Spanish Desk files, lot 58 D 344, “Negotiations—U.S.–Spanish, June–Sept. 1953”
No. 906
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs (Bonbright)1
I have examined your memorandum of September 232 and Ambassador Dunn’s telegram 2433 of September 24 and have discussed the matter with you both. As a result I have signed a telegram4 authorizing Ambassador Dunn to sign the Spanish Agreement.
I do not interpret the clause in question as implying any obligation on the part of the United States to defend Spain which would be beyond the President’s executive authority.
It seems to me that what the provision means is that if there is offensive action in the air over Spain, then we should either take our interceptor planes out or else if they stay there, they will cooperate with the Spanish Air Force.
It is very difficult for me to think of circumstances under which Spain would be attacked without our desiring to cooperate with the [Page 1960] Spanish Air Force in defense. However, if we did not desire to do this, we have the option to take our planes out.
It seems to me that this is a reasonable provision for the Spanish Government to seek and if, as I understand, it is acceptable to Defense, then I do not think that State should interpose objection on constitutional grounds.
- This memorandum was also addressed to Tate.↩
- Presumably a reference to the memorandum by Bonbright, supra. No memoranda by Bonbright dated Sept. 23 dealing with the subject of this memorandum have been found in Department of State files.↩
- In telegram 243 Ambassador Dunn argued against the interpretation given by Bonbright in the Sept. 24 memorandum. (711.56352/9–2453)↩
- Telegram 243 to Madrid, Sept. 25. (711.56352/9–2553)↩