Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

762.022/11–1853

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret

Washington, November 18, 1953.

The Saar Problem

i. elements of the problem

A. The General Situation

1. It is a political reality that there must be some Franco-German agreement on the Saar before the French ratify the EDC. The degree of agreement on broad principles or on details that is necessary remains a question. But it is extremely important that before the end of the year sufficient agreement be reached to clear the way for French EDC ratification and to stem the rising tide of impatience in Germany and the US for several more weeks while the French get over their presidential elections and move into the ratification debate.

2. Adenauer and Bidault are expected to attempt to reach at least the broad lines of a Saar settlement while at The Hague for the November 26 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries (which is to be devoted primarily to attempting to achieve agreement on a European Political Community). Adenauer and Francois-Poncet are holding a series of preliminary meetings in Bonn to clarify their respective positions prior to actual negotiations. The end of November and the month of December thus appear to be the most critical period and the period where US–UK active intervention may be needed if an agreement is to be reached enabling progress on EDC.

3. No purely ideal and logical settlement developed without full consideration of the political tolerances in France and Germany is possible of realization. Because only continued progress in European unification will finally settle the Saar issue, only a very general Saar agreement appears to be possible now. This is especially true when one considers the time that would be required to negotiate in full the necessary instruments which would include an international statute, a new Saar constitution, modified Franco-Saar accords and perhaps certain tripartite accords for cultural relations, trade, et cetera. The overall sequence would seem to be (1) a very general agreement on the Saar permitting French EDC ratification, (2) the creation of the EDC, (3) the development of the EPC and (4) a definitive European Saar settlement complete with all the necessary new instruments.

4. Previous conversations between Adenauer and Schuman or Adenauer and Bidault (and Mayer) indicate that there are three problems that are most troublesome in attempting to reach agreement on the substance of a settlement:

a. How can the French be assured that a settlement is definitive so that the Saar will never return to Germany while the Germans avoid prejudicing the possibility of eventual restoration of both western and eastern frontiers.

b. When and how can the Saar population be consulted under conditions of full political freedom involving the introduction of parties that are for the return of the Saar to Germany.

c. How can Germany have equality of economic privileges under the maintenance of a Franco-Saar customs and monetary union.

5. Although these previous conversations indicated that an agreement on broad principles was not too far from attainment (although the application of these principles in the economic field was far from near solution), both sides to the controversy seem to have hardened their positions recently: Adenauer, because he had previously negotiated on a very personal basis and now believes he must negotiate on the basis of a position cleared by his government coalition; Bidault, because by negotiating and obtaining ratification of the modified Franco-Saar conventions it would now be impossible for him to agree to any outright abrogation of these symbolic conventions.

6. The Council of Europe is a new element in the picture since the Van der Goes van Naters report was debated there last September.² The report itself lends general support to the French position yet in the economic field it apparently does not go far enough, principally as it calls for the substitution of a new treaty for the above-cited conventions. Also the Council has called for a special conference on the Saar in early 1954 if Franco-German talks fail; this might eventually be conducive to an agreement but in the coming weeks Bidault might remain more adamant in his conversations with Adenauer in the belief that the proposed conference might be guided by the Van Der Goes report which tends to support the French position.

The danger that the US and UK might use up their influence in December in attempting to bring about a solution, and fail, is somewhat less important now because there would still exist, if we do fail in coming weeks, the further resource of the Council of Europe sponsored conference to bring about a solution.

7. The French are under the impression that we do tend to support their point of view concerning a Saar solution because in the past we have publicly supported their detachment of the Saar from Germany (pending a peace treaty) and because they were informed that Mr. MacArthur on October 24 urged Hallstein and Blankenhorn to meet the French position. On the other hand, the Secretary sent a message to Bidault that if the French proceeded to ratify the Franco-Saar conventions (which they have done) and thereby ran into difficulties with Adenauer, we would find it most difficult to give support to the French position on the future status of the Saar. Happily, the French action on the conventions does not seem to have brought about the intense German reaction that was expected.

B. Past Conversations

1. Francois-Poncet and Adenauer , November 1953. Information on these conversations is unfortunately sketchy. About four meetings have been scheduled, the first apparently involving no matters of substance, the second a preliminary discussion (see below), the third an exposition of the French position in detail and the fourth (the week of November 16) the German position in detail. The second meeting (November 3) is described in Bonn’s 1589³ as follows:

“In discussing economic question, Francois-Poncet had justified French demand (which had had US and UK support) for Franco-Saar customs and economic union as in nature of reparation for losses France had suffered in war. Blankenhorn intimated that validity of argument had been admitted at least tacitly, but that Chancellor had replied that Germans could not accept such arrangement permanently and that way must be found for gradual termination. Chancellor had indicated that Germany was prepared to make economic concessions to France in this connection. He had expressly asked what France calculated the economic advantages arising from link with Saar to be, which Poncet could not answer but agreed ascertain.

“Berard, who present with Poncet, had taken line that French experts had given much study to possibility German economic concessions to France in lieu of Franco-Saar regime and had come to conclusion that such solution out of question. Poncet, according to Blankenhorn, had taken broader view than Berard and had given clear indication that he at least did not rule out such solution and was disposed to pursue further.

“As for political questions, Blankenhorn stated that ‘Europeanization’ formula for Saar had been accepted by both sides as general ‘objective.’ Adenauer had indicated readiness accept French thesis that Franco-German agreement on Saar should be submitted to Saar referendum. Poncet accepted participation pro-German parties in referendum and that latter should be promptly followed by election of Constituent Assembly.

“Chancellor had raised (as Blankenhorn said he also had with Schuman last year) question of French agreeing that minute French areas adjacent Saar (i.e., Forbach) should be ‘Europeanized’ along with Saar, to facilitate German action. Poncet alluded to extraordinary difficulties, including constitutional.”

2. Franco-German talks of May 12, 1953. These talks in Paris included Mayer, Bidault, de Roziers, Adenauer, Hallstein and Blankenhorn and are described in Paris’ 5950⁴ as follows:

“Adenauer opened by outlining his position as follows:

• “1. As legal point, any settlement of final German frontiers must await definitive peace treaty. Therefore Saar frontiers can only be finally settled by peace treaty.
• “2. He was willing to grant political autonomy to Saar with Saar Government to have own Parliament. But in some respects (not detailed by Adenauer) Saar must be subject to a European authority. He suggested coal and steel authority for this purpose.
• “3. He had heard that monetary problem was considered important to French. To him it seemed not so important. He looked forward to general convertibility of European currencies in next few years and this should automatically take care of problem.
• “4. On economic side Germany had special interests in trade with Saar. Also German business interests must have right to invest in Saar industries.
• “5. Any Franco-German agreement must be subject to ratification by a newly elected Saar Parliament. Elections for this Parliament must be completely free with all parties allowed to take part in election.
• “6. Due to proximity of German elections this not the time to make any agreement. He was confident that he would be successful in elections and at that time, after elections, but not sooner a Franco-German agreement could be reached.
• “7. He said that he realized that for economic reasons and in particular because of the burden of refugees from the east, the population of the Saar did not now and for foreseeable future would not want to return to Germany.

“Mayer for French then answered Adenauer’s points in order:

• “1. Settlement of Saar problem necessary now before ratification of contractual agreements. Problem must be settled if progress toward European unity to continue. French recognized problem of Germans re necessity postpone definitive boundary settlement to peace treaty. Saw no reason why language satisfactory to Adenauer on this point could not be worked out.
• “2. Welcomed Adenauer’s comments on this point but said it not clear exactly what powers should be reserved to European authority. Suggested that Council of Europe might well be preferable to coal and steel authority as over-all authority.
• “3. Continuation of Monetary and Customs Union vital to France. Convertibility of currencies had nothing to do with problem which is simply that French economy requires that Saar trade with French for monetary purposes. Pointed out that French had stated this clearly last fall and after objection by Adenauer had asked him to submit his counterproposal. No German counterproposal received as yet. Mayer inquired if Adenauer now prepared to make a German proposal. Adenauer replied in evasive terms and question was dropped.
• “4. France had no intention of interrupting normal Saar trade with Germany. France agrees Germany has an economic interest in Saar. Question of German ownership of Saar industries not insurmountable. French understand Germans completed a detailed study of German-Saar economic relationships some three or four months ago. French had requested copy of this study some months ago but had not received it. It would be useful to negotiations if French could have a copy of this study. Adenauer made no reply to this request.
• “5. French could not agree to submitting accord to a newly elected Saar Parliament. This would not be a clear test as any election would be affected by other partisan political questions. Also any vote in Saar Parliament would also be subject to other partisan intrigues. French proposed as alternative a referendum to approve or disapprove the Franco-German agreement. If agreement approved there could then be new and completely free elections in Saar. Adenauer had no very good answer to French arguments and French had definite impression that Adenauer would in the end accept their position on this question.
• “6. French regretted Adenauer’s decision to postpone decision till after his elections but expressed understanding of his political problem. French suggested that interim conversations continue to prepare way for prompt agreement after German elections. Adenauer said he felt such talks would not be productive and suggested it would be better to put whole subject aside until fall.”

3. Schuman and Adenauer , 1952. The following is a summary of reports from HICOG and Embassy Paris concerning the positions taken during the conversations between Schuman and Adenauer during 1952:

Bonn: Settlement must be provisional in form. European status requires an acceptable European political authority. Adenauer could agree that, subject to a plebiscite, the Saar shall come under an EPC when it is formed, with self-administration in local affairs. Political freedom in the Saar would have to be conceded before the plebiscite …⁵ French fears should be met by making plebiscite either approval or disapproval of agreed European solution. If vote favorable, this could be followed by “free elections” for a new Saar Landtag which would be bound by the results of the plebiscite. France may not be politically dominant.

Terms of settlement must be consistent with Europeanized status e.g., economic advantages to be guaranteed France must not exclude interests of other members. Germans are ready to agree to continued Saar monetary union with France and to agree that balance between France and Germany in CSC shall not be upset. Adenauer will probably propose that common market provisions of CSC apply to other factors Saar economy but as German interest is political, not economic, there is considerable room for compromise.

Paris: French Government cannot agree to electoral freedom until there is a broad Franco-German agreement. French desire that a definitive settlement be agreed upon, either in broad terms or in detail (degree remains to be seen), which will be only formally subject to confirmation in a later German peace treaty as French wish no loophole left allowing future return of the Saar to Germany.

The French desire to keep a permanent customs boundary between the Saar and Germany and to maintain the French economic predominance in the Saar. October 1 German proposals envisaged drawing customs boundary between France and the Saar, which is not a realistic basis for negotiations. There is a French conviction that there exists no workable alternative to a customs boundary either between the Saar and Germany or between the Saar and France.

On October 24, the French draft said that the economic union between France and the Saar would be “adapted” to the new status and its further evolution “as European integration progresses”, would be the subject of study. The German draft envisaged that the “forms of economic relations between France and the Saar, now covered by the Franco-Saar economic union, would be the subject of study on the part of the interested states as European integration gradually progresses.”

Greatest, and perhaps the only hope for an agreement that would meet French requirements without unduly unsettling Adenauer’s position should lie in a joint declaration which would heavily emphasize the agreed basic features of the political settlement and gloss over the economic differences by general language and by the establishment of an expert committee. It would have to refer to the important French economic interests in the Saar and would have to define the objective of the consultations as determination whether those interests can be safeguarded otherwise than through maintenance of the Franco-Saar customs and currency union. Best possible face on a continuing disagreement appears to be the best that one can hope for in the immediately foreseeable future.

C. Probable Respective Positions

1. Europeanization. Except for some few members of Adenauer’s coalition, there seems to be agreement in France, Germany and the Saar that the solution to the problem lies in the “Europeanization” of the Saar. Exactly what this means is a subject of dispute, other than that the Saar would be not a state but a European territory exercising local self-government under the control of a European institution (preferably supranational) which also handles its external relations; also that eventually Germany would have equal rights with those of France in the Saar through the development of the supranational European community with its common market among all participants.

The principal problems arise now because such a community is still something of the indefinite future, yet the French want now a definitive solution so that they can be assured that the Saar will not one day return to Germany. A Franco-German agreement thus should not only provide for the eventual status of the Saar but for the status pending the full development of the European community. It is in providing for this interim period that the principal differences arise.

2. Definitiveness. This has the potentiality of being a difficult problem but previous negotiations have indicated that a carefully worded compromise is possible to the effect that the Franco-German settlement would be subject to reaffirmation at the time of a peace treaty or whenever Germany’s frontiers would be finally determined. This appears now to be largely a matter of presentation—provided agreement on the other controversial points is achieved—as the French should be able to accept a presentation to the Bundestag by Adenauer of the settlement as not necessarily, or finally, prejudicing the determination of Germany’s borders in a peace treaty. It is possible, however, that the matter of definitiveness might be reexamined, if necessary, in order to resolve an inability to agree on other points (see Section II, B of this paper).

3. Free Elections. The admission of pro-German political parties (dedicated to the return of the Saar to Germany) was the issue upon which the Adenauer-Schuman negotiations broke down in face of the then imminent scheduled Saar elections. It is this issue which is probably of paramount political interest to the Germans. The foremost German objective in a Saar agreement has been described as to bring “political fermentation into Saar political life.” However the French insist upon a delay of full political liberty in the Saar until the possibility of a Saar vote to return to Germany has been precluded by a Franco-German definitive agreement on Europeanization. The Saar elections indicated quite clearly that if the Saarlanders are presented in a referendum with such an agreement, they will vote overwhelmingly for it.

Blankenhorn, in reporting to Conant on the Adenauer–Francois-Poncet conversations of November 3, confirmed that Adenauer was ready to accept the French thesis that a Franco-German agreement on the Saar should be submitted to the Saarlanders in a referendum and Francois-Poncet accepted the participation of pro-German parties in the referendum after which there should be new Landtag or constituent assembly elected under full political freedom. Adenauer had previously indicated his acceptance of this procedure in his October 16, 1952 letter to Schuman and in his May 12 conversations with Bidault and Mayer. Conant has been instructed to express the US view that this procedure should be followed to solve this issue. Nevertheless, other Germans have continued to speak rather loosely about “free elections” in such a way that there is a danger that Adenauer might possibly not stick to his previous acceptance of the French position on this issue. Adenauer might feel that he needs a decision by the Saarlanders in favor of Europeanization, as the political basis of his authority to proceed with negotiations aimed at relinquishing the German claim to sovereignty over the Saar.

4. The Economic Issue. This promises to be by far the most difficult point. The French have maintained that the Franco-Saar conventions should remain intact though they felt they might be broadened to include Germany as European integration progressed. The German position was that the conventions must at once be modified in accordance with a “European” status of the Saar whereby Germany and others would be able to participate in the economy of the Saar on an equal basis, although legitimate special French needs would in some way be met. Both sides in negotiations have recognized the need to provide for the special economic interests of the other but there has been no discussion of any concrete proposals for solution or compromise.

In the November 3 conversations, Adenauer is reported to have tacitly admitted the Francois-Poncet thesis that the French were justified in demanding the maintenance of the Franco-Saar economic union as in nature of reparations for losses that France had suffered in the war. Psychologically, this is the test for the French of whether a Saar solution is satisfactory, i.e. whether it indicates that Germany lost the war and the French were on the winning side.

However, this point naturally is difficult for Adenauer. He reportedly replied to Francois-Poncet that such an arrangement could not be permanently accepted, that some way must be found for a gradual termination. The recently ratified conventions do provide for their modification as progress is made in integration. The French have stated on various occasions that they desire to see the economic union maintained, but that they envisage its gradual disappearance as European economic integration proceeds. There is perhaps a meeting ground here, for Adenauer is reported at one time previously to have held the view that due to the fact that European integration is only at the beginning of its development, the “Europeanization” of the Saar can also be developed concurrently with progress in European integration; this view was expounded in Adenauer’s letter to Foreign Minister Schuman of October 1, 1952. Whether Adenauer will still hold this view remains to be seen, particularly in view of the symbolic importance now attached to the recently ratified Franco-Saar conventions which provide for the monetary and customs union.

The question of principle as to whether the French-imposed economic union is, or is not, to be maintained promises to be the bone of contention. The French are publicly committed, through statements in the past and more recently in the debate concerning the ratification of the Franco-Saar conventions, to substantial maintenance of the economic union and no abrogation of the Franco-Saar conventions. If the Germans can possibly sacrifice principle for the reality of gaining an economic foothold (by means yet to be determined) in the Saar—which is what they really seek, agreement should be possible. There are many detailed points that would be difficult to resolve and, as indicated previously, there has been no detailed discussion of concrete proposals for achieving such compromise; hence, the respective positions on a settlement of these issues—once an agreement has been reached as to principle—can only be guessed with very little accuracy.

Mayer, in the May 12 conversation, again called for concrete German proposals both in the monetary and trade fields and conceded in principle that Germany has special interests in the field of trade with the Saar and with regard to investments there. The Germans were willing, at one time, to accept at least initial complete retention of the Franco-German currency union, but the proposal was never made to the French (although Adenauer on May 12 “minimized the importance of the monetary problem”). The French can be expected to fight for retention of the currency union not only as a matter of principle but because it results in a net accretion of a fairly susbtantial amount of foreign currency to the French treasury.

With regard to trade and investments, the French will undoubtedly be sticky on concessions for they fear that any large-scale opening-up of the Saar to trade with Germany would in the long run have the effect of strengthening the political bonds between Germany and the Saar. Yet it is in this area that concessions will have to be made and where most of the hard bargaining will probably eventuate.

5. Other Elements. It is not expected that there will be any important disagreement on other elements of a settlement such as Saar representation in European bodies, defense arrangements, etc.

ii. alternative courses of action by us

A. Timing

The Adenauer–Francois-Poncet conversations, from reports available so far, have not yet indicated what action might be called for by the US in an effort to intervene on matters of substance so as to bring about an agreement. The moment of decision will come only when we have full reports concerning the results of the Adenauer-Bidault meeting at The Hague. Then we will have to decide, and for fullest effect obtain British concurrence, as to how our influence can best be exerted. Bermuda offers an excellent possibility for working on the French.

In the meantime, little can be gained by attempting to work out the ideal, logical solution for we must work with the elements at hand within the realm of political possibilities. Furthermore, we seek no particular solution of our own conception for its own sake, but wish any solution mutually acceptable to the French and Germans.

B. Possible Compromises That Might Be Proposed

As indicated previously, there appears to be general agreement—and we should press for continued acceptance—concerning (1) the concept of Europeanization, (2) the agreement-referendum-full political freedom sequence of developments, (3) a definitive, if rather broad, agreement subject to reaffirmation at the peace treaty, and (4) local autonomy for the Saarlanders.

There seems to be no practical alternative to the maintenance of the present Franco-Saar currency union and this seems to be recognized by the Germans.

If, as expected, the main difficulty arises over the Franco-Saar conventions provisions concerning the customs union, variations or combinations of the following suggested compromises might be proposed (many of these most probably would not be acceptable to one or the other side without the very greatest of pressure exerted by the US and the UK).

1. That the terms of the conventions be incorporated in a new treaty—much as is proposed in the van der Goes van Nater report, so that from a practical standpoint France would have retained the economic union but, for the benefit of the Germans, under a different name.

2. That tariffs and quota restrictions on trade in commodities other than coal and steel (already part of a common market) between the Saar and Germany shall be progressively eliminated under a regular schedule.

3. That the Germans accept the maintenance of the economic union pending further European integration with the condition that if substantial progress is not made within, say, five or ten years, that this portion of the Saar settlement be reopened.

4. That the Germans agree to the maintenance of the union as established in the Franco-Saar conventions in return for specific concessions in the matter of trade.

5. That the French agree to modify the conventions in return for US–UK support of their other positions in regard to a Saar settlement (sequence leading to free elections, reaffirmation at the time of the peace treaty, et cetera).

6. That unresolved issues be submitted to a Saar plebiscite.

7. That the agreement should be valid only if the EDC is ratified and there is reasonable progress on the EPC.

8. That the French accept a statement of principles that gloss over the difficulties and do not constitute a settlement, and proceed with EDC ratification.

9. (If there is any substantial deadlock after US–UK efforts at mediation) That the conference provided for by the Council of Europe’s resolution be held to help resolve the issue.⁶

1. Drafted by Fisher of WE. A covering memorandum from John Jones, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, to Merchant, also drafted by Fisher reads: “WE is pleased to note from your memorandum of November 11 that Jacques Reinstein has been assigned to concentrate during the coming weeks on the Saar problem. To assist in that task WE has prepared the attached paper containing a preliminary analysis of the elements of the problem and a consideration of the various alternative lines along which a solution might be sought in the event that the Franco-German talks bog down” (762.022/11–1853). Further documentation on the Saar is in volume vii .
2. See editorial note, p. 803.
3. Dated Nov. 5; printed in the compilation on the German Democratic Republic in volume vii .
4. Dated May 14; printed in the compilation on the German Democratic Republic in volume vii .
5. Ellipsis in the source text.
6. Despatch 1670 from Paris, Dec. 30, 1953, reported inter alia that the Embassy had learned that Bidault did not intend to resume conversations with Adenauer regarding the Saar problem until the end of January 1954 at the earliest because of a possible forthcoming governmental crisis in France and the imminence of the Four-Power Conference at Berlin (762.022/12–3053). Documentation on the Berlin Conference is presented in volume vii .