Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

251G.51G22/8–2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, August 23, 1954—4 p.m.

731. Repeated information Saigon 76, Hanoi 9, Manila 4, Tokyo 4. We called on LaChambre in accordance Department’s instructions (Department’s 625).¹ He was prepared make general review Indochina and conversation therefore lasted two hours. We noted our remarks intended General Ely as well (Department’s 624)² who in Paris although not present. Ely now en route Saigon.

LaChambre gratified learn we had informed Vietnamese Government we expected a comparable performance from them in offering aid transporting evacuees from north. He reviewed difficulties French had encountered in organizing plan evacuation and resettlement refugees in south. French had made pointed effort avoid interfering in beginning but were eventually obliged do so in face of shocking ineffectiveness of Diem Government. We stated that in offering our aid to French as well as Vietnamese we of course expected them to contribute to it everything possible to facilitate program, pointing out that French army was only group able to carry out plan in short time available.

LaChambre stressed intention Government and French authorities Vietnam do everything within their power to carry out evacuation and resettlement program. French wished assist Vietnamese authorities to full extent Vietnamese wished but found it difficult to be placed in position of being accused of “interfering with sovereign government” in offering their aid. They had tried to follow policy of not moving until specifically requested because of this but had eventually been obliged do so in order get anything moving. LaChambre spoke glowingly of cooperation of American authorities both in Saigon and neighboring Far East areas. Particularly grateful to Ambassador Heath, Consul Cameron and General O’Daniel who had been tireless in their efforts get things done.

He then gave us details evacuation operation, résumé of which:

A. Air evacuation.

3,000 people being moved per day by air, approximately half civilians and half military. First priority granted dependents both French and Vietnamese soldiers, second priority to civilians, both French and Vietnamese.

B. Sea transport.

Space available for 100,000 persons per month in United States and 20,000 per month in French bottoms. All troops (French and Vietnamese) consisting of approximately 110,000 men, 70,000 officers moved this way. In addition undetermined number of civilians will have to be moved by sea. Present estimate approximately 50,000 though this figure may be greatly increased before evacuation completed. Possibility, for instance, Chinese colony Nam Dinh may decide they wish to be evacuated. Number requesting evacuation varies daily with developments.

We inquired regarding differentiation between French and Vietnamese and were informed that there was none. French colony in Hanoi of approximately 6,000 more than half of whom Eurasians, reluctant to leave and majority would probably remain. As result LaChambre assurances we refrained from pressing point of whether evacuation priority had been given to French troops and families. LaChambre made it clear no intention leave any Vietnamese behind who wished be evacuated.

LaChambre had been given copy Secretary’s message to Mendes-France (Department’s 610)³ which he had handed to Foreign Office and which had been sent to Mendes in Brussels (Embassy’s 706 and 710).⁴ He was distressed at its contents along general lines reported Embassy’s 715.⁵ Although he did not refer specifically to references independence he reiterated previous statements that French Government intended grant full sovereignty to states. Subject which disturbed him most was reference to intention grant aid directly to Vietnam and our failure entirely to mention aid to French Expeditionary Corps. He stated that it was firm intention Mendes’ Government maintain Expeditionary Corps in south under conviction that its presence there necessary to assure stability which Vietnam must have if it is to be preserved as an independent state outside Bamboo Curtain. In order do so they hope receive United States aid as in past. Nothing would please the French public and parliamentary opinion more, LaChambre stated, than to return French forces to France in toto but that would be quickest method assure success Communist objectives and present government had no intention doing so. LaChambre then pointed out with moderation but great emphasis risks of giving military aid to the Vietnamese along arguments previously reported.

We said that we would await French reaction to President’s proposed statement with interest. LaChambre said that he had been requested by Foreign Office to submit his comments and that they would be incorporated in formal reply from Foreign Office to be expected soon after Prime Minister’s return from Brussels.

Principal additional subject covered which has not been previously reported was possible return of Bao Dai to Vietnam. Although LaChambre personally is most ill-disposed towards Bao Dai he is becoming more and more convinced that in spite of grave weaknesses Bao Dai may have to be used again. LaChambre has discussed matter with General Catroux, Albert Sarraut and General Ely so far and intends continue studying question. To date all agreed that possibility of Bao Dai’s return could not be entirely discarded as yet. Although LaChambre did not state that he had discussed subject with Dac Khe his reasoning was very close to that outlined in Embassy’s 721.⁶ He thought that if Bao Dai were to return it would have to be with understanding that he take active role in government. He mentioned possibility Bao Dai heading government himself with Tam as Minister Interior, Diem as Secretary of State and General Xuan as Minister Defense. He was afraid that without Bao Dai’s consolidating influence much time might be lost in futile jockeying for power between politicians and sects.

Sainteny leaving for Saigon tomorrow. He had been given precise instructions regarding functions until he assumed duties in Hanoi after the evacuation was finished in October. He was to avoid appearing to be an adjunct of General Ely’s office and was to deal only with Control Commission set up by Geneva. French wanted him on the spot before the turnover to the Viet Minh was completed so as to avoid any question of his being accredited to Viet Minh and possible Viet Minh request reciprocate.

We continue to be impressed by LaChambre’s energy, reasoning and judgment. He is taking his responsibilities very seriously, thinks hard and comes up with studied unemotional conclusions. He still plans to go to Vietnam as soon as Parliament recesses.

Dillon

1. Dated Aug. 19, p. 1962.
2. Sent to Saigon as telegram 652, Aug. 19, p. 1961.
3. Dated Aug. 18, p. 1957.
4. Regarding telegrams 706 and 710, see footnote 3, ibid.
5. Dated Aug. 20, p. 1964.
6. Telegram 721 from Paris, Aug. 20, summarizing a conversation between an Embassy officer and Nguyen Dac Khe, a former minister in the Buu Loc government, is not printed. (751G.00/8–2054)