Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238
Memorandum of Conversation, Held at Prime Minister Laniel’s Office in Paris, April 14, 1954, 5:30 p.m.1
Present:
- The Secretary
- Prime Minister Laniel
- Foreign Minister Bidault
- Ambassador Dillon
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
- Lt. Col. Walters
After exchanging the usual amenities and after some talk concerning previous conversations which the Secretary had had on this visit in Paris, the Secretary said that he had talked with the British in London and felt that they had moved in considerable measure towards the position of France and the US. Mr. Laniel commented that this must have been difficult indeed. The Secretary said that he had the text of Mr. Eden’s statement in the Commons today, which he understood had not been too well received by the opposition. The Secretary then said that the question of EDC was a vital one for the US. Events were taking place and things were happening, and for a country like the US, it was extremely difficult on one hand to stand still with France and on the other to go forward with the other nations. Both the President and the Foreign Minister said they could understand this difficulty, and Mr. Bidault said that it arose in France from the nature of the majority.
The Secretary said that he was very happy to learn that President Laniel had the intention of making public on the following day the date of the opening of the debate on EDC. The President said that this was so, and that he had been waiting for the appropriate moment to do this, as the risks were great. However, now the Government was going ahead and face these risks. The Secretary said that it was our intention to issue the U.S. declaration after the French Government had fixed the date for the EDC debate. He believed we could make [Page 937] public our declaration about 36 hours after the date of the debate was fixed. He felt that this, in conjunction with the official British paper and the statement that Mr. Eden was making in the Commons today, would have a very beneficial effect on French opinion. The Secretary then said that he felt that it was important that the French Government demonstrate its capacity to act, as there was no weakness greater than indecision. The President said that there had never been any indecision on his part, that his mind had been made up from the beginning, but that he had been awaiting the most opportune time to present this very difficult problem. The Secretary then said that he felt that when the Deputies realized the strength of the position which France would occupy within EDC with the support and assistance of the UK and the US, they would realize that this would be far stronger than anything that might be envisaged under any possible alternative scheme.
Mr. Bidault then said that Mr. Laniel was a block of Norman granite on this subject. There was a jocular exchange at this point between Mr. Laniel who maintained that granite was found only in Brittany and not in Normandy, and Mr. Bidault who maintained that there was granite in Southern Normandy which he knew, having been a candidate for Parliament from a district there. Mr. Bidault then went on to say that under Mr. Laniel’s direction there would be nothing lacking in the political skill which was important and which was Mr. Laniel’s department as was courage. He also said that the Government would do all that had to be done. Mr. Laniel had shown his courage in removing a man who had not wished to be removed from his position. He had been compelled to remove Marshal Juin, difficult though this was in a country as divided as France, because this would show that no man was above the law. A “band of intriguers, imbeciles and men blinded with ambition” had seized upon this event to exploit it for political ends. There were always people avid to “inherit power and control of the government.”
The Secretary then said that if this matter did not go forward and the ancient bonds that united France with the United States and other Western Powers were changed, the man who would aspire to the office of President of the Council of Ministers or Minister of Foreign Affairs in France would have a task which he would not envy and which would be virtually impossible.
The Secretary then said that he felt that there could be no more unfortunate position for a free nation today than to stand alone and apart from the others. He himself had constantly repeated to the American people and to Congress that we ourselves were not strong enough to stand alone, and he felt that this was in a greater measure true for France. Both President Laniel and Mr. Bidault said they [Page 938] shared completely this view. The Secretary said that he felt that much more was at stake here than the signature and ratification of a treaty. It was a concept of the fraternity of nations—whether we could live with such a concept or whether losing our illusions each one turned in upon himself. He feared that if France were to choose to stand alone, the weight of public opinion in America would move towards isolationism, and as he had stated previously, he did not believe that we could live in security in isolationism. Therefore what he sought of France was something more than what was needed to save France, it was also something France could do to help save the free world including the United States. The Secretary said that he did not in any degree minimize the difficulties of this task, the complexity of the problem, and the degree of courage required to deal with it. While he probably did not comprehend the whole problem in France, he did feel he had some appreciation of it.
[Here follows a discussion of Indochina; for text, see volume XIII, Part 1, page 1336.]
- Drafting officer not indicated on source text, but the source text does carry the handwritten annotation “Approved by Sec Dulles. D. MacA”.↩