751G.00/9–754
The Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)
Dear Mr. Anderson: The United States is presently faced with the very serious problem of deciding in what manner best to support the internal security and sustain the self-government and integrity of the free states of Indochina. In deciding upon and carrying out United States policies in that area in an orderly manner it is of great importance that we have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense regarding the military forces the United States would like to see remain in Indochina in order to assure the success of this policy.
In line with the suggestion of the Special Working Group on Indochina, I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause a study to be made for their consideration as rapidly as possible of the overall force which should be retained or developed in free Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the remainder of 1954 and in 1955. In this connection, consideration should be given to the question of what French forces should remain in Indochina to assure the (a) internal security of the area as well as (b) its security against Viet Minh aggression. If possible the study should cover troop strength, organization of forces, infrastructure, training and material. Most important, it should consider the desirable relationship between French and indigenous forces in Indochina during this period in both command and training.
To the extent practicable the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take into account the information that is available regarding the intentions and capabilities of the other governments concerned regarding the future development of military strength in the free states of Indochina.
I believe that the views requested above will enable the United States to conduct more successfully negotiations with the French Government and the Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia regarding the future direction of the United States military and financial [Page 2012] assistance and relationships in Indochina. These views will be particularly necessary in determining what funds the United States should continue to make available from presently available appropriations for a military support program in Indochina, since the force concept appears to be basic to the development and implementation of a sound military support program in that area. It would also be of great assistance if in the study outlined above the Joint Chiefs of Staff also consider the probable approximate cost of whatever military force program it proposes, taking into account the assets which may become available from end-item matériel already delivered to Indochina.
Sincerely,