611.65/6–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State 1
4307. I saw Scelba June 26 at his request. Our meeting was most cordial and we covered following points:
1. US–UK talks. Scelba inquired regarding substance Eisenhower–Churchill conversations and expressed view it was utmost importance that US–UK policy should develop common line soonest. By this he meant UK should swing behind US. Scelba believed that UK attitude on dealings with Soviets had done “incalculable harm” in Europe and he cited Eden’s recent speech in Commons2 as having had adverse effect in Italy. Scelba recalled disastrous effect of Churchill’s speech last year prior to Italian elections3 and asserted that UK attitude ever since had aggravated this damage. UK, by fostering illusion that peace with Soviets is possible in years ahead, has reduced its own support of EDC to mere lip service. UK attitude toward USSR had and would continue to strengthen PCI arguments against EDC, increase neutralist trend through Europe and augment general disorientation against EDC in Italy. Scelba said that he had told Nutting exactly this. Scelba added that while US showed fear of opening to left in Italy, where no such opening had been made in spite of millions of Communists, a world opening to left was being executed by Eden even without Communists in UK. Scelba also believed that French situation had contributed to difficulties on EDC and to general NATO confusion although French attitude did not confuse Italian opinion so much as British attitude.
I told Scelba that Washington talks had no fixed agenda and that they should more accurately be termed “friendly discussions”. Future of EDC and plans for pacific security would undoubtedly figure prominently. Naturally there would be important consequences of talks to US–UK relations, and we all hope results would be greater unity and coherence between US and UK policy, as we have no fundamental doubts that UK objectives are the same as ours. In response [Page 991] my question whether Eden’s recent speech would adversely affect EDC passage here, Scelba replied negatively and said he did not share UK view on Soviet’s peaceful intentions. In his view Soviet foreign policy consisted in making conquests and digesting them and what UK erroneously interpreted as Soviet desire for peace was in fact another digestive phase”.
2. EDC: Scelba said he had “every intention” of bringing EDC to Chamber floor immediately after reaching agreement on Trieste. In reply my query, he said debate would commence on signature of accord and not await conclusion of take-over phase. He earnestly hoped Trieste accord could be reached by July 15 because he felt that between July 15 and August 15 (beginning of traditional Italian vacation period), EDC could be passed. He believed that with Trieste out of the way and with safe majority he now enjoys, he could threaten Parliament with summer session which would bring about quick action and would even disrupt Communist delaying tactics. He considered that government could count on PNM support for EDC since their abstention in Senate confidence vote on June 23 had been due only to absence Trieste settlement. Scelba feared that if Trieste agreement not reached by July 15, would be impossible hold Parliament in session any longer. This would mean that EDC could not be brought to Chamber floor until autumn and debate would then be protracted. In addition, opposition would have time to express dissatisfaction and pick holes in whatever Trieste agreement might have been reached following Parliamentary recess.
3. Facilities and SOF. I have reported Scelba’s remarks on facilities and SOF agreements in mytel 4306, June 26.4 Main point that Scelba stressed on these questions was that with Trieste agreement in hand, he would have no difficulty in obtaining prompt Parliamentary approval of facilities and SOF agreements. On facilities he indicated that he was prepared to approve present text. I did not mention minor modifications necessary as I did not believe it wise to embark on detailed discussions at this juncture.
4. Trieste: Throughout our conversations, Scelba kept returning to thesis that quick Trieste settlement indispensable if government were to move forward on EDC, facilities and SOF rapidly. According to Scelba, essential such agreement be reached by July 15. He emphasized that immediate decision by Yugoslavia to reopen frontier between Zone A and Zone B would make conclusion of agreement much easier. He pointed out that 63,000 Istrians now in Zone A are separated from friends and relatives in Zone B. Scelba considered that opening of frontiers would have 2 important results: (1) Would be gesture of confidence and friendliness by Yugoslavia and would be indication their faith in ultimate success outcome negotiations; (2) would remove nervousness and bitterness of Italians in Zone A and [Page 992] Zone B who are physically separated from families and friends. This in itself would pave way for acceptance compromises which have to be made and would lessen interim possibility of demonstrations and incidents. I expressed my belief that all evidence pointed to fact that Yugoslavia desired rapid agreement as much as Italy. We sincerely hoped that following Trieste accord there would be new era in Italian-Yugoslav relations which would in turn lead to closer Balkan and Mediterranean accord.
Scelba then requested me to assure the President and Secretary that Italy’s foreign policy was still and would continue to be firmly anti-Communist and pro-Atlantic. In his view Italian Government had made remarkable comeback since elections last year. Italy’s determination to ratify EDC and to work firmly and increasingly with West all the more remarkable when considered in relation to pre-June 1953 government which had safe majority and was not working in false atmosphere of “distension” engendered by UK. With only slim majority and with difficult job of balancing quadripartite formula he had preserved and increased anti-Communist measures. This progress was justification his tactics of opening to left-center while continuing to broaden base to right. “Real opening had been made by both sides to center”. Evidence success his tactics was compactness quadripartite and fact that monarchists would probably support EDC and in some measure Trieste settlement.
Scelba said US should have every reason to have confidence in Italy. He was convinced that with Trieste settled Italy would be able pursue more active and fruitful foreign policy and exert leadership for European integration of which it had given many indications in past. He wanted President and US Government to understand Italy’s profound pro-West orientation by which he meant Italy would follow US not UK, lead.
My comments on above in immediately following telegram 4308.5
- Repeated to London, Belgrade, and Trieste.↩
- Reference is presumably to Eden’s comments in the course of his report to Commons on Apr. 13 concerning his discussions with Dulles on Apr. 12. Regarding this, see telegram Secto 5, Apr. 13, p. 930. For the text of Eden’s remarks, see H.C. Debs., 5th series, vol. 526, cols. 969–975.↩
- Reference is presumably to Prime Minister Churchill’s speech in Commons on Foreign Affairs, May 11, 1953, ibid., vol. 515, cols. 883–898.↩
- Not printed. (765.5 MSP/6–2654)↩
- Not printed; it began: “Suspension of facilities negotiations and general indications of our dissatisfaction with lack of progress on EDC, facilities, SOF and other questions coupled with Scelba’s success in Senate confidence vote June 23 have served to clear air here and to give Italians reason to take long hard look at their international position. There is little doubt that Scelba feels he is now in a much stronger parliamentary situation.” The telegram then proceeded to discuss the Trieste situation in gloomy terms, stating that failure by the Scelba government to reach an accord by July 15 might well be used as an alibi for further delay in coming to grips with the EDC issue (750G.00/6–2654).↩