Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/5–254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference (McBride)¹

[Extracts]

²

secret

Geneva, May 2, 1954.

Participants:

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Vice Admiral Davis
  • Asst. Secretary Merchant
  • Asst. Secretary Robertson
  • Mr. McBride
• Australia
  • The Hon. R.G. Casey, Foreign Minister
  • Mr. A.S. Watt, Commissioner in Malaya
  • Mr. T.K. Critchley
  • Mr. J.R. Rowland
• New Zealand
  • The Hon. T.C. Webb, Foreign Minister
  • Mr. A.D. Mcintosh
  • Mr. F.H. Corner

The Secretary opened the meeting stating that he had asked his Australian and New Zealand colleagues to meet with him under the terms of reference of the ANZUS Pact which provide for such consultation when any part of the area is threatened. The Secretary said he felt the situation in Southeast Asia was such that it required consultation as called for in the ANZUS Pact. Furthermore, since all three Ministers were present in Geneva, he thought it would be useful to exchange views again, especially since the present situation requires a broad unified front. He said he had discussed the situation with the Philippines under the terms of our pact with them and also with the French and the Associated States, and with the United Kingdom because of her interest in Malaya. He said that he had also talked with the Thais, and because of their special concern had held military conversations with them in Washington.³ Finally, he had talked on the general subject of the Southeast Asian situation with the Ambassadors of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Japan, Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea. Conversations with the latter group of Ambassadors in Washington had been merely for the purpose of keeping them informed.

The Secretary continued saying that the present situation was due in large part to the lack of any strong French Government, and the French failure to put the situation on a sound basis politically in Indochina earlier. He noted that for the Western powers to appear to be engaged in Southeast Asia in helping France preserve a colonial regime would certainly not win us support from the Asian states. The Secretary said he was, however, fully aware of the problem in France, where public opinion insisted that the French effort in Indochina be in support of the French Union, and pointed out it was somewhat difficult to reconcile full independence with the French Union concept. He added the French had made some progress along the lines of the British Commonwealth although their concept was not quite so liberal. He said that the Governments of the Associated States were feeble, and that Bao Dai and the King of Cambodia had hardly demonstrated qualities that would make people enthusiastic about dying for them.

The Secretary continued that some progress on achieving a united front in Southeast Asia had been made, but the situation remained unsatisfactory. He stressed that the peoples of the area were uncertain as to what issues were involved, and that it was difficult to obtain their support until the issues had been made clearer.

The Secretary continued saying the choice facing the Communists was merely whether to grab Indochina all in one bite, or in little pieces and digest it as they went along. The only reason they might not take it all now is for fear of scaring the other side too much. At the present time there was not even the appearance of any alternative to eventual Communist domination of all of Indochina.

Therefore the Secretary declared he was trying to bring together a group of anti-Communist nations with interests in the area, as the knowledge such a group was consulting might cause the Communists to moderate their demands. If no action is taken until after Geneva and a disaster occurs, it will be too late. Therefore the Secretary said he would like to see military talks going on in Washington, where we have considerable information on the situation, as soon as possible.

The Secretary went on to say Eden had agreed to these talks two weeks ago when the Secretary was in London but he was not quite clear whether this agreement still stood. However, he thought the British might come along if no intervention were involved. He said he agreed, of course, war with Communist China would be a dreadful thing, and assured the others that the United States had no intention of getting into any provocative posture with Communist China. If the Peking Government openly intervenes, then another situation would be created and we must, of course, be ready to fight at some point to preserve our fundamental values. However, the Secretary stressed that we did not intend to give the Communist Chinese any justification to attack Indochina openly.

If we take no action whatever while the Geneva Conference is in progress the French, who have no will to fight, and the Associated States who have no capacity to fight, will not continue resisting and will enter into a lonely and hopeless negotiation. The Secretary agreed that the French situation was deplorable and that there was virtually no Government at the present time. For this reason above all it was urgent to have discussions among ourselves now so that we could at least make up our own minds. For example, he said, if agreement was reached on a line in Vietnam, what would we do to hold that line? At least we should examine that question among ourselves.

Mr. Critchley of the Australian Delegation noted that the work which had been done to date by the Five Power Staff Agency was based on the assumption of an open aggression by the Chinese Communists, and accordingly its conclusions would not be useful in the present context. Therefore he said a new estimate was needed by the five powers as to what was likely to happen and what countermeasures we would take.

The Under Secretary said there was even disagreement between the appreciations of our own and the British joint chiefs, so it was imperative to have broader talks and evolve a common policy. He said we must decide where we would hold the line, and must prevent erosion of our position. He repeated that if for example Communist troops ever reached the Malayan frontier it would then be too late to defend that area.

The Under Secretary stressed the importance of also giving full weight to political considerations. Mr. Webb indicated his agreement that political considerations, especially colonialism as an issue, were most important. The Under Secretary agreed noting we must have a full answer on this problem when we went to Congress to ask for additional aid for Indochina.

The Secretary concluded that the Communists had invented a type of warfare for which we had no ready antidote. They exploited any injustice in the world, and fed military power into minor dissident movements until they had become an explosive force. The problem was, that when you opposed these movements, unless you were very careful, you appeared to be supporting injustice.

Mr. Casey noted Mr. Eden’s difficulties in coming along very far while the Geneva Conference was in progress, and indicated his view that perhaps working within the formula of the Five Power Staff Agency would be best from the British viewpoint. He said Australia would be glad to take part in talks on a multilateral basis, but, of course, could make no commitments until some weeks after the elections on May 29. He said Australia very much hoped that the UK would participate.

Mr. Webb asserted the New Zealand position was much the same as the Australian and agreed with the United States conclusion that we must develop a position to which we would stick. Accordingly he was willing to participate in talks on the same basis as Australia, with the general aim of stopping Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Mr. Casey added again that we should make every effort to get the Asian states on our side.

In closing the meeting the Secretary stated he thought Mr. Casey’s talks in Karachi would be useful, and noted he had already talked with the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington on this subject.⁴ The Secretary made the point that East Pakistan was nearer to the danger than even India, and accordingly Pakistan might recognize the danger. The Secretary stated that since Australia and New Zealand agreed to the general idea of talks, we should explore the question with the other members of the five (UK and France) and see if they are willing also to join in talks. He asked the Australian and New Zealand delegates if they had any objections to Thailand participating in view of her obvious concern, and no objection was made.

The Secretary concluded the meeting reading the attached communiqué to which the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers agreed.⁵

1. Under Secretary Smith left Washington the afternoon of Apr. 30, arriving in Geneva the morning of May 1. Vice Admiral Davis was in Geneva as an adviser to the U.S. Delegation.

   Of the Australian participants, Critchley was Head of the Pacific and Americas Branch, Department of External Affairs, and Rowland was a member of the same department assigned to Vietnam.

   Of the New Zealand participants, McIntosh was Permanent Head of the Prime Minister’s Department and (permanent) Secretary in the Department of External Affairs, and Corner was Counselor of the New Zealand representation in the United Kingdom.

2. Printed in full in vol. xvi, p. 654.
3. Perhaps a reference to Dulles’ conversation with the Thai Ambassador; see p. 402. In addition, in accordance with instructions from Dulles, officials of the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had held a preliminary defense consultation on Apr. 30 with members of the Thai Embassy, including Brig. Gen. Camron Sudasna, Military Attaché. (Memorandum of conversation by Landon; 790.5/4–3054)
4. See footnote 2 to Williams’ memorandum of conversation, Apr. 9, p. 411.
5. The communiqué reads: “The Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, and the Secretary of State of the United States met in Geneva on May 2, as the Council of ANZUS to discuss the situation in South East Asia in accordance with Article Three of the Treaty.”