Office of the Historian

740.5/6–2854

Agreed United States–United Kingdom Secret Minute on Germany and the EDC 1

secret
[Washington, June 28, 1954?]

The President and the Prime Minister have today agreed that:

(1)
Failure of the French Assembly to ratify EDC before recessing for the summer would create an extremely difficult situation in Germany and threaten the position of the Chancellor.
(2)
In such event, it would be necessary in the interest of retaining the alignment of the Federal Republic with the West promptly to take such steps as were open to them to restore to the Federal Republic the measure of sovereignty contemplated by the contractual agreements.
(3)
Such restoration of sovereignty should be accomplished in a fashion which would as little as possible militate against ratification by France of the EDC in the fall.
(4)
Until the French Assembly has in fact recessed without favorable action, the Govts of the US and the UK should maintain in full force their public and private support of EDC. They should discourage any public discussion of alternatives.
(5)
The action contemplated in (2) above will require parliamentary action in the case of those who participate. For this reason, parliamentary authorization should be sought prior to recess for the summer. The US and UK will approach the French Govt with a view to explaining their purpose in obtaining parliamentary authorizations to place the contractuals into effect, if necessary, in the absence of a concurrent coming into force of the EDC Treaty or French ratification of the contractuals. French participation or acquiescence should, however, be sought.
(6)
Concurrently with the action necessary to place the contractual agreements into effect, at least as regards the UK, US, and Germany, provisions should be made in agreement with Chancellor Adenauer that Germany will defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament.
(7)
In the event that the French refuse to participate in the foregoing course of action, they should be told that the Govts of the US and UK were resolute in their determination to place in effect, insofar as their relations with the Federal Republic were concerned, the provisions of the contractual agreement to the maximum extent practicable.
(8)
The Chancellor should be consulted as appropriate in placing the above program in effect with a view to securing his views and cooperation.
(9)
Experts from the US should meet in a matter of days with British experts in London with a view to working out the legal, procedural and chronological aspects of the program described above.2
(10)
In the event that the French Assembly before recessing should reject the EDC Treaty, there would then exist all the greater reason to proceed resolutely and expeditiously with the above program. In addition, it would then be necessary for the Govts of the US and the UK, together with their partners in NATO, urgently to consult regarding alternative measures for securing a German defense contribution.

  1. The source text was transmitted in telegram 7143 to London, June 28; repeated to Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, and Luxembourg. At the time of transmission the text had been agreed to by U.S. officials and by Eden but had not yet received Churchill’s final approval. Telegram 7179 to London, June 29, reported that since the Prime Minister had now approved the minute in telegram 7143, that minute was now official U.S.–U.K. policy (740.5/6–2954).↩
  2. Regarding the work of the experts in London, see editorial note, p. 997.↩