611.51/11–2254: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
secret
priority
priority
Washington, November 22, 1954—8:04
p.m.
2070. Re Secretary’s talks with Mendes-France on Indochina,2 there follows summary of general aspects concerning all three missions three Associated States. Supplemental telegrams will follow concerning specific matters each country, particularly Vietnam.
- A.
- General Objectives. Mendes-France reaffirmed French agreement on understandings reached in September talks in Washington. Common instructions are supplement to Minute of Understanding of Sept. 29 (Deptel 2055 to Saigon, rptd Phnom Penh 159, Vientiane 105 and Paris 1868).3 Mendes-France and Secretary each stated respective national policy is to strengthen independence and freedom each Associated State. On critical question of Vietnam, Mendes-France reaffirmed French policy assist in building strong free Vietnam as counterpart to Communist North. He opposed any “north-south mixture”. Secretary stated compromise with Communist could mean loss of area. US objective is if possible to build indigenous power, authority and military strength within the formula of national independence, [Page 2278] which will mean gradual lessening of French role and activity. Secretary frankly put the question as to how much effort and resources US could or should put into Indochina in view of heavy risks there and valid competing claims on our resources in other areas in Asia. He stressed need for political stability to make military and other aid programs effective.
- B.
- US–French Relations. Mendes-France showed particular sensitivity to any actions tending to liquidate French position in Indochina. This theme reappeared constantly during three plenary sessions, with particular reference to US training and advice for indigenous military forces and US technical assistance programs for Cambodians and Vietnamese in US. Mendes-France strongly questioned propriety and necessity of US assuming exclusive role in either case. He recognized US primary responsibility in Asia but emphasized French can make contribution. Secretary replied FE responsibility not exclusively US: cited UK in Malaya, France in IC and US north Asia, Formosa. Mendes-France pointed out demoralizing contrast that would profoundly affect French in Indochina as well as in France of transfer of everything from French to American influence and responsibility while continuing to use French forces to defend Indochina. Secretary stressed that positive results could be achieved in Indochina only by closest cooperation between France and US and by French participation. The US was not disregarding interests of the French people for removal French would create vacuum in Indochina which Communists would rapidly fill. US had no desire itself to supplant the French position in Indochina, but believed French authority and control would be replaced by indigenous forces. Our purpose in Indochina is not to compete with French for influence and popularity but to try to save Free Vietnam. Secretary hoped French held similar view and would not think in terms popularity contest. Mendes-France indicated agreement. Both Secretary and Mendes-France agreed respective personnel should be advised work closely together.
- C.
- Coordination of Aid. Mendes-France was disturbed that no machinery had been set up and that aid was still uncoordinated. He pressed for formal tripartite committees and periodic review at governmental level. Secretary agreed to such review but rejected fixed machinery of formal tripartite, bipartite committees for field coordination. He preferred to leave to informal methods of coordination by respective representatives in the field in cooperation with appropriate official local governments. Secretary stressed flexibility safer course at this time than formalized machinery while situation still unclear. He agreed on need for French and US representatives work closely and informally together to avoid overlapping and any tendency on part of local governments play French and Americans off against each other. [Page 2279] Mendes-France did not insist on agreement on tripartite machinery but stressed importance of advance information and preparation between French and Americans before decisions reached or made public. Mendes-France also suggested bringing UK into coordinating committees. Secretary replied suggestion emphasized all more need for flexibility since addition of UK would lead to request from Australia and others to be included making coordinating setup unwieldy. Instead Secretary suggested US and French keep in touch with UK and others where required in some suitable operating relationship. At Secretary’s suggestion, drafting committee set up to draft common instructions on how US and French representatives should work together which were subsequently reviewed and accepted (Deptel referred to in para. A). In approving these instructions, Secretary made clear he did not interpret anything in them as requiring fixed tripartite committees, and that US not permanently bound by these instructions as new conditions, such as Manila Pact developments, might require changes in principles in common instructions particularly regarding consultation with other signatories which might require new procedures. Mendes-France replied para. 4 of instructions would continue even after Manila Pact in force. Finally, both Secretary and Mendes agreed consult before changes made.
- D.
- Manila Pact. Implementation mentioned in passing in plenary, but we discussed with members French delegation proposals some signatories supported by US set up working group in Washington and hold preliminary meeting Bangkok perhaps in January even before all ratifications final, such meeting not technically to be a council meeting—Secretary did refer Manila Pact formula as deterrent to aggression when discussing security situation with Mendes-France, especially re Vietnam.
Dulles