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, to CINCFE. (Enclosure to letter from Sebald to McClurkin, Feb. 27, 794C.0221/2–2752)
5. For text of the Proclamation by the Heads of Government of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, pp. 1474–1476.
6. For text of this address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 203–214.
7. For text of the “Statement by the President Concerning the Japanese Mandated Islands”, see ibid., 1946, p. 474.
8. Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings, September 4–8, 1951 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951).
9. See despatch 1021 from Tokyo, Document 477.
10. Source of quotation not found in Department of State files.

11. For text of the Convention on international civil aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on Dec. 7, 1944, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1591, or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1180.

    Article 2 of this Convention reads: “For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.”

12. Article 76. “The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be:

    • “a. To further international peace and security;
    • “b. To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
    • “c.…
    • “d.…” [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]

13. Article 82. “There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.” [Footnote in the source text.]

14. Article 83. “1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

    “2. …

    “3. …” [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]