751S.00/11–1254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
2028. During luncheon at Embassy residence today, I had good talk with Chevalier (Secretary d’Etat for Army) regarding situation in Algeria. He said French were moving large forces to Algeria not so much because they would use them in present action, but because their mere presence would inhibit further troubles. He said present plans called for 4 battalions to be moved in addition to the full 25th division which has already arrived. They are also planning to bring back 3 regiments from Indochina for service in Algeria. Chevalier said that he thought there were three or four hundred Tunisian Fellagahs, in the Aures region, plus the population of these mountains which was always ready for trouble. He said that the French would make a real effort to clean up this area in the next 30 days prior to the full advent of winter, otherwise they may have to wait until spring to clear the region. Chevalier said that from the NATO and purely military point of view, he felt that something had been gained from this revolt, as now the French were fully cognizant of what would have happened in case of general war. Their plans now were to greatly increase their intelligence service in North Africa and to make certain troop dispositions which would make it easy to handle any future troubles. He said that the major units which had been moved to North Africa could be returned to continental Europe in case of war in time to meet their NATO dates.
[Page 398]Regarding the use of MDAP material,1 he said that he personally realized that this was a politically important problem in the U.S. and that therefore he was following it carefully. He said that all that was necessary for operations in North Africa were light arms, rifles, machine guns and mortars, practically none of which were MDAP equipment. He said that he could state that MDAP equipment represented less than ten percent of the equipment presently in use in Tunis and Algeria. He said that he would continue to follow this problem personally and that U.S. could be assured that for all practical purposes MDAP equipment was not being used in the present operations in Algeria.
- In telegram 1951 from Paris, Nov. 6, the Ambassador reported that he had been unable to see the Premier, who was campaigning in the Lille area. He suggested, however, that any serious representation to the Premier regarding French use of MDAP material in Algeria would be totally ineffective and would create serious risks regarding the French position in NATO. Since Algeria was legally part of Metropolitan France, the Ambassador strongly recommended against making any definite requests which the United States knew in advance would be unacceptable to the French and which would risk public rejection. (711.56371A/11–654)↩