740.5/4–1454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)1
Participants:
- Prime Minister Laniel
- Douglas MacArthur, II
At the request of Prime Minister Laniel I called on him privately last evening at 10:15 p.m. (he had sent word to me at the airport by [Page 933] M. Vidal, the Director of his Cabinet, that he would like to see me at the above-mentioned hour). We were alone except for Mme. Laniel, who sat quietly in another corner of the room.
After the usual exchange of amenities I said to M. Laniel that we were very glad to know that on Thursday, April 15, the French Cabinet would at last fix the date for the Assembly debate on the EDC. M. Laniel immediately replied that the entire EDC situation was extremely difficult. The URAS and ARS were making great difficulties and he was apprehensive that a political crisis might ensue when the date for the debate was fixed by the government, and this crisis would involve the fall of the present government. If the present government fell, he did not see how it could be succeeded by any other government which would put the EDC through. He felt that if someone like Mendès-France formed a new government the situation with respect to both the EDC and Indochina would be virtually hopeless. Furthermore, to get a majority for EDC in the French Parliament he needed a few of the URAS and ARS votes, which he thought he could get if he maneuvered properly. Therefore, he was not certain that it would be wise tactically to insist on fixing the date for the debate on Thursday.
I said to M. Laniel that I had known Chaban-Delmas, the leader of the URAS group, for some 15 years. Chaban was intelligent and clever, but was tremendously ambitious and lacked moral scruple. His lack of such moral scruple had been clearly shown, not only by the way he treated his first wife, but in his political intriguing and maneuvering. I said that I did not believe that Chaban-Delmas and his friends would ever go along with EDC. They were opposed to it and their efforts to postpone the fixing of the Assembly debate was simply a maneuver to postpone any decision until such time as EDC was virtually down the drain. I thought that if the consideration for postponing the debate was the hope of bringing Chaban-Delmas and his friends along in support of EDC, it was unsound.
M. Laniel said that his position was very difficult and he did not wish to take steps which would involve the fall of the French Government prior to Geneva. He was inclined to agree that most of the URAS and ARS would, in the final analysis, oppose the EDC but he still thought he could carry a few of them along with him.
I replied that I did not share his view. I said that the Secretary [Page 934] expected upon his return to the United States on Thursday, to be able to report to the President that M. Laniel and his government had finally set the date for the EDC debate. If this were not possible I thought that very grave consequences would ensue. I said that I would like to speak very frankly. In the past few weeks the United States had been approached by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Benelux countries with a view to discussing alternative plans for the EDC which would ensure German association with the West, and participation in collective defense. These approaches had been made because there was a growing belief that France had lost the capacity to act or take any decisions which required courage. This incapacity to face up to reality was rapidly undermining France’s position as one of the leading powers of the free world. Thus far we had not discussed alternatives and other courses of action with our U.K., German and Benelux friends. However, if the French Government could not even fix the date of the debate, M. Laniel should know that we would be obliged to go quietly ahead and work out alternative courses of action. We would not announce publicly that we were doing this, since the French would construe any such announcement as a threat or blackmail. However, he should have no illusions. If France, by its inability to act, forced us to leave her behind, we would go on with the other nations which wished to survive. If the French Government did not fix the date of the debate on Thursday, I felt that we would soon have to begin to explore other courses of action to which we had given a great deal of thought and for which we had some plans.
I said that the countries that were joined together in the collective enterprise of making Europe were like a group of mountain climbers who were roped together. They had left the last resting camp and were attacking the peak. The peak or summit as we saw it was our very survival. Halfway between the last camp and the peak one member of the group, France, suddenly refused to go forward or backward. It simply wished to camp on a ledge and remain there until it perished. It apparently not only wished to remain there alone, but wished the other members of the party to remain there and perish with it. The United States, as one member of the group, was not prepared to die simply because France wished to commit what amounted to suicide. Furthermore, we did not believe that the other members of the team who were roped together in this enterprise wished to perish because of lack of collective action. Therefore, the time had come when, if France would not budge, the rest of us must cut the rope and leave her on the ledge.
In conclusion, I said I had one final observation to make about all this. M. Laniel and I were very old friends. We had worked together in the Resistance. I knew his courage and his devotion to the cause of Franco-American understanding. To me it would be infinitely sad [Page 935] if he were Prime Minister presiding over a French government which, by its inaction, deliberately separated France from the United States and the other Western Allies and who would be responsible for France losing its position as a leader of the free world and becoming in effect another Belgium.
M. Laniel said he recognized that the rest of the world could not wait indefinitely on France. However, his problems were very great. The constitution and the electoral law had resulted in a situation where it was impossible to govern France under the existing system. He wished to make clear that he had not taken a decision not to fix the date of the Assembly debate on Thursday, but it was all very complicated.
[Here follows a discussion on Indochina; for text, see volume XIII, Part 1, page 1327.]
- The meeting took place at the Prime Minister’s private residence at 15 rue Leroux from 10:15 p.m. to midnight on Apr. 13. MacArthur had accompanied Secretary Dulles to London and Paris; see footnote 1, p. 930. In telegram 3245 to Paris, Mar. 20, Dulles had suggested to Dillon that in view of the fact that “early EDC ratification in France seems to be slipping out from under us”, it might be useful to send MacArthur to Paris within a week “carrying strong oral message to Laniel from President (who has not yet been consulted concerning this possibility)”. Dulles added that if either Dillon or Bruce felt that such a visit “might cause damage to our cause and I see some risk in that respect”, then MacArthur would not come (740.5/3–2054). Dillon replied in telegram 3481 from Paris, Mar. 23, that both he and Bruce agreed that a MacArthur trip would be most useful, and that Bidault concurred (740.5/3–2354).↩