751G.00/8–3154: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
842. Repeated information Paris 285, Manila 111, Hanoi unnumbered. Diem sent for me this morning and I had a two hour talk with him. He asked me to see General Bay Vien of Binh Xuyen, Cao Dais, and possibly Hoa Haos to tell them very explicitly that if they attempted to overthrow his regime by force US would withdraw its aid. I told him that in my talks with Hinh and Tran Van An (mytels 796 and 807)1 I had gone about as far as I could in warning them of reaction of US to coup d’état and that a month ago I had impressed on General Phuong of Cao Dais necessity of rallying behind Diem Government. I felt certain that they had clearly taken in my warning and were disposed to come to terms with government. I was afraid that concessions he had hitherto offered were insufficient. Notably minority membership in an Assembly which had yet to be created was obviously insufficient attraction. I said further that while I could understand his using his brothers and Ministers to engage in initial negotiations with sects he would have very promptly to deal direct with them himself. On that occasion he must be prepared to offer concrete propositions. Furthermore, he could not hope merely to threaten sects into obedience with loss of American aid but he would have to win them over by prospects of advantage, by appeals to their patriotism which he had said they possessed in spite of their appetites, and by establishing friendly personal relations with their leaders. I had always been informed by Vietnamese friends that Vietnamese were sensitive to personal appeal and sympathy.
Comment: This may sound a bit like lecturing but it is a lecture which needs to be repeated again and again. Substantial part of Diem’s difficulties resides in his suspicion and distrust of people not possessed of same ideals and motivation as himself and in his lack of personal warmth.
Diem then remarked that “high personality of French Commissariat General” had come to see him day before and told him he must take Tam into his Cabinet; that if he refused to do so both America and France would approve Tam being made Prime Minister.
[Page 2000]I told him what he should have done in that circumstance was to call me on phone and ask me over to confirm or disprove any such statement. I told him I was certain that Ely had not authorized any member of his staff to make such statement but observed that great many Frenchmen sincerely thought that Tam, as good policeman, would add to effectiveness of Diem’s Government if given Ministry of Interior. Diem replied that he would certainly rather resign than accept Tam; that no government could hope to rally support of free Vietnam with Tam on team. He could stand as matter of political necessity leaving General Bay Vien and Binh Xuyen to continue to run police for time, but he could not stand Tam. Binh Xuyen did have public order well in hand in Saigon–Cholon at present time and he felt certain that after a time they would agree to give up their gambling concession and step aside from their police control in Saigon. Bay Vien, while crafty and ambitious, had certain qualities and also a sense of reality. After all, Binh Xuyen were only two thousand strong and if Vietnamese National Army could be brought into shape and under control of government, former could not hope to maintain their control of Saigon.
Diem told me of his talks with Hinh. Hinh had promised to see his brother with a concrete program and list of candidates for a new government under Diem. But when Hinh showed up he had no program and no candidates to offer. Diem observed that Hinh was not strong man, merely an impulsive one, and did not enjoy a true prestige in his own army.
Comment: I will not quarrel with this description of Hinh. We have noted other occasions where he has not followed through.