Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

662A.00/7–1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Embassy in France ¹

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London, July 12, 1954—11 a.m.

47. Paris pass Hughes and Bruce. From Lyon. Verbatim text. Reference Department’s 201 repeated Paris 132, Bonn 103.²

Following is clear text of study group’s draft instruction for action by US and British Ambassadors Paris referred to paragraph 2 Department’s 188³ to London repeated Paris 122, Bonn 97.

“HMG and the US Government are now considering the report of the Anglo-US study group. It will be forwarded to you by [omission in source text].

2. In consultation with your US colleague, you should approach the French Government on the evening of Monday, July 12, and make an oral communication in the following terms. You should begin by recalling that, as was made clear in the Washington statement and in my statement in the House of Commons on July 7, HMG, like the US Government, are still working on the assumption that the German contribution to Western defense will be made through the European Defence Community. We are, however, concerned about what would be the political effect in Germany if the French Parliament were to rise at the end of their present session without having taken a vote on the EDC. No progress has been made since the treaty was signed over two years ago in improving the international status of the Federal Republic. Any further delay would have a most unsettling effect on Germany, gravely weakening the position of the Federal Chancellor and bringing his policy of European cooperation into disrepute.

3. As the French Government will be aware, both Congress and Parliament adjourn towards the end of this month. Both Governments therefore feel that before such adjournment they should formulate their positions so that they can inform and consult with their parliamentary bodies as seems appropriate in each case. They have considered most sympathetically the French Government’s suggestion that any public statement in Parliament might be avoided or perhaps deferred. HMG will, however, undoubtedly be questioned on the recommendations of the study group in the course of the foreign affairs debate on Wednesday, July 14, which is in any case the last opportunity for the discussion of foreign affairs before the House arises. They understand moreover that consultations between the President and Congress cannot be delayed much longer. They do not therefore feel that they can avoid making some public reference to this problem during the debate, although they are confident that this can be done in a way which need not embarrass M. Mendes-France. For your own information, the intention is for the Minister of State to deal with this matter in passing and in reply to what will have been said by other speakers in winding up the debate.

4. As the French Government knows, the Anglo-US study group was set up in London to consider on a purely hypothetical basis and in all its aspects the question how the international status of the German Federal Republic could be improved were the EDC treaty not to enter into force in the very near future. The two Governments have come to the conclusion that, in that event their aim could best be achieved by dissociating the Bonn Conventions from the EDC treaty by means of a short and simple agreement to be concluded between the Four Powers who signed those conventions. Such an agreement would provide, in agreement with Chancellor Adenauer, that German rearmament would be deferred for the time being. It would also provide for the continued financial support of the Allied Forces in Germany.

5. In making this communication, you should of course, leave the French Government in no doubt that the two governments maintain in full force their support of EDC and that it is their confident hope that the French Assembly will vote the treaty during the present session.

6. You should inform the French Government that we shall be making a subsequent communication in the same sense to the German Federal Government, the Benelux governments and the North Atlantic Council.

7. For your own information, you will see when you receive the study group’s report⁴ that it includes drafts of Four Power protocols. The existence of such drafts should not, however, be mentioned to the French now because (a) the texts have not been finally cleared; (b) they cannot be submitted to Parliament at this stage; (c) knowledge of their existence might only encourage further delaying tactics on the part of French opponents of the EDC and (d) we could only usefully enter into negotiations upon them with the French at a later stage, if at all.

Nor, of course, should you mention the possibilities of action which might be taken if the French were unwilling to proceed on the basis of the protocols. We should regard these parts of the study group’s work as being covered by the words (paragraph 4 above) “on a purely hypothetical basis and in all its aspects”.

8. Should the French Government suggest that the work of the study group might now be resumed with their participation, you should explain that this seems to us premature and suggest that it could only confuse the issues while the EDC issue is still before the Assembly. We shall, of course, be anxious to consult fully with them if to our great regret the problem becomes actual rather than hypothetical.

9. We understand that your US colleagues will be receiving parallel instructions. The wording of your respective statements need not be identical. No written communication should be made.

10. I shall probably take the opportunity of my meeting with M. Mendes-France in Geneva on Monday to speak to him on similar lines, but the formal notification of our intentions should be made by you and your US colleague in Paris. You should request that this notification should be regarded as confidential pending whatever public statement is made in Parliament.”

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Washington as telegram 196. Source text is that found in Department of State files. Repeated also to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
2. Not printed; during the deliberations of the London Study Group, the Foreign Office had drafted the instructions for action by the British Ambassador in Paris contained in the source text. Telegram 201 reported that Dulles was agreeable to informing the French of agreed U.S.–U.K. policy regarding German contribution to Western defense along the lines contained in the source text (662A.00/7–1254).
3. Not printed; it reported that Dulles had by July 10 considered the initial text of the proposed U.K. instruction to its Ambassador at Paris and with two reservations agreed to it. Should the United Kingdom agree to two revisions proposed by Dulles, then Ambassador Dillon was authorized to make a parallel statement to the French Government on July 12 (662A.00/7–1054).
4. Supra.