Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.51/8–453: Despatch

No. 610
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
No. 469

Paris, August 4, 1953.

• Subject: The Decline of French Confidence in US Leadership

I warmly welcomed your Circular Telegram 53 of July 23¹ as recognition of the necessity of maintaining the confidence of our allies if US leadership of the free world is to be effective.

In reply I enclose a memorandum² which I have drafted with the cooperation of the senior members of my staff and which I commend to your most serious consideration. It may be summarized as follows.

1. French confidence in US leadership has indeed declined in the last six months.

2. The basic causes are as follows:

a. Domestic political developments, in particular the method of opposing Communism at home summed up in the term “McCarthyism” and, even more important, the fact that the Administration has not made any direct public denunciation of McCarthyism.

This is the greatest single cause of the decline of French confidence in our leadership. Behavior which the French associate with dictatorship cannot be indulged in in any instance by the world’s leading democracy and leave confidence in that country as a leader of the free world intact in France.

b. Doubts as to who speaks for the US in foreign affairs. Frenchmen are disappointed when the tone and substance of the President’s words on foreign and military policy are not followed by all members of the Administration, including particularly top military officers; they totally fail to understand how basic American policies can be attacked in the public speeches of Republican Congressional leaders.

The French doubt the Administration’s ability to obtain the necessary support and acceptance of its policies in the Congress. They fear the apparent growth of Congressional leadership in foreign policy as opposed to leadership by the President and the Department of State. They have little confidence in any parliamentary body as a vehicle for world leadership in foreign affairs. On the other hand, they have only the greatest respect for the President’s opinions and policies in foreign affairs, and are prepared to welcome any direct assertion of Presidential leadership.

c. Doubts as to whether the present US Government believes in the possibility of a long period of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, and hence constant worry that the US may ultimately direct its policy toward military victory rather than toward preservation of peace.

Frenchmen see in the policy of “rolling back the iron curtain,” and the clandestine acts presumed to accompany it, as distinct from the policy of “containment,” increased risks for their own security in Europe because of their apprehensions both as to German irredentism and as to the temptation to the Soviet Union to take retaliatory action that might bring on a third world war.

Strengthening apprehensions on this score is the conclusion of many ordinary French citizens that our reluctance to enter into broad negotiations with the Soviet Union means we do not sincerely desire peace.

d. A tendency on the part of Washington to act without what the French consider adequate consultation with our allies, or US insistence that its policies be adopted by its allies and associates even when the US is at the start in a minority of one. Respective examples of these counts against the US are the recent letter of President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer,³ and the position of the US on matters concerning East-West trade.

e. The current European mood of increased national self-assertiveness, particularly toward the US, and the responsiveness of the war-weary European peoples to the seemingly friendly gestures of the Kremlin. These two phenomena are, however, less important factors in contributing to the loss of confidence in our leadership than our tolerance of McCarthyism at home and French doubt, mistrust, and resentment over various aspects of our policy abroad.

3. These five causes of the decline in French confidence in the US are generally intermingled and frequently heighten each other. For example, the violence of McCarthy’s attacks on American Communists and on the conduct of our allies lends credence to the belief that we may be tempted by our increasing military strength to stamp out the threat of world Communism by military means and that we intend to force our allies either to follow our policies or to give us a free hand to go-it-alone. Similarly, the fact that the Administration has not cracked down on McCarthy aggravates the doubts as to whether the President has a firm grasp on the policy of his party. The unilateral aspect of some of our handling of relations with the Soviet Union enhances the fear of the French that we are wedded to an inflexible policy that makes us unwilling to take advantage of apparent readiness for a detente on the part of the Soviet Union, whether or not such readiness actually exists and regardless of what its motives may be.

4. Given this situation, if we wish fully to reestablish our position of leadership with the French people, a constant effort to counteract the causes listed above is necessary, including:

a. National behavior that enables us to stand as an example of democratic comportment to be imitated by the countries who look to us for leadership. (This is a large order as it means effectively putting an end by one means or another to the phenomenon known as McCarthyism and a greater emphasis on the President’s beliefs as to the fundamentals of American conduct.)

b. Self-discipline on the part of Administration and Republican Congressional leaders in order to present to the world a unified party supporting the President’s leadership in foreign affairs.

c. A constant effort to convince our allies that we are being careful not to provoke the Soviet Union to retaliatory acts from which our allies believe they would be the first to suffer; and that we do not have an inflexible policy toward the USSR, but in fact are constantly reviewing it in the light of any new bases for judgment as to Soviet intentions as well as Soviet capabilities.

d. Demonstration, in our actions and through consultation, of due regard for the interests and opinions of our allies in order to convince them that we sincerely consider them as partners, equal in rights if not in strength, rather than as satellites.

e. Demonstration that we are prepared to participate fully in rather than merely to urge, common efforts to deal both realistically and imaginatively with common political, economic, and military problems.

5. Two measures of particular importance for building the confidence of our allies in the broadmindedness and constancy of our foreign policy are:

a. Adoption of a firm positive line in the matter of trade policy that will emphasize not only the necessity of a low US tariff but the stability of the level of tariffs over an extended period. This is of fundamental importance and is urgent.

b. Establishment of an affirmative Administration position that military aid will continue for some time in the future, and, if possible, indication as to the probable limits of US economic and military aid over a period of time longer than one year.

Many minor causes of irritation could also advantageously be removed from the McCarran–Walter Immigration Act without changing its basic provisions.

6. Full advantage should be taken of the unique position of the President in giving effective leadership to the country in many aspects of its international relations. France looks to the President himself not only to set the tone of American foreign policy, but also for the reaffirmation of the basic tenets of American democracy.

In presenting the conclusion that there has been a noticeable loss of confidence in the US among important segments of French opinion during the last six months, I am well aware that the French themselves are behaving on many issues in a manner to destroy foreign confidence in France. Frenchmen who throw stones at the US live in the most vulnerable of glass houses. Nevertheless, despite the sometimes carping criticism of the US on the part of Frenchmen, it is important for our Government to recover and maintain the confidence of a people whose views are often irritating but whose friendship for the US is so important to our own security.

Douglas Dillon

1. See footnote 1, Document 824.
2. Not printed; it was an 11-page memorandum prepared by the senior staff officials of the Embassy with a 1-page supplementary memorandum on French public opinion.
3. For text of this letter, dated July 23, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 491.