611.94/2–2352
No. 490
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Counselor of the Mission in Japan (Bond)
Participants:
- Ambassador Rusk
- Assistant Secretary Johnson
- Mr. Bond
- Minister Okazaki
- Mr. Nishimura
Subject:
- Informal Discussion with Japanese Delegation Concerning Administrative Agreement Negotiations.
By mutual agreement the above listed members of the U.S. and Japanese Delegations meet at 10:15 a.m. today in Ambassador Rusk’s apartment to discuss informally certain outstanding problems relating to the substance of the draft Administrative Agreement.
[Here follows discussion of draft Articles I, VI, VII, and VIII.]
Turning to Article II (Facilities and Areas), Ambassador Rusk expressed this article lies at the heart of the Administrative Agreement. He stated that it was his impression that our two Governments are in general agreement as to the necessity of recognizing the end of the Occupation and of concluding de novo arrangements to cover the post-Treaty period, but that the problem is to find a practical solution. It is in search of such a solution, he added, that we have proposed the formula set forth in Article II of our draft. Ambassador Rusk pointed out that our principal concern in drafting this article was to prevent a legal lapse in our occupancy of certain facilities in order that we would not for even the shortest time be in the status of trespassers on the properties which we might be occupying. He said that he wished to emphasize, however, that we would be most anxious to begin discussions, in the Joint Committee or otherwise, with a view to resolving the question of facilities and areas. He then inquired of Mr. Okazaki as to the views of the Japanese Delegation on how this problem might be worked out as a practical matter.
Minister Okazaki replied that the principal reason for the suggested deletion of the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article II was that certain Army and Navy units of the Occupation Forces have recently renewed the requisitioning of property in Yokosuka and other areas. He said that this had given rise to a suspicion among the Japanese people that the Occupation Forces are trying to lay their hands on as much property as possible before the Treaty comes into effect in order to be in a position to retain it during the post-Treaty period. He said that the Japanese amendment had therefore been proposed for reasons of public opinion, in which connection he felt it to be very important. Although stating that we had no knowledge of such recent instances of requisitioning, Secretary Johnson called attention to the fact that if U.S. Forces are to move out of urban areas, as the Japanese appear to desire, they must have alternative facilities elsewhere to which they can move. Minister Okazaki acknowledged that fact, and went on to say that, as a practical matter, the Japanese would favor the commencement of informal talks concerning the release of facilities as soon as possible, perhaps even before the conclusion of the Administrative Agreement. Mr. Nishimura interjected that if we could settle the problem of facilities and areas before the conclusion [Page 1124] of the Administrative Agreement, which he regarded as a real possibility, the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article II would not be necessary.
Ambassador Rusk said that he appreciated the problem of Japanese public reactions to this question and said that he would like to put forth informally and on his own responsibility a suggestion which he believed might help to meet this problem. He went on to say that his suggestion was that it be made clear in the language of Article II that the use of facilities and areas by U.S. Forces under the Administrative Agreement would be on a new and different basis foliowing the end of the Occupation—namely, a basis of mutual agreement and not of requisition or procurement demand. He stated that such a formula would help to emphasize the changed status of our occupancy of certain facilities which we might be obliged to retain until such time as the Joint Committee could make alternative arrangements, and that it would help to avoid a situation in which we might become illegal occupants of such facilities.
Minister Okazaki stated that it certainly is not the intention of his Government to inconvenience the U.S. Forces in the matter of facilities and areas, and that if arrangements could not be made in time, some temporary expedient would be found to legalize their occupancy of any facilities which they might need to retain. He went on to say, however, that he was strongly of the opinion that, for the reasons which he had cited, the third sentence of Article II should be deleted.
Ambassador Rusk expressed the belief that our two Governments were in general agreement on this question and that the problem was to find some means of giving written expression to that agreement. Minister Okazaki emphasized again that the important consideration from the point of view of Japanese public opinion is that the retention of facilities by U.S. Forces be by mutual agreement and not by procurement demand, i.e. not through a continuation of the occupation. This, he stated, was the only purpose behind their suggested amendment of Article II.
Following a brief conversation with Mr. Nishimura, Minister Okazaki advanced the suggestion that the Japanese amendment of Article II might be broadened to include an understanding that the substance of the deleted third sentence would be incorporated in an explanatory note or an exchange of letters outside the body of the Agreement. In response to Ambassador Rusk’s question concerning the advisability of concluding any secret understandings outside the Agreement, Minister Okazaki said that it would be his suggestion that such exchange of notes be made public along with the main Agreement. Ambassador Rusk suggested that our two Delegations [Page 1125] consult further on this matter, and reiterated that our concern was that we not be placed in the position of being trespassers on Japanese properties after the end of the Occupation.
Stating that he believed it might be useful to Minister Okazaki, Ambassador Rusk then proceeded to explain some of the background of our draft of Article XV (Criminal Jurisdiction). Following this exposition, Mr. Nishimura expressed the view that the NATO formula would be ideal for Japan but that there would be technical difficulties in its adaptation, primarily because of the absence of a Japanese military establishment. He stated that the Japanese are grateful for the option given them under Article XV but that he feared that the formula for the interim period would be difficult to defend because of the fact that it accorded treatment inferior to that accorded under the Philippine Bases Agreement.1 Ambassador Rusk pointed out that our formula does, on the other hand, hold out the promise of treatment more favorable than that accorded the Philippines, and that the provisions covering the interim period before the effective date of the NATO agreement are not substantially less favorable than those which have been in effect since 1942 with respect to the status of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom. In this connection he emphasized that, while the U.S. Government is determined that Japan shall not be discriminated against in the matter of jurisdiction, it is also of great importance in the relations between the U.S. and its other allies that there be no discrimination against them and in favor of Japan. He went on to say that the interim period provided for before the going into effect of the NATO formula would, in fact, give the Japanese Government and the U.S. Forces the time which would required on both sides to prepare for the transfer to the Japanese authorities of the much broader jurisdictional responsibilities embodied in the NATO concept. In response to Minister Okazaki’s question as to the probable time of U.S. Senate action on the NATO formula, Ambassador Rusk expressed personally and informally the opinion that such action would probably be taken at some time during the current calendar year.
Minister Okazaki then asked if Ambassador Rusk could give him an exposition of our views concerning Article XXII (Defense Measures), in response to which Ambassador Rusk explained the background of the necessity for laying the ground work for prompt and effective joint action in the event of hostilities or threatened hostilities. Mr. Nishimura stated that his Government agrees in principle with the substance of that article but that they greatly fear the [Page 1126] reaction of the Japanese public to Article XXII as written, particularly from the point of view of its constitutional implications. In response to a question from Ambassador Rusk, Mr. Nishimura added that it is paragraph 2 of that article which gives them the greatest concern.
Turning to the agenda for this afternoon’s formal meeting,2 Ambassador Rusk suggested that we might begin by agreeing on the revised Preamble, bypass Articles I and II for the time being, and pick out certain articles on which there appeared to be substantial agreement for final drafting by technical subcommittees. He further suggested that, if such procedure was agreeable to the Japanese Delegation, a press statement to the foregoing fact be prepared for release following the meeting.
The foregoing conversation was concluded at 12:20 P.M.