Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

711.56373/2–1654: Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State¹

secret

Tripoli, February 16, 1954—4 p.m.

270. Deptel 184, February 8.² Legation and United States Government officials have repeatedly warned Libyans over past two years of possible waning US strategic interests here because of delay in conclusion negotiations and consequent relocation necessary installations elsewhere. Legation has had impression Libyans consider such warnings merely bargaining tactics on our part. In addition, request US representations as to urgency for expediting negotiations have confirmed to Libyans what they consider strategic indispensibility Libya as far as United States concerned.

Presentation reduced United States requirements as outlined reference telegram should rudely dispel Libyan illusions this latter score and can be expected cause consternation in Libyan Government circles, particularly in view virtual elimination proposed Cyrenaican installations.

Presentation should have salutary effect and demonstrate to Libyans that past statements on part United States were frank and straightforward. It will also put Libyans in psychologically disadvantageous position when negotiations concerning compensation begin.

To achieve maximum effect in terms of:

(a) Reducing compensation, and

(b) Expediting conclusion negotiations.

Legation suggests following approach:

1. Reduced technical schedule could be handed to Libyans without comment as annex to agreement under provisions Article 11.

2. When Libyans express dismay at modesty United States requirements, as they undoubtedly will, Legation would then point to frequent past advice that requirements in Libya would by necessity have to be shifted elsewhere if there was undue delay in concluding agreement.

3. In order to keep Libyans off balance, technical schedules should include two or three minor requirements (but not commitments) which Legation can eliminate in bargaining process as further evidence waning US interest.

4. When actual discussions regarding compensation begin, Legation, pointing to greatly reduced requirements, could start at one million dollars arguing (in this connection) that Libya was at one time prepared give US blanket military access to Libya for this sum and that now, as US requirements are so much lower, this amount would appear generous. If Libyans seem unconvinced, we might find it tactically advantegeous at this point reveal magnitude previous technical schedule. With any further delay Legation could use tactic outlined item 3 above. If, as can be expected, Libyans point to large United Kingdom contributions, Legation would then indicate disparity our requirements as compared those of United Kingdom. In ensuing unhappy atmosphere, Legation could raise ante toward $2 million with quid pro quo being promise speedy ratification on part Libyans.

Legation suggests following timing for above approach:

1. If agreement on minor points of difference continues at present relatively rapid pace, Legation would withhold reduced technical schedule until I began negotiations with Libyan Government on question compensation. This tactic would preclude possibility Council of Ministers, angered at prospect of reduced compensation, introducing new objections to articles which might otherwise be readily agreed upon at Council of Ministers level.

2. If Council Ministers insist on technical schedule prior my negotiations, Legation would present slightly expanded list as outlined above, but attempt keep question requirements out of picture as much as possible until maximum area of agreement reached.

3. If unnecessary delay occurs at Council Ministers level, Legation would use reduced technical schedule and possibility further reduction as spur to discussions. Of course, any approach to Libyans must await until permission granted for POL line, [garble] gunnery range unless it appears that delay obtaining such permission will be great.

Legation, on basis original large-scale technical requirements had believed Libyans would consider $2 million out of question. Although shock at reduction their anticipations will be great, they might accept amount as better than nothing. Legation still believes offer should be made palatable with as many “fringe benefits” as possible (Legtel 217 January 9)³ and recommends Department give urgent consideration Legation suggestions in order we may have some benefits in hand for bargaining purposes.

While advent Saqizli as Prime Minister may necessitate modification foregoing approach, particularly in terms of timing, Legation believes on basis present information basic line approach described should be followed.

Villard

1. This telegram was repeated to CINCUSAFE and CINCEUR, Frankfort; CINCNELM, London; and Benghazi.
2. Not printed; it informed the Legation that because of delay in securing base rights, the USAF had eliminated a number of requirements in Libya. The Department informed the Legation that “this significant reduction U.S. military requirements Libya puts new complexion on base negotiations, particularly regarding grant aid quid pro quo. Two million dollars annually is maximum Defense can provide for reduced requirements.” (711.56373/2–854)
3. Not printed; it repeated the Minister’s belief that Libya would not be satisfied with $2 million a year. If he were not authorized to offer any larger payment, Villard suggested a number of “fringe benefits” that might make the agreement more attractive to the Libyans. (711.56373/1–954)