Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

845A.411/10–952

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hicherson)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 9, 1952.

Subject:

• Position Paper on Question of Race Conflict in South Africa

Reference is made to the above-cited Position Paper (SD/A/C.1/395, dated October 5, 1952),² which was submitted to NEA for final clearance, and to the meeting on the subject which took place in the Secretary’s office today.³ Following is a summary of the points which I endeavored to make:

NEA concurs in general in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 4. NEA has, however, grave reservations regarding the concept of referral to the ICJ, for the following reasons:

1. The question of race conflict in South Africa is a matter of deep emotion to the Arab-Asian group in general and to India and Pakistan in particular. The latter two states are fully committed to seeing this matter through, and will not only strongly contend that the UN is competent to discuss the issue but will regard any effort to refer the matter of competence to the ICJ as an obvious subterfuge designed to sidetrack and postpone action on the substantive issue of human rights, undertaken by the white Western “imperialist” powers on behalf of South Africa. Quite aside, furthermore, from their interest in the substance of the matter, the Arab-Asians also strongly resent failure to inscribe and discuss matters of concern to them when we frequently are in the position of urging them to support matters of concern to us. (See Tab A, remarks of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan re the case of Cardinal Mindszenty.)⁴

2. A vote for referral to the ICJ would not only be resented by the Arab-Asians but would gain us no credit with the South Africans, who may be expected to be adamant in their insistence that the UN is not competent. Although the UK and the Australians have informed us they do not consider the General Assembly competent to discuss this matter and plan to vote against inscription, the UK has indicated that they will “go underground” after the vote on inscription and take no further part in the debate. If these who challenge the General Assembly’s competence do not care to go to Court and may not accept the Court’s opinion, why should other members press for a reference to the Court?

3. While it may be argued that a “genuine difference of opinion” exists on the question of competence, our Legal Advisor’s office is not only convinced of the competence of the General Assembly in this respect but anticipates that a majority of the Court is likely to adopt a similar view. The proposal for referral to the Court may therefore be expected to have the following effect:

a. to produce in the General Assembly a violent reaction and bitter debate on the part of the Arab-Asians on a case on which we should already have voted for inscription, thereby likewise increasing the chances of South Africa’s walking out of the UN;

b. if adopted, to transfer to the ICJ the debate, in which South Africa may refuse even to appear;

c. in the event of an ICJ decision affirming competence, to return the issue to the General Assembly under circumstances greatly strengthening the position of those states desiring to see the strongest possible action taken against South Africa. Such action would most likely be stronger than action proposed by the Indians this year and thus would be more likely to force South Africa out of the UN;

d. in the unlikely event of a negative decision of the Court, to produce a feeling of complete frustration and disillusionment on the part of the Arab-Asians which will have the most adverse effect on future efforts of ours to obtain their support on other issues, and possibly result in their writing off the UN as a forum in which they can discuss matters of the deepest concern to them. (See Tab B, statement of the Prime Minister of India re the Tunisian case);⁵

e. to enable the USSR once again to pose as the champion of the under-privileged, non-white, colonial peoples, and of the small nations estopped by the Western White “imperialists” from airing their legitimate grievances;

f. to risk exposing the US to a possibly most embarrassing precedent if the Arab-Asians or the Soviets should ever place on the agenda the questions of racial discrimination in the US or of our restrictive immigration quotas. It would presumably be easier for us to contend non-competence in the General Assembly without an affirmative opinion in the South African case than it would be if we were forced into the position of ignoring an ICJ opinion which clearly established the competence of the Assembly to deal with the South African situation. On the other hand, the US should face this problem honestly and objectively, bearing in mind all the possible implications, legal and otherwise, with regard to racial discrimination and segregation in the US. We cannot urge a course of action upon others, which we would not adopt for ourselves, nor should we essentially nullify Article 2 (7) of the Charter. We should be frank in discussing this matter with our Arab-Asian friends.

NEA fully concurs in necessity for and the wisdom of a moderate, cautious approach to this difficult problem. It is gratifying and most helpful in this potentially explosive case that its chief protagonists, despite the depth of their feelings in the matter, have been relatively restrained in their exposition of the case and avoided the use of violently condemnatory language in the Resolution which they propose to present. Indeed, it may be argued that if any action at all is taken in this case, as is in any event likely, it could hardly be more moderate and less objectionable than in the form in which it is proposed. In NEA’s view, the greatest danger which exists is the extreme exacerbation of feelings on both sides which would result if the Arab-Asians are frustrated in their effort to obtain some sort of action, i.e., the passage of the kind of Resolution which they propose.

Time at the Secretary’s meeting did not permit me to put forward the following alternative course of action, which may now be academic. However, since the presently agreed Position Paper may necessarily have to be modified in the light of developments, it may be helpful to record here what NEA considers to be an exceptional opportunity to take advantage of Madame Pandit’s⁶ leadership and friendly feelings toward the US:

The Arab-Asians are aware of the explosive nature of their proposal, and will consider our position to be a crucial test of the validity of our moral position. Following on the heels of their bitterness over our position on the Tunisian case,⁷ it is likely that they expect us to oppose them on this issue, and are therefore prepared for a real battle to achieve their purpose. If we could express to them in advance, and particularly to Madame Pandit, the leader of the Indian Delegation, our sympathy with their concern over the situation in South Africa and our fear that immoderate action in the General Assembly might exacerbate that situation and result in driving South Africa out of the UN, we might be successful not only in toning down still further the proposed Resolution but also in freezing the Indian position at that moderate point, obviating the risk of a later more violent Resolution. If the Indians should agree to this moderate position in exchange for our support, we could endeavor to persuade South Africa to recognize that such a Resolution is the mildest which could possibly be expected, and therefore to limit its statements in the General Assembly to a firm insistence on non-competence, without walking out. Simultaneously we could urge the other states who oppose competence (UK, etc.) not to provoke violent debate. The net effect of this position would be a mild and practically unopposed debate on a restrained Resolution which would presumably be adopted quickly and disposed of. Thus we should be in a much better position to exert our influence for moderation in other cases, such as Tunisia and Morocco, where the same group are the protagonists, and possibly obtain their support for other cases (e.g. Korea), which are of major importance to us.

1. This memorandum was drafted in the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA) by the Officer in Charge of India-Nepal-Ceylon Affairs, William Witman.
2. Ante, p. 938.
3. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
4. Not printed. Tab A is entitled “Statement of Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) on Inclusion of the Moroccan Question on the Agenda of the General Assembly, December 13, 1951” and is referenced as UN document A/PV.354, p. 246. He noted that the trial of Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty had been placed upon the agenda of the General Assembly by a very large majority, despite the contention, given in opposition, that this was a matter completely within Hungary’s domestic jurisdiction. “The manner in which this [i.e. the Mindszenty] question is determined by the General Assembly,” Zafrulla Khan maintained, “will provide us with a measure, a standard, a yardstick which we should, those of us in Asia and Africa, apply to similar questions when we are invited to assist in placing matters upon the agenda of the General Assembly.”
5. Not printed. Tab B is entitled “Statements by Prime Minister Nehru and Government of India Regarding Failure of UN to Permit Discussion of Tunisia and Other International Questions.”
6. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Permanent Representative and Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations.
7. On Apr. 14, 1952, the United States had abstained on three votes in the UN Security Council, which would have placed the Tunisian-French dispute on the Security Council agenda. The measures failed for want of a requisite majority.