The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 180th Council meeting on January 14,
1954 adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 177, subject to the deletion of the last sentence of
paragraph 1–a thereof and to the deletion of paragraph 46 (NSC Action No. 1011–a).
In connection with this action the Council also agreed that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in collaboration with other appropriate departments
and agencies, should develop plans, as suggested by the Secretary of State,
for certain contingencies in Indochina.
The Council at its meeting on January 8, 1954, in connection with its
preliminary consideration of NSC 177 also
(NSC Action No. 1005–c and d):
The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in
NSC 177, as amended and adopted by the
Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5405;
directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating
Board as the coordinating agency. A financial appendix is enclosed for
Council information.
[Enclosure]
[Here follows a table of contents.]
Statement of Policy by the National
Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action
With Respect to Southeast Asia*
i. general considerations
1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would
seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the
longer term, United States security interests.
- a.
- In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-Communist
worlds clearly confront one another on the field of battle. The loss
of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast
Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious
repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in Europe and
elsewhere.
- b.
- Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that
effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent
the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an
alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast
Asia and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia
falls under communism, an alignment with communism of India, and in
the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable
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exceptions of at least
Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread
alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of
Europe.
- c.
- Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would
threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and
would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in
the Far East.
- d.
- The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic
consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would
add significant resources to the Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia,
especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of
natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other
strategically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma,
Indochina and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon
and Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and
India, all important areas of free Asia. Furthermore, this area has
an important potential as a market for the industrialized countries
of the free world.
- e.
- The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia,
could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to
make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual
accommodation to communism.
2. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is
inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China.
The use of U.S. forces to oppose such an attack would require diversion
of military strength from other areas, thus reducing our military
capability in those areas, as well as over-all, with the recognized
military risks involved therein, or an increase in our military forces
in being, or both. Toward deterring such an attack, the U.S. Government
has engaged in consultations with France and the United Kingdom on the
desirability of issuing to Communist China a joint warning as to the
consequences to Communist China of aggression in Southeast Asia.
Although these consultations have not achieved a full measure of
agreement a warning to Communist China has in fact been issued,
particularly as to Indochina, in a number of public statements. (See
Annex A for texts.) The U.S. has also participated with France, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in military talks on measures
which might be taken in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression
against Indochina.
3. However, overt Chinese Communist attack on any part of Southeast Asia
is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination
through armed rebellion or subversion. By far the most urgent threat to
Southeast Asia arises from the strong possibility that even without
overt Chinese Communist intervention the situation in Indochina may
deteriorate anew as a result of weakening of the resolve of France and
the Associated States of Indochina to continue to oppose the Viet Minh
rebellion, the military
[Page 369]
strength of which is increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese
Communist and Soviet regimes. Barring overt Chinese Communist
intervention or further serious deterioration in Indochina, the outlook
in Burma, Thailand, and Malaya offers opportunities for some improvement
in internal stability and in the control of indigenous communist
forces.
4. The successful defense of Tonkin is the keystone of the defense of
mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya. In addition to the
profound political and psychological factors involved, the retention of
Tonkin in friendly hands cuts off the most feasible routes for any
massive southward advance towards central and southern Indochina and
Thailand. The execution of U.S. courses of action with respect to
individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the route of
communist advance into Southeast Asia.
5. Since 1951 the United States has greatly increased all forms of
assistance to the French in Indochina, particularly military aid, and
has consulted continuously with France with a view to assuring effective
use of this aid. Partly as a result of these efforts, French resumption
of the initiative under the “Laniel-Navarre Plan” has checked at least
temporarily deterioration of the French will to continue the struggle.
Concurrently the French have moved toward perfecting the independence of
the Associated States within the French Union. In September 1953 the
United States decided to extend an additional $385 million in aid, in
return for a number of strong French assurances, including a commitment
that the French would vigorously carry forward the “Laniel-Navarre
Plan,” with the object of eliminating regular enemy forces in Indochina,
and on the understanding that if the “Laniel-Navarre Plan” were not
executed, the United States would retain the right to terminate this
additional assistance. (See NSC Action
No. 897, Annex B.)8
6. The French objective in these efforts is to terminate the war as soon
as possible so as to reduce the drain of the Indochina war on France and
permit the maintenance of a position for France in the Far East. By a
combination of military victories and political concessions to the
Associated States, France hopes to strengthen these States to the point
where they will be able to maintain themselves against Communist
pressures with greatly reduced French aid. In the absence of a change in
basic French attitudes, the Laniel-Navarre Plan may be the last French
major offensive effort in Indochina. There is not in sight any desirable
alternative to the success of a Franco-Vietnamese effort along the lines
of the “Laniel-Navarre Plan.”
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7. Notwithstanding the commitment and intent of the Laniel Government to
seek destruction of Viet Minh regular forces, a successor French
Government might well accept an improvement in the military position
short of this as a basis for serious negotiation within the next year.
Political pressures in France prevent any French Government from
rejecting the concept of negotiations. If the Laniel-Navarre Plan fails
or appears doomed to failure, the French might seek to negotiate simply
for the best possible terms, irrespective of whether these offered any
assurance of preserving a non-Communist Indochina. With continued U.S.
economic and material assistance, the Franco-Vietnamese forces are not
in danger of being militarily defeated by the Viet Minh unless there is
large-scale Chinese Communist intervention. In any event, apart from the
possibility of bilateral negotiations with the Communists, the French
will almost certainly continue to seek international discussion of the
Indochina issue.
8. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly continue their present
type of support for Viet Minh. They are unlikely to intervene with
organized units even if the Viet Minh are threatened with defeat by the
Franco-Vietnamese forces. In the event the United States participates in
the fighting, there is a substantial risk that the Chinese Communists
would intervene. The Communists may talk of peace negotiations for
propaganda purposes and to divide the anti-Communists believing that any
political negotiations and any settlement to which they would agree
would increase their chances of eventually gaining control of
Indochina.
9. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia require
sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure the
optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the general
area, and on the other, to accommodate to the greatest practicable
extent to the individual sensibilities of the several governments,
social classes and minorities of the area.
ii. objective
10. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the
communist orbit; to persuade them that their best interests lie in
greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free
world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free governments
with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without
and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.
[Page 371]
iii. courses of action
A. Southeast Asia in General
11. Demonstrate to the indigenous governments that their best interests
lie in greater cooperation and closer affiliation with the nations of
the free world.
12. Continue present programs of limited economic and technical
assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist
governments of the area and expand such programs according to the
calculated advantage of such aid to the U.S. world position.
13. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate with, and
restore and expand their commerce with, each other and the rest of the
free world, particularly Japan, and stimulate the flow of raw material
resources of the area to the free world.
14. Continue to make clear, to the extent possible in agreement with
other nations including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New
Zealand, the grave consequences to Communist China of aggression against
Southeast Asia and continue current military consultations to determine
the military requirements for countering such Chinese Communist
aggression.
15. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in
the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.
16. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the overseas
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia: (a) to organize and activate
anti-communist groups and activities within their own communities; (b)
to resist the effects of parallel pro-communist groups and activities;
(c) generally, to increase their orientation toward the free world; and,
(d) consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their
local governments, to extend sympathy and support to the Chinese
National Government as a symbol of Chinese political resistance and as a
link in the defense against communist expansion in Asia.
17. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia,
recognizing that the initiative in regional defense measures must come
from the governments of the area.
18. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of
Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression, to indigenous Communist
insurrection, subversion, infiltration, political manipulations, and
propaganda.
19. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate, in
relation to the area to foster increased alignment of the people with
the free world.
20. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to
the security of the United States so that they may be prepared for any
of the courses of action proposed herein.
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B. Indochina
In the Absence of Chinese Communist Aggression
21. Without relieving France of its basic responsibility for the defense
of the Associated States, expedite the provision of, and if necessary
increase, aid to the French Union forces, under the terms of existing
commitments, to assist them in:
- a.
- An aggressive military, political and psychological program,
including covert operations, to eliminate organized Viet Minh
forces by mid-1955.
- b.
- Developing indigenous armed forces, including independent
logistical and administrative services, which will eventually be
capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from
French units.
Toward this end, exert all feasible influence to improve
the military capabilities of the French Union-Associated States forces,
including improved training of local forces, effective command and
intelligence arrangements, and the reposing of increased responsibility
on local military leaders.
22. Continue to assure France that: (1) the United States is aware that
the French effort in Indochina is vital to the preservation of the
French Union and of great strategic importance to the security of the
free world; (2) the United States is fully aware of the sacrifices
France is making; and (3) U.S. support will continue so long as France
continues to carry out its primary responsibility in Indochina.
23. Encourage further steps by both France and the Associated States to
produce a working relationship based on equal sovereignty within the
general framework of the French Union. These steps should take into
account France’s primary responsibility for the defense of
Indochina.
- a.
- Support the development of more effective and stable governments
in the Associated States, thus making possible the reduction of
French participation in the affairs of the States.
- b.
- Urge the French to organize their administration and
representation in Indochina with a view to increasing the feeling of
responsibility on the part of the Associated States.
- c.
- Seek to persuade the Associated States that it is not in their
best interest to undermine the French position by making untimely
demands.
- d.
- Cooperate with the French and the Associated States in publicizing
progress toward achieving the foregoing policies.
24. Continue to promote international recognition and support for the
Associated States.
25. Employ every feasible means to influence the French government and
people against any conclusion of the struggle on terms
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inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives.
In doing so, the United States should make clear:
- a.
- The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa,
in Europe, and as a world power.
- b.
- The free world stake in Indochina.
- c.
- The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the over-all strategy
of France’s free world partners.
26. Reiterate to the French:
- a.
- That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military
situation there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect
for acceptable terms.
- b.
- That a nominally non-Communist coalition regime would
eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh9 with no
opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United
States or the United Kingdom.
27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a preliminary to
negotiations, because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable
deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in
Indochina.
28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the
Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any
response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.
29. If the French actually enter into negotiations with the communists,
insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the
course of the negotiations.
30. In view of the possibility of large-scale Chinese Communist
intervention, and in order that the United States may be prepared to
take whatever action may be appropriate in such circumstances, continue
to keep current the plans necessary to carry out the courses of action
indicated in paragraphs 31 and 32 below. In addition, seek UK and French advance agreement in principle
that a naval blockade of Communist China should be included in the
courses of military action set forth in paragraph 31 below.
In the Event of Chinese Communist Intervention
31. If the United States, France and the Associated States determine that
Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened
in Indochina, or are covertly participating so as to jeopardize holding
the Tonkin delta area, the United States (following consultation with
France, the Associated States, the UK,
Australia, and New Zealand) should take the following measures to assist
French Union forces to repel the aggression, to hold Indochina and to
restore its security and peace:
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- a.
- Support a request by France or the Associated States that the
United Nations take immediate actions, including a resolution
that Communist China had committed an aggression and a
recommendation that member states take whatever action may be
necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France and
the Associated States to meet such aggression.
- b.
- Whether or not the United Nations so acts, seek the maximum
international support for participation in military courses of
action required by the situation.
- c.
- Carry out the following minimum courses of military action,
either under UN auspices or as
part of a joint effort with France, the UK, and any other friendly governments:
- (1)
- Provide, as may be practicable, air and naval
assistance for a resolute defense of Indochina itself;
calling upon France and the Associated States to provide
ground forces.
- (2)
- Provide the major forces to interdict Chinese
Communist communication lines, including those in China;
calling upon the UK and
France to provide token forces and such other assistance
as is normal among allies.
- (3)
- Provide logistical support to other participating
nations as may be necessary.
- d.
- Take the following additional actions, if appropriate to the
situation:
- (1)
- If agreed pursuant to paragraph 30 above, establish
jointly with the UK and
France a naval blockade of Communist China.
- (2)
- Intensify covert operations to aid guerrilla forces
against Communist China and to interfere with and
disrupt Chinese Communist lines of communication.
- (3)
- Utilize, as desirable and feasible, Chinese National
forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea,
or China proper.
- (4)
- Assist the British in Hong Kong, as desirable and
feasible.
- (5)
- Evacuate French Union civil and military personnel
from the Tonkin delta, if required.
32. a. If, after taking the actions outlined in paragraph 31–c above, the
United States, the UK and France
determine jointly that expanded military action against Communist China
is necessary, the United States, in conjunction with at least France and
the UK, should take air and naval action
against all suitable military targets in China which directly contribute
to the war in Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near
the USSR boundaries.
b. If the UK and France do not agree to
such expanded military action, the United States should consider taking
such action unilaterally.
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33. If action is taken under paragraph 32, the United States should
recognize that it may become involved in an all-out war with Communist
China, and possibly with the USSR and
the rest of the Soviet bloc, and should therefore proceed to take
large-scale mobilization measures.
C. Burma
34. Encourage the Burmese Government to cooperate with the anti-Communist
nations.
35. Implement promptly and effectively the recent agreement to furnish
Burma with military equipment and supplies on a reimbursable basis.
36. Be prepared to resume economic and technical assistance to Burma if
requested by Burma.
37. Continue to demonstrate U.S. interest in a solution of the problem of
the Chinese Nationalist irregular troops in Burma, and be prepared to
provide limited logistic support for the evacuation of these troops.
38. a. Exchange views with the U.K.
regarding policy for Burma, avoiding indications of any desire to
supplant the British, but making clear that it is undesirable for the
British to maintain a monopoly over military assistance to Burma.
b. Urge the British to expand their military mission, insofar as
possible, to meet Burmese requirements.
39. Attempt to arouse the Burmese to the dangers of Chinese Communist
expansion and to the need for effective military defense against it,
including coordinated military action with other Southeast Asian
countries.
40. a. Develop united action and cooperation among indigenous,
anti-communist groups in Burma to resist communist encroachments.
b. Make suitable preparations for the establishment of guerrilla forces
among suitable ethnic groups for possible use against the Communists;
recognizing the limitations involved in making such preparations,
because (so long as the Burmese Government remains non-communist) a
major consideration should be to take no action that would involve
serious risk of alienating that Government.
41. If there is a large-scale attempt by local communists to seize power
in Burma, activate to the extent practicable the guerrilla forces
referred to in paragraph 40 above.
42. In the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Burma:
- a.
- Support an appeal to the UN by
the Burmese Government.
- b.
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take appropriate
military action against Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in
conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other
friendly governments.
- c.
- Employ as desirable and feasible anti-Communist Chinese
forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in military
operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.
43. If, in spite of the preceding courses of action, communist control of
all or a substantial part of Burma becomes inevitable, support any
trustworthy elements capable of continued resistance to communism.
D. Thailand
44. Continue to assist the Government of Thailand in creating conditions
of internal security, in becoming a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia,
in better withstanding communist pressures in the area, and in
maintaining its alignment with the free world; and, as appropriate to
support these ends, conduct military, economic and technical assistance
programs, and strengthen cultural and propaganda programs and covert
operations.
45. If a serious deterioration of the situation in either Indochina or
Burma appears imminent, take whatever measures, including increased aid
to Thailand, may be determined as feasible to forestall an invasion of
Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai Communists.
46. In the event of overt Chinese or other Communist major aggression
against Thailand:
- a.
- Support an appeal to the UN by
the Thai Government.
- b.
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take appropriate
military action against Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in
conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other
friendly governments.
- c.
- Employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist Chinese
forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in military
operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.
E. Malaya
47. Support the British in their measures to eradicate communist
guerrilla forces and restore order.
48. In the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Malaya, in
addition to the military action which would already have been taken
against Communist China (see paras. 32, 42, 46), the United States
should assist in the defense of Malaya, as appropriate, as part of a
UN collective action or in
conjunction with the United Kingdom and any other friendly
governments.
