740.5/11–2053
The Secretary of State to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer)1
Dear Mr. Chancellor: I am writing you this personal note at the suggestion of the President because of our very real concern over reports which have reached us from a number of sources indicating that certain elements within Germany are speculating on German participation in Western security arrangements by means other than the European Defense Community. Knowing as I do your own devotion and that of your Government to the principles of European unity, I am taking the liberty of writing you with complete frankness so that there may be no misunderstanding of our views on these questions.
The policy of the United States with respect to Europe is based on the imperative necessity of a Franco-German unity as the only solid foundation for the development of any real strength in Europe. If [Page 855] France and Germany cannot be woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common endeavor, not only will there be no real strength in Europe, but the resources which the United States in its own enlightened self-interest has been pouring into Europe will be wasted and will not serve the long-term purpose for which they were appropriated. Our policy with respect to Europe does not, therefore, involve a choice between France or Germany. It is based on France and Germany. Insofar as the United States is concerned, we are convinced there can be no adequate security arrangements for the defense of Europe which are not based on full and effective Franco-German integration in the military and related fields, and we know of no alternative to the European Defense Community which would provide a basis for such cooperation.
In this connection, we strongly believe that a great remaining obstacle to ratification and entry into force of the European Defense Community is the Saar. It would be a tragedy for Germany, Europe, and indeed the Western world, if the solid basis for real European unification which has been laid by the European Defense Community Treaty should come to nought because of failure to reach agreement on the Saar. We know you have this very much in mind in your approach to the Saar problem. I recall your assurance to the President and me at the White House that the Saar matter would be solved. I do hope that no effort will now be spared to reach early agreement.
We recognize that a Saar agreement acceptable to France raises real difficulties because of certain currents of German opinion. However, it is our earnest conviction that we have reached a decisive moment—a moment of historic opportunity which may not recur. If we seize this opportunity which is now well within our grasp, we will be able to move forward on the course we have all worked out together to infinitely greater unity, strength, and hence security and well-being for our peoples. If we let ourselves be diverted by obstacles which we know we have the strength to surmount, it will be an infinite tragedy for all the free world, but particularly for Europe.
I realize that reports and speculation in the press and elsewhere could easily lead to false impressions about the attitude of the United States with respect to Europe. Therefore, my purpose in writing you is to assure you of our continued firm support for the policy of European integration which you have long advocated so vigorously and successfully. On our part, we will continue to do our utmost, as we know you will do, to bring about the realization of our great common objective. The President sends his warm personal regards in this letter.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by MacArthur. The source text was enclosed in a long letter from Dulles to Conant “to let you know of my continuing concern over indications that Chancellor Adenauer is more reconciled to a slower schedule for the settlement of the Saar issue, and hence the EDC, than he was prior to the German elections.” Dulles then rehearsed all of the arguments in favor of speedy resolution of both the Saar and EDC issues, emphasizing the importance of Franco-German rapprochement to peace in Europe, and informed Conant that Under Secretary Smith had forcefully impressed them upon Ambassador Krekeler of the Federal Republic in a recent interview. Dulles particularly stressed the growing mood of impatience in Congress as symbolized by the Richards Amendment and promised to maintain pressure on the French Government at both the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meetings at Bermuda and the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris in December (740.5/11–2053).↩