125.456/8–254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Executive Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Capella)

secret

Subject:

  • Closing of the American Consulate at Hanoi.1

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Allen DullesCIA
  • Mr. SaltzmanO2
  • Mr. WisnerCIA
  • Mr. DrumrightFE
  • Mr. DayPSA
  • Mr. BlanckePSA
  • Mr. CapellaFE/Ex

In response to a question by the Secretary as to the position of the French and British regarding continued representation in Hanoi, Mr. Drumright replied that although we have working level views from both London and Saigon we do not yet know the intentions of the French and the British. The Secretary requested that we find out, with the thought that we may wish to act in concert with them. …

Mr. Allen Dulles took the position that we should not retreat and that if we had to get out of North Vietnam we should be forced out. Mr. Wisner thought that by remaining in Hanoi we might have an [Page 1900] opportunity to drive a wedge between Communist China and the Vietminh whereas if we got out no such opportunity would be afforded. It was also thought that the Vietminh might behave differently than the Communists behaved in China towards our officials because of their desire to trade with the United States.

Mr. Drumright pointed out that the matter of trade had already been settled and that it was that we would not trade with Communists in China. He also referred to the treatment that we had received from the Communists in China. He also pointed out, and the Secretary agreed, that serious consideration would have to be given to the reaction on the part of the U.S. public to any abuse which might be leveled at our officials in Hanoi and that we should be prepared for criticism when it was evident that there was nothing that the United States could do to prevent such abuse. The Vietminh might, however, behave properly as long as the international armistice group was in Hanoi. Mr. Day pointed out that once the Vietminh moved in our communications would have to be in clear, and . … Mr. Drumright suggested that we may wish to determine Congressional opinion regarding this problem. The Secretary stated that we should first reach a decision in the Department and then inquire as to whether or not certain Congresmen have opinions regarding it. He thought that it would be a good idea to consult Congressman Judd on this problem. It was generally agreed that we would want to keep the question of closing the Consulate under review during the 80-day period and take final action on the basis of developments.

A proposed cable to Hanoi instructing the Consul to take no steps to close the Consulate was shown to the Secretary. He agreed that it should be sent. …

  1. During a telephone conversation of July 20, Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, told the Secretary of State that it was important that the Hanoi Consulate remain open. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)
  2. Charles E. Saltzman, Under Secretary of State for Administration.