751G.00/1–3154: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1360. Repeated information Paris 415, Hanoi unnumbered. DeJean asked me to see him yesterday to bring me up to date on military situation. At Dien Bien Phu French had intelligence, not yet entirely confirmed, that one Viet Minh division had been withdrawn from besieging forces and was on its way south toward Luang Prabang. It seemed evident that Giap had decided against attacking Dien Bien Phu. It was great disappointment to French Command who had counted on inflicting really heavy losses there on Viet Minh. Instead Giap apparently planned to make spectacular advance against Luang Prabang. It was politically necessary for French to defend Luang Prabang, De Jean said, although it meant further dispersal of French forces and foregoing attacks on now largely undefended provinces of Thanh Hoa and Vinh, which were crucially important to Viet Minh. I remarked I could understand political importance but it seemed military nonsense to disperse forces for defense of Luang Prabang when more damage could be done to Viet Minh elsewhere, but DeJean replied that Navarre was in full agreement as to political necessity of defending royal and religious capital of Laos. Giap intended apparently to leave two divisions to “mask” Dien Bien Phu. DeJean said French Command was convinced that was not enough to hold down garrison, which could break out and inflict damage on enemy.
Meanwhile, in Central Laos Viet Minh had seven battalions north of Savannakhet and three battalions apparently moving south with missions to cut river and highway line of communications to Vientiane. French had forces to handle that threat. Apparently as a countermove to current Francos-Vietnamese operations in coastal area of Central Vietnam, Viet Minh had moved about a regiment and half against Kontum, but French Command in high plateau had moved groupes mobiles to Kontum and were confident they would hold there.
Cogny, he said, was bemoaning lack of two additional divisions which would enable him to invade Thanh Hoa and Vinh, which would force Viet Minh to call off any attack on Luang Prabang and recall divisions surrounding Dien Bien Phu. Two divisions could not be made available within Indochina and there was no chance of getting them from France. With movement of three Viet Minh divisions to Dien Bien Phu the delta was in no danger. Cogny had enough force to block any sizeable Viet Minh operations there.
Navarre, DeJean said, was still entirely confident that he could not only meet all Viet Minh movements in Laos and high plateau but that his time-table for eventual victory would not be altered. With present [Page 1009] near-equilibrium of forces it was never contemplated that decisive blows could begin to be made against Viet Minh until next fall when build-up of new Vietnamese battalions would provide high command with necessary superiority in manpower.
DeJean inquired if we had any news on French request for B–26’s, additional matériel, military mechanics and civilian pilots. It was obvious, he said, that French could meet these dispersed operations of Viet Minh only through their air power, both bombers and transport planes. Whatever delay there might be in furnishing an extra squadron of B–26’s, he hoped there would be no delay in furnishing 10 B–26’s which had been requested with special urgency.
He said he could not believe that if French had had massive air force of say 500 planes they could not have broken up Viet Minh movement to Dien Bien Phu and other places. He quite realized that it was impossible to furnish such a number of planes and ground crews or for French to find pilots for them.