740.5/6–2154: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
priority
4946. During the Undersecretary’s visit with Mendes-France, the Undersecretary brought up the question of the EDC and stated that Secretary Dulles was personally very disturbed by the press reports that the US and the UK were now considering alternatives for EDC. He said at least as far as the United States was concerned, these reports were entirely untrue as the United States was still wholeheartedly in favor of EDC and saw no other possible solution.
Mendes said he was glad that the Undersecretary had brought the question up and said that he had meant to outline his position on EDC in any event. Mendes said that he now was and always had been strongly and solidly in favor of the movement for European unity in every field. However, he said that he also had always believed that it would be most unfortunate for France to take such a serious decision as joining the EDC by a narrow majority of a few votes over the opposition of an embittered minority. Therefore, he said he would try to see if he could obtain a large majority. His attempt would be to find a means of uniting all of those who believed (1) in working towards European unity or integration and (2) who also believed that German rearmament was necessary. He said that he felt that there was a substantial majority of the French Parliament in favor of these two basic policies and it would be his idea to ask all concerned to make compromises so as to reach an agreement.
Mendes then said that he felt that Indochina had had a serious effect on EDC in France and that if the Indochina crisis was settled and the French people could look forward to the return of the Expeditionary Corps to France they would be more willing to proceed with EDC. La Chambre (Republican Socialist Minister for Associated States) heartily seconded this statement. Secondly Mendes said that if he could settle the Indochina crisis, he would have a greatly enhanced personal prestige and would be able to ask the Assembly to take a decision on EDC which it might otherwise be unwilling to do.
Mendes then stated that if his search for compromise resulted in any suggestions for changes in the EDC, it would be his idea to put the [Page 979] EDC, with these reservations, to a vote before the summer recess of the National Assembly. He said it was his firm resolve to have a vote in the National Assembly on the EDC prior to the summer vacation provided only that he first could reach a settlement of the Indochina problem which had priority. In this connection he emphasized the fact that he wished the EDC vote to follow an Indochina settlement because of the enlarged prestige such a settlement would give him in the Assembly. Mendes said that he felt that if he could obtain ratification in France by a large majority, he would then be entitled to go to France’s partners in the EDC and ask them to accept changes because of the fact that they guaranteed the wholehearted and enthusiastic support of France for the EDC concept. He said any changes in the EDC treaty that would not be acceptable to France’s partners would obviously not be useful, and he would only accept such changes as he felt he could honestly recommend to the other EDC countries. He said that in no case would he negotiate with the other countries on such changes before the French National Assembly had actually ratified the treaty as he was sure that the other countries would rightfully regard any such attempt to negotiate changes as a new method of delay. However, he felt the situation would be different after the French National Assembly had actually ratified as in that case France would be already fully bound. The Undersecretary emphasized the importance of reaching an early solution and said he understood and sympathized with Mendes-France’s feelings that ratification by a narrow majority would not be a satisfactory solution.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩