Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer)

secret

Washington, April 1, 1954.

Subject:

• EDC

Participants:

• Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Director, RA

Mr. Leishman called today at his request and informed me of the contents of two cables from Paris describing the conversations on March 30 between Steel and Alphand, and between Harvey and Bidault, along the lines reported in Paris’s 3611 of March 31.¹ (It will be recalled that Alphand had passed to Steel a message from Laniel in which the latter indicated that he had been informed by the URAS Ministers that if the French Government signed the agreement before the Easter recess on UK association with EDC, the URAS Ministers would not resign but would seek immediately to bring down the Government on an extraneous issue.)

Mr. Leishman then informed me that in response to Ambassador Harvey’s report of these conversations, the Foreign Office had sent instructions to the U.K. Ambassadors in the six EDC countries, re-emphasizing the parliamentary pressure on HMG to make a statement regarding the UK–EDC negotiations on British association. The message went on to express the hope that the agreement would be signed in time for Mr. Eden to make his announcement in the Commons on April 5 and directed the UK Ambassadors to each of the EDC countries to press for early signature which would make this timing possible. The message concluded by saying that if the signature were nevertheless impossible, Mr. Eden would still propose to make his statement on this subject on the 5th, casting it as a description of what the U.K. has offered.

I told Mr. Leishman that I thought that the British difficulties in withholding release of their agreement and assurances were understood. Our problems are somewhat different and we continued of the opinion that we could not release the text of our assurances in the absence of a French decision to set a, date for the debate. Mr. Leishman said that he thought it was too bad that we could not announce our respective assurances simultaneously, but recognized that our somewhat different problems probably made this impossible. I suggested that there might, in fact, be some advantage in different release dates from the point of view of maintaining an impact on French opinion and Mr. Leishman agreed.

I also took occasion to inquire whether Mr. Leishman had any further information as to the French reasoning in proposing the deletion of the proposal in the U.K. assurances for the extension of the duration of NATO to 50 years. He replied that Alphand had maintained that this deletion was desirable since it would bring the U.S. and U.K. assurances into closer conformity and since it appeared improbable that such a proposal could, in any event, be adopted by all member nations.

Mr. Leishman subsequently telephoned me to say that he had just received a further telegram from London indicating that Mr. Eden had decided, as the result of a strong plea from “his colleague” (I gathered: Bidault), to delay any statement on UK assurances until April 12.² Mr. Leishman noted that this did not correspond with the April 14 date for which M. Laniel had indicated preference, but would nevertheless be after the presently contemplated date for the adjournment of the French Assembly on April 9.

1. Not printed; it reported that Laniel had informed Steel through Alphand that the URAS Ministers had stated that if the French Government signed any agreement on U.K. association with EDC before the Easter recess, then the URAS Ministers would not resign but would immediately seek to bring down the government on an extraneous issue. In a subsequent conversation with Harvey, Bidault had also indicated that he had learned of the URAS Ministers’ action, adding that Laniel had three preoccupations: “One was that Cabinet must authorize Alphand signature on United Kingdom–EDC agreement which presented dilemma; without knowledge of assurances declaration anti-EDC Ministers would find agreement inadequate; given such knowledge, declaration would leak. Second was that if Assembly voted on date for EDC debate before Socialist Congress held, there might be general or sufficient Socialist abstentions to defeat Government. (Bidault stated he did not share this fear.) Third was Laniel’s desire that if Government fell, it do so squarely on EDC issue”. (740.5/3–3154)
2. Ambassador Aldrich reported from London in telegram 4331, Apr. 2, that the Foreign Office had stated that the United Kingdom “intends to release EDC assurances and association agreements on April 12, unless unforeseen contingencies again intervene” (740.4/4–254).