Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

AF files, lot 58 D 459, “Locker Correspondence”

The Ambassador in Liberia (Locker) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)¹

confidential
official–informal

Monrovia, November 17, 1954.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have just reviewed with senior officers of the Embassy and USOM/L the Department’s Aide-Mémoire of November 10 sent to the Liberian Ambassador in Washington, which sets forth the position of the United States toward the economic proposals of the Liberian Government.²

While it is appreciated that the Department’s Aide-Mémoire probably does not “tell the whole story”, our immediate reaction may be described as one of “grave concern” and dismay by its implications, even though the Aide-Mémoire itself merely appears to express in a formal manner the oral commitments made by United States representatives in the course of the conversations with the Liberian negotiating team reported in the Department’s Memorandum of Conversation of October 20, 1954.³ It is our considered view that the general tenor of the Aide-Mémoire, in itself, will tend to complicate enormously the difficulties of the Embassy and USOM/L in negotiating the “certain modifications” which “experience indicates” are “desirable in extending the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation as well as in the Agreement establishing the Joint Commission for Economic Development”.

May I observe that while “the United States Government is most pleased to concur … is prepared to increase … is prepared to establish … is prepared to continue … and to move forward” and “shares the desire of the Liberian Government”,⁴ the Aide-Mémoire contains no statement indicating that the Liberian Government has been required to give any firm “quid pro quo” or to enter into any firm commitments to improve local standards of public administration, which certainly should be—and should have been made—an essential prerequisite to the extension of increased technical assistance. Without such definite commitments obtained in Washington from the Liberian negotiating team, we must anticipate great difficulties in reaching any meaningful agreements with the Liberian Government when negotiations commence here, whether for the extension of the General Agreement on Technical Assistance, or for modification of the Agreement establishing the Joint Commission, and, still more so, in the negotiations of individual project agreements to spell out in detail the enlarged programs to which the United States has committed itself in principle.

To be specific, even with definite commitments from the Liberian negotiating team as to the “ground rules” under which “an adviser in public administration” might be enabled to “render invaluable assistance, particularly in the area of fiscal and budgetary management”, we must anticipate that such “ground rules” as presumably are included in the recommendations of the FOA Evaluation Team will be difficult to implement here.⁵ While the Aide-Mémoire commits the United States to the Liberian Government on a number of substantive questions, it raises or leaves unresolved a host of important policy, procedural, administrative and technical questions, and in such a manner as to suggest that the views of the Embassy, USOM/L and the presumed recommendations of the FOA Evaluation Team have not been taken fully into account.

I recognize that officers in the field are in no position to question substantive Washington policy decisions involving commitments in principle to a friendly government, but my staff and I are gravely concerned by what specific procedures these policy decisions are to be executed; to what extent, if any, policy decisions may be modified or modifiable, taking local situations and conditions into account; the administrative implications of such policy decisions in terms of such problems as housing and transportation (not only in Monrovia but in places such as the sleeping-sickness project proposed for Voinjama, where housing, water, light and transportation are all absent); and how we justify a sleeping-sickness training project before basic research has determined what control programs offer any hope of significant and effective performance.

We are left uninstructed whether the Liberian Government has agreed to expand its financial contributions to Joint Commission programs, or whether as in the past the interested Departments are to be left in complete control of all activities outside of Joint Commission projects, including contract and concession negotiations, procurement, budget and fiscal planning, which have complicated a variety of joint operations across the board. It is our feeling that, as a tactical matter, the period of direct negotiations with the Liberian team may have been the best time to press for joint funding operations embracing all developmental activities and thereby assuring over-all coordination in programming, execution and evaluation of the total country effort. Would it not still be possible to take this up with the Liberian negotiating team prior to their ultimate departure for Monrovia? Provided the presentation were not “too little and too late”, we believe a number of the Liberian cabinet officers might be persuaded of the desirability of agreeing to such arrangements.

My staff and I view with concern the 50% expansion in program funds committed by the Aide-Mémoire under discussion, while at the same time FOA/W has taken action to reduce both administrative personnel and funds for the direction of the proposed expanded program, despite the consensus of the Embassy, USOM/L and the FOA Evaluation Team that present administrative resources are inadequate to administer the present program, much less to implement the JAS program which in our view the new commitments will make indispensable.

On the procedural side as a specific instance, the United States is evidently committed to “move forward on the Prairie View University contract”. However, I have not had an opportunity to review this question with the Country Director due to his absence in Athens.⁶ I deem this essential as there appear to be important reservations evidently held by USOM/L on a number of unresolved issues in the basic contract between FOA/W and that Institution, especially with respect to Article IV. Procedurally, I would consider it undesirable to undertake the negotiation of a project agreement in compliance with instructions to USOM/L, Usfoto 163 of November 10,⁷ until a meeting of the minds between USOM/L and FOA/W has been reached as to the import of these and other clauses in the basic contract.

While the Department and FOA/W have made it clear that the participation of Embassy and USOM/L representatives, other than the Country Director, were not desired during the discussions with the Liberian negotiating team, I consider that the point has been reached when consultations with the two Washington agencies have become indispensable at the earliest possible date, for the purpose of reviewing the positions taken in their policy, procedural, administrative and technical aspects. I am apprehensive that unless this can be done promptly, the responsible officers of the United States stationed in Liberia may well be placed in untenable positions which might lead to unfortunate consequences, for the program as well as for the officers concerned.

With these considerations in mind, I deem it necessary to request that immediate arrangements be made for the detail to Washington on consultation of certain officers stationed in Liberia. Quite tentatively, I suggest that the “team” be selected from the following officers:

• For the Embassy: Ambassador Locker or Counselor of Embassy Hinke.
• For USOM/L: Acting Country Director Robert B. Kitchen and Educational Adviser Edward W. Brice.
• For JAS talks: Embassy Administrative Officer John T. Sinclair.

Because of the importance which I attach to this request, I suggest that the Country Director be instructed to proceed to Washington direct from Athens for participation in the proposed discussions with the Monrovia Group. I should like to point out that these proposed consultations would make possible a simultaneous comprehensive review of the JAS program, which in my view becomes an urgent necessity because of the expanded technical assistance program being extended to Liberia, together with indispensable parallel fiscal and budgetary planning exercises.

Because of the complicated nature of the above discussion, I have deemed it preferable to present my recommendations in the form of a letter rather than by telegram, in the belief that this comunication will provide a sufficiently ample exposition of my views as to presuade you to accord them favorable consideration.

I shall appreciate the earliest possible reply by radio to this communication.

Sincerely yours,

Jesse D. Locker

1. Hinke indicated to Utter in a covering letter that Ambassador Locker’s letter to Byroade had been entrusted to Jay V. Hall, Jr., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for hand delivery.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 1, supra.
4. The ellipses occur in the source text.
5. The team, which was led by Dr. Robert P. Daniel, President of Virginia State College, Petersburg, and which also included Dr. Vincent J. Browne of Howard University, and Arthur S. King, John W. More, and Albert E. Farwell of FOA, submitted its report to Stassen on Oct. 11, 1954. It spent the period from Sept. 3 to 27 in Liberia. It appraised the FOA operation in terms of U.S. foreign policy objectives. (Monrovia Consulate files, lot 61 F 164)
6. Brig. Gen. Richard L. Jones was the new Country Director replacing Dr. John W. Davis who gave up his post on Sept. 5, 1954.
7. Not printed.