Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–554: Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) and the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, August 5, 1954—5 p.m.

504. From Bruce and Dillon. Re Deptel 447.² Following information representing summary of EDC ratification picture has been checked and rechecked with various French officials participating in these questions.

As of first of this week, Mendes-France was still insisting, in conversations on the EDC with his Cabinet ministers and advisers, that EDC treaty cannot be ratified in its present form and that a “compromise” including substantial changes must be found. Mendes still has no proposals to make himself. He now thinks that other EDC countries will accept almost any reasonable change that he will propose. He does not agree with position of Bourges-Maunoury that any French proposal on EDC must be limited to “improvements” in present text which would not require action by parliaments of other EDC countries.

Mendes had been impressed by firm and clear position of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic and US on EDC a few weeks ago and was inclined to believe that he had been left very little room for maneuver. Now he has put this aside as an initial reaction on part of the other countries. This unfortunate change in attitude of Mendes can be in large part attributed to activities of Spaak during last ten days. Spaak has presumably given impression that other EDC countries might accept almost any change proposed by France. In particular, he is reported to have seen no special difficulty with the ideas calling for unanimous voting by the commissariat and postponement of many features of the treaty for a 5-year period.

Now that confrontation between Bourges-Maunoury and Koenig has failed and has given Mendes-France breathing spell on the EDC that he wished, he is conducting his own confrontation with a small group of advisers in process of making up his mind about what to do.

De Seynes is to present pro-EDC side of confrontation and Gros, the anti-EDC side. Unfortunately, De Seynes is almost entirely new to EDC treaty and does not fully understand real objective of present European policy. On positive side, he is in close contact with pro-EDC officials in. Paris. Gros, on other hand, knows treaty backwards and forwards and is most intelligent man in the anti-EDC group in the French Foreign Office which has been trying to kill or thwart European policy for last three years. Additional advisers working directly with Mendes are Boris, Parodi, and Chatenet, all confirmed opposers of EDC.

At least three other groups have also been asked to work up the proposal that Mendes might make in connection with EDC:

1. The old anti-EDC group under Parodi, Chatenet, Gros, Bergner, Wormser, etc.—is now back in business and is in direct contact with Mendes. This group has drawn up a new treaty of about 14 articles based on the “little NATO” concept of a 7-nation coalition of national armies including the United Kingdom. There are, of course, special limitations and restrictions on Germans. An armaments pool of 6 nations with some supranational features is included as usual so that France can take advantage of all the EDC features on armaments production which the French like so much. This scheme is very similar to first scheme that Nutting, Kirkpatrick, Roberts and others in British Foreign Office suggested might be possible a few weeks ago.

2. Gruerin De Beaumont also has a small group. They now seem to be on right line of limiting themselves to proposals which would not require new actions by parliaments of other countries. The change in De Beaumont’s position is said to be due to strong position taken by Dutch, particularly the rather insulting attitude Beyen took on De Beaumont’s ideas of postponing certain supranational features of the treaty. The report sent by De Beaumont to Mendes-France after his trip to The Hague is supposed to have been very good from a pro-European point of view. Apparently, idea of commissariat voting by unanimity has now been dropped by De Beaumont. Also, French Embassies in the various European capitals may cease to advocate this idea as the possible solution.

3. Bourges-Maunoury is continuing to prepare a French position limited to “improvements” which would not require new parliamentary action by other countries. Quai d’Orsay officials have leaked a large part of the possible suggestions to press. This publicity plus Alphand’s efforts to take credit for nearly every suggestion will not help in convincing Mendes that this should be his policy.

Bourges-Maunoury seems to be getting along very well with Mendes. The esteem is said to be mutual. Mendes was apparently helped a great deal by Bourges during difficulties in his Cabinet over Tunisia. It is nearly certain that Mendes will consult Bourges almost daily on EDC question and, presumably Bourges could force Mendes to present a reasonable proposal to the Brussels meeting by resigning, as he promised, if something other than present text of EDC treaty is presented for ratification.

Various pro-European officials are nervous about tactics that Mendes might adopt. They fear Mendes may try to maneuver as follows: He would decide at last minute to propose a “compromise” changing or postponing supranational features of treaty and creating overtly or otherwise a German national army; he would not at that stage seek support of political groups in French Assembly but would first seek approval from the US and UK probably in the form of “we cannot write the EDC treaty and we will accept whatever the other EDC countries will accept”; he would force an anxious Adenauer and a mediating Spaak to agree to submit whatever is necessary to their parliaments; he would then face the MRP, the Socialists, and Independents and the Radical Socialists with this “fait accompli”.

In summary, tension is mounting in Paris on both sides of EDC question as Mendes continues successfully to conceal his views and intentions. Pro-European leaders have indicated that they are prepared to force resignation of Mendes if his “compromise” goes beyond changes considered eligible by Bourges-Maunoury. Guy Mollet has stated publicly that he will firmly oppose any which by postponing or watering down supranational features of treaty would lead to recreation of German national army. Chaban-Delmas, on other hand, states that ex-Gaullists will overthrow Mendes Government around August 20 on EDC issue and create political situation which will lead to “crisis of regime” in September.³

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Rome.
2. Not printed; it expressed the Department’s concern at the implication in recent telegrams from Paris that Mendès-France intended to approach the United Kingdom and United States before consulting further with the Foreign Ministers of the EDC countries and that Mendès-France might still be considering a compromise substantially different from the existing EDC Treaty text contrary to prior indications. It asked Dillon and Bruce “your views soonest on above points” (740.5/8–454).
3. Telegram 504 was a subject of conversation at the Secretary’s staff meeting on the morning of Aug. 6. Following that meeting, Merchant called Bruce at Paris and informed him that the Secretary was extremely disturbed that Spaak seemed to have given the impression to Mendès-France that other EDC countries might be willing to accept any changes proposed by France. Merchant “told Mr. Bruce that we thought he should consider a prompt trip to Brussels with a view to getting Spaak back on the rails … that we considered the next week or so critical in this enterprise and we are anxious to do anything from this end that he might consider helpful. Mr. Bruce said that he did not think Spaak was in any real sense wobbling but that he had again been guilty of loose talk. He said that he would bear in mind the possible utility of a trip to Brussels but that for the moment he felt he could accomplish all that needed to be accomplished through André de Staercke. He thought that at this particular juncture it was well for the United States to give no appearance of great activity.” (Memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Aug. 6, 740.5/8–654)