Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

320/10–2852: Telegram

The Chargé in the Union of South Africa (Robertson) to the Department of State¹

secret

Pretoria, October 28, 1952—11 a.m.

116. In view of extent to which we believe US position on Indian UNGA agenda items can influence So Afr course both at home and abroad, we desire give Dept fol views:

If we become aligned or largely associated with Arabic-Asiatic bloc in Union’s eyes on So Afr UNGA agenda items and recriminating debates and condemnatory resolutions fol with heavy voting against So Afr as in past, we risk her withdrawal from both UN and Korea, with possible repercussions on her participation in MEDO.² So Afr looks to US for leadership in world affairs and wld be sadly disillusioned if that not forthcoming in terms of some sympathetic interest in her complex problems.

Likelihood of So Afr withdrawal from UN has recently diminished by support she has received in UNGA from France, Brit and commonwealth countries. We believe avidity with which Union Govt welcomed this support as improving her UN position points to hope So Afr will not be driven to withdrawal. On other hand nationalists are inflexible on their racial policies, and there is no difference in substance between parties on question “white supremacy;” differences relating primarily to tactics. Important segments within country opposed to So Afr withdrawal from UN which poses important restraining factor against precipitous govt action. To extent US and other major powers show sympathetic interest, this segment will be strengthened. Reverse is equally applicable.

I feel that “in time” we might be able to capitalize, through careful nurturing and endless patience, on existing potential latent forces for moderation in So Afr. One course action was suggested in Embdesp 214 Oct. 8.³

Acrimonious debate and condemnatory resolutions, followed by heavy voting against So Afr, on highly controversial So Afr UN issues in this session cld only serve: To entrench further Nationalist govt in office, enhancing their possibilities for return to power in 1953 election; to shift control within cabinet from relatively moderate leaders Malan, Havenga and Sauer to ardent nationalists Strydom, Swart, Louw, Donges, Erasmus and Verwoerd;⁴ to increase racial repression here, to weaken forces for moderation; and to accelerate creation situation favorable to Commie exploitation. Such a development wld only tend toward increasing difficulty for whites and natives live side by side in single geographic area, also posing possible disruptive influences elsewhere in Africa South Sahara. Referral So Afr apartheid to ICJ to determine UN competence may gain valuable time and permit passions to cool (Embtel 84 Oct 1.)

Tone of the Secy’s UN remarks Oct 16⁵ counselling moderation and consideration being given by Dept to possibly requesting an advisory opinion from ICJ on UNGA jurisdiction are encouraging. The position expressed repeatedly in high govt circles here is that “So Afr wld not have approved charter and joined UN except for reassurances by organizers in 1945 at San Francisco that art 2, section 7 wld be controlling over human rights and other charter provisions, ‘adding’ that So Afr racial policies pose no threat to peace of any other countries.”

Indian imperialism and Communism now regarded by So Afr as equally imminent threats. Indian maneuvers at UN regarded here as preliminary measure in flow of Indian imperialism and nationals to Africa, logical outlet for her surplus millions. Indians wld not in circumstances hesitate exploit Commie or Western help, playing one against the other, is a thought expressed in high govt circles here.

In summary, we strongly hope US, in addition to exerting restraining influence in UN re Indian items, can find some way of making clear (1) US friendship for So Afr and understanding that she is faced with grave problems, and (2) US endeavoring find middle course rather than take sides between India and So Afr to disadvantage of latter.

Foregoing takes into account discussions with Prime Min (Embtel 85 Oct 2), Forsyth (Embtel 86 Oct 2), Erasmus (Embdesp 244 Oct 21), Louw (Embtel 107 Oct 22 and Embdesp 249 Oct 23), Donges (Embdesp 252 Oct 27), Strydom (Embtel 113 Oct 27 and Embdesp 253 Oct 27), and Malga (Embtel 115 Oct 27).⁶

Robertson

1. This telegram was repeated to London and New Delhi.
2. United States-United Kingdom plans to establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) included a role for the Union of South Africa, as well as several other non-Middle Eastern States. During 1953, the United States shifted its approach to a “Northern Tier” strategy which did not include the Union of South Africa. Documentation on South Africa’s involvement in MEDO planning is located in file 780.5. For documentation on U.S. interest in MEDO and the “Northern Tier”, see volume ix.
3. Not printed. In it, the Embassy advised that a “coordinated Western diplomacy”, based upon specific lines of action, could contribute “to the development of a situation upon which Communism could conceivably capitalize in Southern Africa.” It recommended that more study be given to the situation, that additional experienced officers be assigned to the post and that consultations be held with other governments having responsibilities in the area. (611.45A/10–852)
4. Johannes G. Strydom, C. R. Swart, Louw, Johannes M. Donges, Erasmus, and Hendrik F. Verwoerd were all members of the National Party holding Cabinet positions.
5. Secretary Acheson’s address to the UN General Assembly is printed in Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952, pp. 639–645.
6. None printed.