790.5/7–2654
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- Southeast Asia Security Organization
Participants:
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- Mr. R.H. Scott, British Minister
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs
During the call on the Secretary by Ambassador Makins, the following was discussed:
Southeast Asia Defense Organization. Ambassador Makins, referring to Eden’s statement in Commons in which he assumed neither Cambodia, Laos, nor South Vietnam would be a party to a defense [Page 674] pact although their territory presumably would be covered,1 expressed the hope of his Government that we would take the same position.
The Secretary replied that our lawyers were still studying the matter; offhand, it seemed that Cambodia had the legal right to enter a defense arrangement, South Vietnam did not, and Laos’ right was fuzzy, its position being somewhere in between. We would like to take cognizance in some way of the courageous stand of the Cambodians at Geneva; they had earned the status by the spunk they showed in holding out for full freedom of action.
The Secretary remarked that recent conversations with prospective signatories had covered fully the military problems, but had not given the same attention to economic problems. He felt that economic assistance to Southeast Asia might prove more important than military assistance. We do not expect early overt military aggression, though we must guard against it as the police guard against lawlessness even in an orderly community. Military measures were necessary to provide the atmosphere of security indispensable to economic progress. There would undoubtedly be strenuous competition between the free and communist portions of Vietnam to see which could show greater economic advancement. It would be important to assist the free portion as well as other countries in the area. He observed that a multilateral economic mutual assistance agreement would be very important, regardless of whether it was a part of the military pact or separate and distinct. It would be highly desirable to bring Japan into such an economic pact at some stage; it was important to give Japan better access to markets and raw materials in Indonesia, Pakistan, and India.
Ambassador Makins, agreeing, also stressed the importance of the political or administrative phase. Apart from the military and economic factors, the countries could not cope with domestic administration or curb subversion and infiltration without an effective civil service, which we could aid them to establish.
The Under Secretary was inclined to believe that Cambodia should be kept out of the military side of the proposed pact for the present; he had informed some colleagues at Geneva that although not committing his Government, he would use his personal influence in that direction. Cambodia and the other countries concerned could come in immediately on the nonmilitary phase. Pakistan was prepared to participate fully if invited; however, he was inclined to agree with Eden that there would be a better chance of bringing in more of the Colombo powers at a later stage if neither Pakistan or [Page 675] Cambodia was brought in now. It might be possible to bring them in a year hence.
The Secretary thought this estimate somewhat optimistic; it would be difficult to bring in Pakistan without India.
The Under Secretary thought India’s course would depend largely on whether the influence of men like Pillai2 or those like Krishna Menon proved dominant.
The Ambassador observed that except for East Bengal, the orientation of Pakistan was more toward the Middle East than Southeast Asia.
The Ambassador and the Under Secretary agreed the situation in East Bengal was precarious. It was mentioned that Australian Foreign Minister Casey, former Governor of Bengal, had expressed deep anxiety.
The Under Secretary remarked that it was clear the signatories of a military pact would have to react if the line established at Geneva were violated by the Communists. Possibly the line would not be defended locally, but the pact would immediately become operative and action of some sort would be taken. The Ambassador agreed that violation of the line would bring the military provisions of a pact into force.
The Secretary remarked that the Western coloration of the proposed pact was unfortunate. As it now stood the principal members would be the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand—all Western powers. It was true that Thailand and the Philippines presumably would adhere but their influence was limited and the adherence of additional Asian countries would be desirable.