751G.5/11–2654
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to your request of 16 November 19542 that the Department of Defense consider its position with respect to Vietnamese force levels in the light of recommendations on this subject made by the U.S. Ambassador (Department of State telegram from Saigon, number 1830, 15 November 1954).
With reference to General Collins’ proposal on the levels of indigenous [Page 2310] forces that should be developed in Free Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended, on the basis of the type missions to be performed to maintain internal security in Indochina, minimum personnel strengths as follows:
- a.
- Viet-Nam: 89,085 which includes 4,400 civilians at an estimated cost of $193.1 million for FY 1956. Cost of U.S. support during the remainder of FY 1955 has not been computed but will probably be approximately $140 million.
- b.
- Cambodia: 28,815 at an estimated cost of $30.9 million for FY 1955 and $69.7 million for FY 1956.
- c.
- Laos: Since direct U.S. military aid to Laos is specifically restricted by the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement, no force levels are recommended for this country. However, Laos is capable of furnishing 12–15,000 personnel for its armed forces.
Fund estimates do not include approximately 154 million dollar maintenance and military support programs for the build-up of Associated States forces.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a program designed for the accomplishment of the proposed missions and for the stabilization of the Diem Government could be accomplished in the following phases:
Phase #1
- a.
- Prompt institution of a phased reduction of current armed forces by a process of selective discharge.
- b.
- The immediate reassignment and reorganization, with limited
training, of selected personnel and units from the present
forces into an internal security force capable of:
- (1)
- Maintaining the security of the legal government in Saigon and other major population centers.
- (2)
- Executing regional security operations in each province.
- c.
- The deployment of selected Vietnamese Army units on territorial pacification missions.
Phase #2
The construction and operation of military center(s) for the reorganization and training of Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders and units.
Phase #3
A concerted effort in support of planned integrated operations by the armed forces to insure the elimination of Viet Minh influence and control throughout Viet-Nam.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that the chaotic internal political situation within Viet-Nam will hamper the development of loyal and effective security forces for the support of the Diem Government and that it is probable that the development of such forces will not result in political and military stability within South VietNam. Unless the Vietnamese themselves show an inclination to make the individual and collective sacrifices required to resist communism [Page 2311] no amount of external pressure and assistance can long delay a complete Communist victory in South Viet-Nam.
In a further expression of their views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that the recommended forces will not provide adequate security for the Associated States against external aggression after the withdrawal of the French forces. With the Viet Minh increasing the size and effectiveness of their forces, and with no forces in being committed to mutual defense under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the above long-range program would provide no more than limited initial resistance to an organized military assault by the Viet Minh.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider whether an increase in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Saigon, above a total of 342, would be in violation of the Geneva Agreement. It is their view that this question properly is one to be considered by the Department of State. However, it is probable that the current MAAG Indochina is capable of furnishing training assistance to develop Army and Navy internal security forces provided:
- a.
- A maximum portion of the MAAG military personnel is devoted to training; and
- b.
- The cooperation and collaboration of the French MAAG is secured.
The Department of Defense concurs in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined above contingent upon:
- a.
- Additional funds in the amount of approximately 325 million dollars being made available from Section 121 funds for the balance of FY 1955; and
- b.
- An expression by General Collins of the validity of considering that Free Viet-Nam and the other Associated States may be saved from Communist domination and that they can establish strong, viable, indigenous governments through the above proposed and subsequent U.S. assistance programs.
Sincerely yours,