Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

752.5/2–1953

No. 880
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)¹

top secret

Washington, February 19, 1953.

• Subject: US Military Command Arrangements in Spain

We understand that the JCS will raise tomorrow² the question of US military command arrangements in Spain and ask for the Department’s views.

1. The Air Force has recommended that the JCS accept the arrangements proposed by General Kissner, i.e., one senior military official responsible for all US military activities in Spain; (a) command of all US military forces in Spain; (b) construction; (c) conduct of technical negotiations relating to the military arrangements; and, (d) the MAAG. According to the Air Force recommendations this senior official would be an Air Force officer (presumably General Kissner), would work closely with the Ambassador in coordinating all US military activities in Spain and would report to the JCS through the Air Force as executive agent.

These arrangements are recommended for an interim period of one year and, as General Kissner and the Air Force have pointed out, have the following advantages:

(a) they provide for local coordination of a variety of US military activities which would otherwise be conducted separately;

(b) such coordination will be essential during the first year to ensure that operations under the new agreements are initiated in the most satisfactory manner;

(c) on the US side, these arrangements will provide one senior officer to report to and work with the Ambassador and the Washington agencies concerned; and

(d) on the Spanish side, they will provide a single point of contact which, General Kissner states, the Spaniards have already indicated they consider desirable.

2. The Army has recommended that the US command in Spain be placed under General Ridgway as soon as the agreements are concluded. We understand that although General Ridgway opposed this arrangement last October, he has now been prevailed upon to accept it. We also understand that, under the Army proposal, the four main US military activities in Spain would be administered as follows: (a) the military command would report to General Ridgway; (b) construction work would be directed by the Army’s construction group in Europe; (c) technical military negotiations would be carried out primarily under the direction of USCINCEUR; and, (d) the MAAG would report to the Army.

The Army view is, apparently, that: (a) it is agreed that all US forces in Europe should be brought under General Ridgway; and (b) as he is responsible for these forces, he should also be responsible for US military activities in Spain in order to ensure necessary preparations there in the event that an emergency should require a withdrawal to or through Spain.

3. Two distinct issues are involved in the conflicting Air Force and Army recommendations; first, the question of a single officer responsible for coordinating all US military activities in Spain and, second, the military chain of command.

With regard to the first it is recommended we support the Air Force position for the reasons given in Section 1 above.

With regard to the second, it would appear that this is primarily a military matter since, even though a single officer is made responsible for US military activities in Spain, it may still be possible that he would be placed under General Ridgway’s command. However, from the Department’s point of view the Air Force recommendation that this officer report direct to the JCS has the additional advantage of avoiding possible misinterpretation which might arise if US military activities in Spain were placed under General Ridgway. There will probably be great interest in all aspects of the US–Spanish arrangements for a brief period after the agreements are signed. If at that time it should become known that our military activities in Spain are under General Ridgway’s command, this might be misconstrued as a design on our part to bring Spain into NATO through the back door. Therefore, if the Air Force recommendations are adopted, this risk can be avoided and should have greatly diminished during the interim period of one year contemplated by the Air Force recommendations. Consequently you may wish to indicate the Department’s preference in this matter also.

FYI, in the Department’s own interests the Air Force proposal is also desirable for another reason. The base agreement will constitute an agreement to agree on a number of technical military matters. During the first year at least, we will have a continuing interest in negotiations regarding these matters. Our influence on such negotiations would be difficult to exercise under the Army proposal which would put these problems under USCINCEUR. Past experience indicate that USCINCEUR often settles such matters locally and that, when they are referred to Washington, USCINCEUR views are given such weight that Defense’s position is inflexible. However, under the Air Force proposal regarding the chain of command the close State–Defense cooperation which exists today on these matters, both here and in Madrid, would be continued.

1. Drafted by Dunham and cleared by Rogers.
2. A record of the meeting, held on Feb. 20 between representatives of the JCS and the Department of State, is in State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417, No. 74. No decision was reached on the question of command arrangements for base construction and planning purposes at that meeting.