751G.00/8–2054: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
priority
715. Repeated information Saigon 74, Hanoi 80, London unnumbered, Phnom Penh 1, Vientiane 2. From Parks [?]. In Mendes-France’s absence advance copy Secretary’s message to Prime Minister delivered yesterday by Joyce to Parodi, acting head Foreign Office.1
Parodi read message very carefully and without going into specific detail on points contained stated that it would require considerable thought before reply could be drafted. He was obviously distressed at repeated references to “independence” and statements in numbered paragraph 2 that “all of this aid should be given directly rather than through the French Government as has been done previously” and “we plan in future to deal directly with the Governments of the Associated States in questions concerning economic or military aid to these states”.
Regarding independence we of course pointed out that the Government had made several public and private statements recently of its intention to carry through granting of full independence, publicly most recently by Mendes himself during last Indochina debate in Assembly and privately to us on two recent occasions by LaChambre. We also pointed out that as stated our aid will be conditioned by extent to which recipient governments give evidence of their stability and capacity to carry out needed reforms.
These arguments seemed to have little effect in placating Parodi’s concern. We are not surprised for it has been evident for some time that French consider we have almost psychotic attachment to “independence” without giving sufficient thought and attention to the practical problems and risks involved. Although we do not question the sincerity of Mendes and the present government with regard to its policy of granting full sovereignty to the states as promised, this must not in any sense be interpreted as including a relaxation of their resolute attachment to the French Union concept. It should be clearly understood that the French, rightly or wrongly, logically or illogically, [Page 1965] believe it entirely compatible that they should grant full sovereignty to the Associated States while at the same time retaining the French Union relationship. This has been made clear on many recent occasions, notably in the Assembly during the post Geneva debate2 when Mendes attested to the intention of his government to grant full independence to the states. The acceptance of French parliamentarian and public opinion to the principle of independence remains, as heretofore, subject to the proviso that the French Union relationship be maintained. The Mendes-France or any prospective successor government would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to gain public support and parliamentary approval for any progressive future policy concerning Vietnam which did not include as a sine qua non membership of the states within the French Union.
To the average Frenchman, including parliamentarians, the practical results of maintaining the French Union relationship between France and the Associated States are principally:
- (1)
- An example position other overseas territories, the retention of which within the French Union framework of nations is vital to the existence of France as a world power of any consequence.
- (2)
- France acquires certain economic and commercial advantages which are mutually profitable.
- (3)
- French culture can be maintained and advanced in remote quarters of the world where it has already taken root. (The importance of this is often underestimated abroad, particularly in the United States. One of the first subjects which occupied French official and public opinion following the Geneva settlement was as much what would happen to the French schools, museums, churches, seminaries, etc. in Tonkin as what would happen to the cement works and coal mines.)
The same average Frenchman is not interested in any union relationship which might be termed a one way street. He is utterly convinced that the Vietnamese has advanced his lot under French tutelage more than would otherwise have been the case and will continue to do so under a form of union association which will also benefit the other member of the partnership—France. But he is no longer interested in having him advance it at French expense, as has been the case in recent years.
As previously reported, the French regard the question of whether aid is to be furnished to Vietnam directly or indirectly through them as the most important issue now facing them in their relations with the United States concerning Indochina. Their confidence in the ability of the Vietnamese to govern themselves, which had already been severely shaken in the past, has now been subjected to even greater strain as result of what they regard as the shocking negligence and inefficiency of the present Vietnamese Government. They sincerely [Page 1966] believe that if United States aid were turned over directly to the Vietnamese it would at best provide new fuel for graft and corruption or at worst serve as bargaining ammunition in the hands of the present or successor governments for use in trading, in traditional oriental fashion, with the Viet Minh, the sects, etc. One thing of which they are absolutely certain is that under Vietnamese control the aid will not be used efficiently.
We cannot emphasize too strongly the difference between our concept of dealing with the Indochina problem as expressed in the Secretary’s message and that held by the French. The latter are convinced that if the Vietnamese are given, without restriction, an erector set with all the parts for a ten story building they will end up with a one story cabin and the remaining parts will either be sold or end up in the pockets of the builders. On the other hand if the parts are handed out with care and supervision, a well-built five story building will emerge after many trials and tribulations. Furthermore, the French believe that their past sacrifices on behalf of Vietnam and their obligation as a member of French Union dictate that they should be the construction supervisor.
Upon Mendes’ return to Paris, the Ambassador will, in his next interview, discuss the Secretary’s message further with him. In the meanwhile Parodi reported that he is forwarding it without delay to Mendes in Brussels (this has now been done) and hopes to be able to make a reply soon after the Prime Minister’s return to Paris. Later the Foreign Office phoned to ask again that Presidential statement be deferred until the Secretary’s message could be studied and a reply could be carefully drafted.
- For the Secretary’s message to Prime Minister Mendès-France, see telegram 610 to Paris, Aug. 18, p. 1957.↩
- Regarding the National Assembly debate of July 22–23, see footnote 2, p. 1871.↩