Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 358

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

secret

Manila, September 6, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• The Secretary
• M. Guy La Chambre, Minister of State,
• M. Jean Chauvel,
• Mr. MacArthur

M. Guy La Chambre called at his request on the Secretary this evening. After a discussion relating to the draft treaty for Southeast Asia, M. La Chambre said he would like to speak briefly to the Secretary about the situation in Indochina.

He opened by saying that at Geneva the French had fought desperately to get a period of two years’ delay in any elections in Vietnam in order to consolidate the situation so that Southern Vietnam would not be lost as a result of the elections. If the elections were to be won, much must be done, and it would be a tragedy if the two-year period negotiated at Geneva were wasted. Two-and-a-half months had elapsed since the Geneva settlement, and little progress had been made in coping with the political and economic problems which must be dealt with if Vietnam were to be saved.

M. La Chambre said that shortly before he left Paris he had conferred with General Ely. General Ely believes that no matter how estimable Prime Minister Diem may be in terms of integrity and purity, he is very ineffective in dealing with the political realities of the situation in Vietnam. His government, thus far, has proved totally ineffective in reconciling the anti-communist elements in retained Vietnam and producing a government which commands wide popular support.

M. La Chambre said the Vietminh is proceeding with great effectiveness in forming communist political groups in South Vietnam to replace the armed communist Vietminh forces which, according to the Geneva settlement provisions, must be disbanded. The Vietminh is forming political cells throughout retained Vietnam and is undertaking a systematic policy of intimidating the population so that they can win the elections in 1956. M. La Chambre said that only the Sects have the capacity for combating the Vietminh campaign of propaganda and intimidation thus neutralizing the Vietminh efforts by “creating a counter-intimidation”. La Chambre expressed the view that Tam, if he were appointed Minister of Interior, could handle this problem better than anyone else.

Reverting to Diem’s inability to organize broad support behind his government, La Chambre said that the real problem is to find a Prime Minister who could enlist the support of the Sects and the majority of other anti-communist elements. He said Diem was unwilling to work with the Sects and that while he was a man of integrity and intellectual purity, this was not enough if he could not mobilize a broad foundation of support. Diem, he said, was from the North and preferably there should be a leader from the South. There were several possibilities: General Xuan and Tran Van Huu were potential candidates, but they didn’t have much character. In La Chambre’s own personal view, Buu Hoi, a cousin of Bao Dai, had created a very excellent impression insofar as he was concerned. Hoi was a scientist, had worked with the Pasteur Institute, and had recently been in Paris. While he was a cousin of Bao Dai, he did not share Bao Dai’s views.

M. La Chambre said that three weeks ago Bao Dai had made overtures to see him. La Chambre had sent back word that he did not believe any useful purpose would be served by a meeting, whereupon Bao Dai had sent his Director of Cabinet to see La Chambre. The Director of Cabinet told La Chambre that Bao Dai was thinking about returning to Vietnam but did not wish to do so until he knew the views of the French Government regarding his possible return. General Ely, who was present at that meeting, said he was returning to Indochina, that he would consult with various elements there, and then send a recommendation to Paris on the question of Bao Dai’s return. A week ago today General Ely had cabled Paris that under no circumstances should Bao Dai be permitted to return. His message had also said that any new Prime Minister that Bao Dai might designate would be contaminated by Bao Dai’s blessing and would be unable to perform any useful service.

M. La Chambre said he thought France and the US should sit down to talk about this situation. He asked the Secretary to suggest a date and place either in Washington, Paris, or elsewhere, where the US and France could meet to discuss this situation.

The Secretary replied that it was very difficult in Manila, in Paris, or in Washington to decide on what to do about Vietnam on the basis of cables which are received. He said he shared the view that retained Vietnam was in great danger and that he also believed the Diem Government as presently constituted did not have a sufficiently broad basis to mobilize the maximum possible popular support. However, the consensus of US representatives in Vietnam and the Department of State was that the best solution was to keep Diem and have the latter bring into his Government people who would broaden its structure. He said the US recognizes that the Sects play an important role and that to govern Vietnam effectively and deal with its problems without their support was probably not possible. He said that while we had no particular fondness for Diem, he nonetheless appeared to be a man of integrity and honesty, and we did not know of anyone who might be any better. The Secretary said that when he left Washington the very strong belief there was that all effort should be made to try to get Diem to enlarge the base of his Government by bringing in the Sects, and that according to the cables which he had received since he had arrived in Manila, this was still our strong view. We did not believe any useful purpose would be served in getting rid of Diem since no better substitute had been advanced. He mentioned that Senator Mansfield had recently been in Indochina and had expressed the view that Diem might possibly be the last chance of a Prime Minister who could be effective.

M. La Chambre hastened to assure the Secretary that he also would rather have Diem enlarge his Government than to have him eliminated. However, if the enlargement consisted of simply adding one or two people as a gesture, it was not good enough. What was required was a fundamental reorganization of the Diem Government in order to give it really solid support of the Sects and other elements. M. La Chambre said that two-and-a-half months had been wasted since the Geneva settlement, and it was intolerable that the situation in Vietnam continued to drift, with the elections drawing ever closer. The present situation was untenable simply because Diem would not adequately enlarge his Government and at the same time insisted on remaining in power. If he were incapable as Prime Minister of enlarging his Government, he should step down and let another try. In such event, he should most certainly be given a post in any new government, and La Chambre thought Diem would be well-fixed in such circumstances to have the Ministry of Interior, for example. He said the point he was trying to make was that Diem, as Prime Minister, was doing nothing to create a Government which would really have broad support, and as a consequence the situation was deteriorating from day to day.

M. La Chambre said that France attached the greatest importance to coordinating economic affairs in Indochina with the program which the US might wish to undertake. Without such coordination, satisfactory results would not be achieved and the end result might be that the economic resources which were put into retained Vietnam might end up in the hands of the Vietminh as a result of the elections. Proper coordination, he felt, would ensure that such economic assistance as France and the US put forward would result in constructive results in terms of the 1956 elections. M. La Chambre said the French Government was trying to undertake a program where all the refugees from Northern Vietnam who arrived in the South would be given two or three hectares of land and a black cow. The effective resettlement of the refugees from the North was of vital importance. If these refugees received two or three hectares of land and sufficient assistance to start life anew, it would be the best proof that life on this side of the iron curtain was infinitely preferable to slavery behind it.

The Secretary said M. La Chambre had raised a number of difficult questions. He would reflect on them and hoped M. La Chambre in turn would reflect on the views which he, the Secretary, had set forth. The Secretary concluded by saying that if he had any thoughts on this matter he would doubtless have opportunity to discuss them further with M. La Chambre before the conclusion of the Manila Conference.

1. This conversation occurred at the U.S. Embassy Residence from 6 to 7 p.m. It was reported to Washington in telegram Secto 18 from Manila, Sept. 8. (751G.00/9–854) Secretary Dulles and La Chambre headed the delegations of their respective nations at the Manila Conference on the defense of Southeast Asia, which convened on Sept. 6. Regarding the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed on Sept. 8, see editorial note, p. 2012.