Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

396.1/7–3153: Telegram

No. 606
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, July 31, 1953—8 p.m.

413. Limit distribution strictly. MacArthur and I saw Bidault this afternoon. He told us that things had not been too easy for him recently, and he mentioned in particular Salisbury’s statement in the House of Lords that the British in Washington had tried to attain agreement on a four power meeting at the highest level but had not been able to do so because of French and US opposition.¹ He pointed out that this was not a correct description of what had happened and said it naturally made things more difficult for him in France. He also pointed out that the President’s letter to Adenauer² had had a very bad effect here in France and had constituted a serious blow against French ratification of EDC. He said that the one good thing about the letter was its timing, coming at a period when the French Parliament was on vacation, and when everyone was preparing to take their August vacations. He said he hoped it would be forgotten in the fall by the time Parliament came back.

We then talked about Indochina, and he pointed out that the real problem now was the question of finding the necessary financing, and that the action of the Senate in reducing Indochina credits by $100 million had been a very severe blow.³ MacArthur told him that this decision was not yet final and described the efforts of the administration to have these funds restored in conference. Bidault was very pleased by this explanation as he had not realized that any possibility remained of restoring the funds. He pointed out that his problem in regard to Indochina was particularly difficult as there were a number of people in the French Cabinet opposed to continuing the war effort in Indochina. Among those in the Cabinet who desired to pull out of Indochina as soon as possible, he named Reynaud, Mitterand and Faure. He also said that Pleven had not been much in favor of sending additional troops to Indochina. He then said that, nevertheless, he would be able to carry the principle of an increased effort in Indochina, provided the necessary funds could be found. We pointed out to him our deep interest and desire to help in the present situation in Indochina but said that the US was unable to do anything concrete until it had received the details of the French plan. He agreed that the next step was for the French to give us their definite plan. He said further that Reynaud’s overall plan was to leave Indochina and simultaneously to dethrone the Sultan of Morocco in order to prove that France was still a strong power. He said that this was obviously a ridiculous policy in both regards. He then thanked MacArthur for his information on Indochina and said that it was helpful to know definitely of our real interest in Indochina. He said that he personally had always felt that the US was deeply interested and would do what it could to help.

Dillon

1. Regarding the Foreign Ministers meetings in Washington, July 10–14, see Document 603.
2. For the text of President Eisenhower’s letter to Chancellor Adenauer of July 23, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 491.
3. For information concerning Congressional reaction to the Mutual Security legislation and Congressional efforts to reduce appropriations during the Second Session of the 82d Congress, see Document 276.