Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

611.71/8–753

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

confidential

[Washington,] August 7, 1953.

Subject:

• Relinquishment of U.S. Eights in Tangier.

Following our conversation last Saturday,¹ I asked Earle Richey to write up a few comments on the above subject. He has submitted the following:

The relinquishment of our treaty rights in the International Zone of Tangier has been discussed within AF several times in the past few years and has been the subject of two or three despatches from our Legation at Tangier. In many ways such action, particularly at this time, would be tantamount to opening a pandora’s box. This is true because action along these lines in Tangier would have repercussions on our treaty position in the French Zone and in turn on our position in the Spanish Zone. Some of the possible ramifications of such action are set forth hereunder.

1. Giving up our treaty rights in Tangier could only be done with the advice and the consent of the U.S. Senate. Even though limited to the International Zone, a proposal to the Senate along these lines at the present time would probably not be favorably received in the light of past and present Congressional interests in the Moroccan trade problem.² Such action would be opposed by Colonel Rodes.³ and even more important by RCA and Mackay Radio as well as other commercial and business organizations. Rodes would undoubtedly oppose such action on the grounds that it constituted the first step in a concerted move by the Department to surrender our treaty rights in the French Zone of Morocco. RCA and Mackay would oppose the action on the grounds that it would jeopardize their operations in Tangier where they have invested several million dollars as the result of encouragement from the U.S. Government and only because of the favorable situation created by the U.S. treaty position there.

2. Politically, the surrender of our treaty rights in Tangier would constitute a slap at the Sultan of Morocco. The Sultan has made it clear that he wishes the U.S. to hold on to its position in the Sherifian Empire which he considers has long been the one factor which has prevented France from making an outright colony of Morocco. Once we surrender our rights in the International Zone we could anticipate that the French would relentlessly press us to take similar action in the French Zone.

3. Relinquishment of these rights in Tangier would have to be accompanied by adherence to the Tangier Statute of 1923 or by the drafting of a new Tangier Statute (to which we would adhere). If we adhere to the 1923 Statute as it now stands we would have to reduce our office in Tangier from a Legation to a Consulate General and our Principal Officer from a Diplomatic Agent to a Consul General. Such a change is specifically provided for in the Statute. Reducing the status of our representation in Morocco would not seem to be an expedient course of action in the face of political developments there which, generally speaking, are in the direction of eventual independence for this area. On the other hand the drafting of a new statute for Tangier (provided for in the 1945 Anglo-French Agreement) is not desirable at the present time because of the possibility of Russian participation therein (Russia has this right under the 1945 Agreement). Incidentally, the Powers adhering to the 1923 Tangier Statute have not opened legations in Rabat after closing theirs in Tangier as required by the Statute. Sweeney (L/EUR)⁴ says he believes it is contrary to custom to have a diplomatic representative in a Protectorate. He will look further into this aspect of the problem.

4. Spain is evidencing more and more interest in Tangier and Franco is at least talking rather loudly about the British giving up Gibraltar to Spain. It may be necessary at a future date to take a firm stand against Spain and her intentions in this area. It occurs to AF that such a stand would be strengthened insofar as Tangier is concerned if we maintain our present treaty rights there, however anachronistic and annoying they may be to us.

1. Aug. 1.
2. When France imposed import controls which discriminated against U.S. nationals in the French Zone, the Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign Aid Act gave the President discretionary authority to withhold funds from nations not in compliance with treaties.
3. As commander of the American Legion Post at Casablanca and president of the American Trade Association in Morocco, Robert E. Rodes had waged a campaign against the French trade restrictions.
4. Joseph M. Sweeney was an assistant in the office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs in the Department and had been counsel to the agent of the United States in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice.