711.56352/7–1252: Telegram

No. 861
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the Department of State1

secret
priority

41. USNEG. Mytel 35,2 rptd Paris 9, London 3, Rome 4. Translation of memo follows:

Text Begins: During the preliminary conversations held by Amer and Span groups and as consequence of exchange of impressions carried out, the respective positions have slowly become more clear. In order envisage the problem adequately, it is necessary begin with exposition of these points of view which may be presented as follows: [Page 1863]

I.
United States position:
(A)

The US places at disposition of Spain $100 million for mil, technical, and econ aid. There exists, in addition, the official announcement that to this amt may be added another $25 million for same purpose.

Distribution of these amts might be:

$37 million for mil equip; $88 million for purchases of an econ nature.

(B)

Utilization of these amounts, in the manner and distribution which may be agreed upon, is conditional upon:

(1)
The signing of an econ coop agrmt.
(2)
The signing of a mutual Def agrmt.
(3)
The signing of the base agrmt.

In contrast to the gen nature of two first agrmts, the third requires the establishment of statute by which the bases to which it refers must be governed and the conditions for their use. Therefore, it is in this agrmt that the difficulties of the negots are encountered.

II.
Spanish position:
(A)

On econ side, it is felt that sum of $125 million is very small and that assistance wld be necessary which wld permit development of a concrete program continued for several years; this aside from advisability of introducing modifications in the econ agrmt proposed by the Americans.

It must be pointed out that the recent authorization of $25 million was voted mentioning “not less than $25 million for mil, econ, and tech aid to Spain.” The American negotiators have left it reduced to that minimum figure of $25 million.

(B)

On mil side, the Span position has taken the fol form:

(1)
Maximum figure of $37 million for mil aid is considered wholly insufficient, quite apart from the fact that the application to mil ends of the entire $25 million established for econ aid appears to be illogical (inconsistent).
(2)
Assurance of continued aid for a period of several years wld be indispensable.
(3)
Aid shld be in sufficient quantity to accomplish fol objectives:
  • As regards ground forces, to organize and equip the divisions necessary for adequate Def.
  • As regards air forces, to have available to us planes and antiaircraft material sufficient for protection of national territory against air attacks.
  • As regards navy, to accomplish modernization of certain units and coastal defenses.

(C)
Spain wld be willing conclude an agrmt for construction and org of wholly Span bases whose eventual utilization by Amer forces in the event of emergency wld have to be subject of a later agrmt. Use of Span bases in time of peace by a fon power, inasmuch as it is not indispensable, conflicts with natl feelings and dignity and is [Page 1864] considered harmful to harmony and understanding between our countries.
III.
3
(1)
Exposition of both points of view clearly shows that the difficulties encountered in negots arise from disproportion which exists between amt of $125 million in total budgeted for econ aid and the obligation which wld arise for Spain from an eventual agrmt between both countries under terms of Mutual Security Act of 1951 and proposed base agrmt.
(2)
Although investment of amts allocated by Cong for aid to Spain wld assist Span economy and Span mil preparation, that amt is not by any means sufficient to cover requirements proceeding from a later agrmt under the act cited which, if carried out, wld require investments of greater magnitude.
(3)
Neither in text of law nor upon authorizing such assistance was it sought to assign to it such a character. If application of aid already granted had had to be subordinated to prior existence of an agrmt under Mutual Security Act cited, such an agrmt shld have been negotiated previously and, in that case, such aid should have been increased in amt, form, and for period demanded by requirements derived from new obligations contracted.
(4)
On the other hand, when one compares form and amt of aid granted to the other nations with that which is offered to Spain, it is evident that there exists a difference in treatment and, in our judgment, Amer econ assist is small by any standards in contrast with Span responsibilities which include whole range of polit and mil affairs.
(5)
If there are not available sufficient elements with which to confront the aggressions which our belligerency might provoke, our gen staffs and country itself wld disapprove an agrmt in which they were limited in or denied the indispensable and minimum elements with which to organize their own Def. Likewise, public opinion wld not support such an agrmt which wld aggravate the country’s sitn without obtaining the countervailing advantages corresponding to importance which problem demands.
(6)
Both aid granted to countries of the Western group, in spite of their weak will to resist which has been so often expressed, and that which recently has been quoted to Yugoslavia, show clearly how justified our arguments are and support our request that we be able to rely on sufficient elements in indispensable minimum quantity.
(7)
Consequently difficulties encountered in progress of negots derive from fol causes:
(a)
Inability to advance in detailed negots if a basic agrmt has not been reached previously.
(b)
Fact that proposed assistance will in no case be sufficient to satisfy the obligations of an agrmt such as the one sought.
(c)
Inescapable necessity for our nation that her security in the face of danger be guaranteed with amt of assist indispensable to strengthen her econ and mil preparedness.
(8)
If it is not within powers of US Del to meet the inescapable obligations for a fundamental agreement, which were clearly set forth to Adm Sherman and Gen Spry; and taking into account the firm will to resist of Span nation, as well as advantages to US and its internatl responsibilities that econ and mil preparedness of Iberian Peninsula be strengthened, it wld be necessary to place this negot on fol bases:
(a)
Concession by US of amt voted in Cong for econ, mil and tech aid to Spain, which already amts to minimum of $125 million.
(b)
Study, on Span side, of texts of econ cooperation agrmt and Mutual Security Agreement presented by Amer Dels, to effect their modification on those points where it may be considered necessary.
(c)
Engagement to use peseta counterpart of dollars received as aid to construction which, by mutual agrmt, may be considered appropriate for increasing our defensive mil strength.
(d)
Postponement of execution of gen base agrmt until authorizations and econ assistance to meet the obligations derived from such an agrmt are available but allowing necessary study to complete text thereof to proceed. Text ends.

Comment follows in separate tel.4

MacVeagh
  1. Repeated to Paris, London, and Rome.
  2. Dated July 11, telegram 35 reported the meeting between Arguelles and Train on July 5 (see supra) and the receipt on July 9 of the memorandum promised by Arguelles during the course of the discussion. It further offered the opinion that the Arguelles memorandum presented a viewpoint so different from that of the United States that new instructions from Washington were required in order to continue the negotiations. (711.56352/7–1152)
  3. In telegram 35, July 11, Ambassador MacVeagh expressed the opinion that the portion of the memorandum following this point was written by Generalissimo Franco himself. (711.56352/7–1152)
  4. The comments under reference were transmitted in telegram 46, July 14. Ambassador MacVeagh recommended that the United States raise the amount of the aid package for FY 1953 by $30 million and make a long-term commitment to support Spanish defense efforts in order to meet the desires reflected in the Arguelles memorandum. (711.56352/7–1452)