Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

788.5/3–1854: Telegram

No. 439
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Tehran, March 18, 1954—8 p.m.

1972. Limited distribution.

1. I presented Admirals Wright and Beecher to Shah on March 10. Before audience we spent half hour with Minister Court Ala. Both Shah and Ala devoted considerable time to discussing importance that Iran begin at once systematically develop armed forces capable defensive action. Both also touched on Iran’s attitude toward defense cooperation with its neighbors.

2. For more than hour Shah outlined his hopes for Iranian army stressing his conviction that relatively small Iranian army properly equipped, trained and handled could not only delay enemy advance across country but with aid of military equipment received through Iraq could defend certain portion of country almost indefinitely provided it not compelled face certain new types atomic and other deadly weapons. He thought even atomic bombs might not be too effective in mountain fighting. He pointed out on map certain passes which could be held, certain deserts and rugged areas which it would be difficult for enemy traverse, and places to which Iranian army could retreat and could hold against vastly superior numbers. He argued Iranian soldiers were tough, accustomed to hardship, inherently religious, and patriotic. He maintained officers anxious learn and intelligent. New era would be opened to Iran if hope could be instilled into Iranian people that they could eventually have armed forces capable of defending country with honor. He said he somewhat concerned at delay in receiving answer to questions put to me several months ago as to whether or not US considered it worthwhile for Iran to develop army with defensive capacity.

3. Then referring to Turkish-Pakistani defense cooperation Shah as in previous conversations expressed opinion that any kind such cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey which did not include Iran “really made no sense”. Iran must be keystone any plan for defense Middle East and South Asia. Defense Pakistan and Turkey could not be more than extensions of defense Iran. Iran realized value regional defense arrangements. Useless, however, for it to enter into them until it had armed forces capable contributing defense area. Iran’s honor would not permit it enter into any kind of mutual defense arrangements to which its contribution would be merely territory on which forces its neighbors would fight invading armies. Iranians, not Turks, Pakistanis or Iraqis, should bear primary responsibility for defending Iran. Shah admitted that Iranian armed forces armed and equipped as he envisioned could not long defend any areas of country without receipts of ammunition and other supplies through Iraq or through Persian Gulf. It important, therefore, that capabilities Iranian armed forces be developed as rapidly as possible so that Iran in minimum period of time could begin conversations re mutual defense with its neighbors. Ala went somewhat further in this regard than Shah. He said if it clear Iranian army to have defense capabilities in not distant future it might be advantageous for Iran to begin informal secret defense talks “immediately” with its neighbors. Too early to enter into formal defense arrangements but not for secret exploratory talks. Shah said it necessary: “That we know something of our neighbors plans—what areas they contemplate holding and to what areas they plan to retreat so that we can coordinate our movements with theirs. We should know what transport facilities they might have for getting supplies to us in case of aggression, etc.”. Both Shah and Ala urged Admiral Wright to do his utmost to impress upon appropriate American authorities fact that one of most effective and inexpensive methods of strengthening defense free world would be to assist in developing Iranian army capable defensive actions so that Iran could play appropriate role in regional defense. At one point during conversation Shah again expressed concern lest it intention US and neighbors Iran not to give consideration to Iranian armed forces as factor in future plans for defense of area. Admiral Wright was careful not to make any commitments. He merely played role of sympathetic auditor.

4. On evening March 10 I told British Ambassador I had received instructions from Washington (see Deptel 1838 March 9 to London 4601) authorizing me give reply to Shah long lines paragraph 8 Embtel to Department 1872 to London 570,² but suggesting I talk with him before doing so. Ambassador suggested I postpone approach to Shah until he had received further instructions from London. He had already asked London for comment on paragraph 8 Embtel 1872. It might be preferable for him and me see London comment before I talked to Shah. On March 13 Ambassador informed me he had received telegram from London indicating British Government had no opposition my approach Shah along lines paragraph 8.

5. On March 17 I gave Shah long awaited reply to his questions. To prevent later misunderstanding I prepared reply in writing on basis paragraph 8. Without departing from sense that paragraph I expanded its terminology somewhat in order cushion impact. I told Shah document which I was about to read aloud to him was paraphrase of Washington reply. Shah listened attentively and then asked to read it himself. He went through it word by word asking many questions. For instance he wanted to know what was meant by “modest army”, by “unnecessary trappings”. He asked whether US would be willing to give Iran assistance for economic and technical development so that Iranian national economy would more quickly be able support army capable of defensive action. He asked whether Turkish national economy was at present capable supporting Turkish armed forces and whether US considered Iran less worthy of military assistance than Turkey. What should he do next? Through what channels should conversations take place for purpose determining amount and character of additional assistance? I told him I not prepared or qualified enter into technical discussions Iranian defense. It would not therefore be helpful for me endeavor undertake interpret answers I had conveyed to him. Logical course would be for Iranian Chief Staff and General McClure continue and broaden discussions re future Iranian army which I understood had already been initiated by Chief Staff. Shah said he thought it would be preferable that he personally talk with General McClure at early date. If he and General should reach certain agreements did I think General’s recommendations would be accepted by highest US defense authorities? I said General McClure had great prestige with US defense planners. Nevertheless Shah should bear in mind that Washington in making decisions must give consideration not only to recommendations coming from Tehran but to defense needs other areas, and to internal, political, economic and military factors in US. I sure recommendations made by General McClure or myself would be given sympathetic consideration in Washington but they might not be accepted—particularly in full. Neither General McClure nor I were policy makers. Our role was to make recommendations based on our knowledge of conditions here in light of what we understood US policies to be. Shah said he hoped our conversation would be beginning renaissance for Iran; that Iran would become self respecting country with enough confidence in its future to encourage it to develop its economy, to play appropriate political and economic role in world, and to overcome inferiority complex which had plagued and weakened it for so many years.³

6. Shah asked if he could keep copy document which I had read to him. I agreed, pointing out that it merely transcript of oral statement. I asked however if he had suitable place to keep document such high classification. He decided eventually he would not keep copy but I would let him see it whenever he desired. Copy this document being pouched to Department.⁴ I have given copy British Ambassador.

7. Shah told me he would mention matter to British Ambassador with whom he expected have conversation afternoon March 18.

Henderson

1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London.
2. Document 431.
3. On Apr. 2 Ambassador Henderson reported that, as a result of his statements made to the Shah in paragraph 5 of telegram 1972, General McClure saw the Shah at the Shah’s request on Mar. 29. Once again, the Shah said that Iran had to join the Turkish-Pakistani pact, but that Iran also had to have some military capacity before beginning discussions. The Shah then proceeded to present a shopping list of equipment he deemed necessary to have immediately to give the Iranian Army combat effectiveness. General McClure was noncommittal in his response, but did bring to the Shah’s attention certain deficiencies in Iran’s armed forces. (Telegram 2041; 788.5/4–254)
4. Ambassador Henderson pouched the text of this document to the Department in despatch 618, Mar. 18. (788.5/3–1854)