Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–1153

Memorandum of Conversation, by Francis L. Spalding of the Office of Western European Affairs

top secret

Washington, March 11, 1953.

Subject:

• Visit of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns

Participants:

• Foreign Minister J.M.A.H. Luns
• Ambassador J. H. van Roijen
• The Secretary
• EUR—Mr. Bonbright
• WE—F. L. Spalding

The Foreign Minister remarked that he had discussed with the President many aspects of European problems and the EDC in particular. He said that the Dutch had certain misgivings as to the sincerity of some European countries’ attitude toward the EDC and felt they were perhaps not convinced of the wisdom of the EDC. The Dutch objections were not that the EDC countries would be too closely knit but that they would not be bound together closely enough. Strong links and an integrated army were necessary. The Dutch, the Foreign Minister said, were not as fearful of Germany in NATO as of a loose EDC where each country would have too much autonomy over its own armed forces. The French reservations might make possible unilateral decisions such as crossing the Oder River and Western Europe would be faced with a fait accompli and forced into a war provoked by one country. The Secretary replied that there would be less risk of that with Germany tied into EDC. Ambassador Van Roijen said there were no Dutch objections to the French having a privileged position in Europe but there would be no objections if the same privileges were given to the Germans. The Foreign Minister reiterated the Dutch had no fears of France but their fear of Germany influenced their attitude toward France. Giving in to France, the Foreign Minister said, might encourage the Germans.

The Foreign Minister said we should not rely on paper links which would permit any given country to go too far. When the Secretary urged the Netherlands to proceed with the ratification of EDC as soon as possible, the Foreign Minister replied that the Government had done all it could as the ratification bill had been submitted to Parliament with the recommendation that it be ratified. The Parliament would, however, like to know what the French decisions would be before ratifying as the Dutch were anxious about differences in interpretation and whether there would be any textual changes.

The Foreign Minister remarked that in his opinion if Italy did not ratify this month it would have to wait until after the Italian elections. The Dutch had no such problem as elections were not expected until 1958. The Dutch were convinced that, for better or worse, there must be an EDC but that Europe could only truly be united if economic unity comes into being at the same time as political integration. The Dutch feel so strongly that it would be better not to go further with political integration, military questions aside, if it is not possible to go ahead with economic integration. The Dutch believe integrated countries cannot remain in control of their own financial and economic matters as this leads to more division than unity. Van Roijen commented that economic and political integration must be parallel and simultaneous. When the Secretary said the EDC must come first, Foreign Minister Luns said that the Dutch did not tie the EDC question to political and economic integration. There were no psychological barriers in the Netherlands to EDC as the Dutch population realized the value and necessity of European unity, and were prepared to make sacrifices, if necessary, but the Parliament must know what the protocols mean.

The Foreign Minister remarked that the Dutch document on economic steps¹ needed for unity had been given a good reception in Italy which was especially favorable to the plan. In his opinion Dutch and Italian relations were becoming closer and closer, and that their positions were very similar in that they each have a surplus population problem, have lost colonies, and have a post-war feeling of uneasiness and insecurity. He remarked that De Gasperi and Beyen had gotten along very well together, and the Dutch felt they had gained a “beachhead” in Italy. Van Roijen remarked that European integration with only a political roof would not be a very solid structure Mr. Luns remarked that they now had a very good understanding with their Benelux neighbors and saw eye-to-eye on big issues, but even they had difficulties in ironing out economic problems and real economic union was not being speeded up. He remarked that the Dutch Minister for Agriculture was optimistic about the Green Pool and obtaining a common agricultural policy in Europe.²

The Secretary said that any concessions we might make to the French viewpoint on the EDC might lose their value if progress on ratification was not made. He hoped the Dutch would be able to take action soon, as we had the NATO meeting to face. We were in a difficult position with Congress with regard to appropriations and some sign of vitality in the EDC would be helpful. He said he had been informed his own organization would have to be cut down and if Congress was making a cut in our own organizations there would be a tendency to cut foreign assistance. As he had said in a recent press conference, the EDC was a European concept and we would want to know it if other governments changed their minds. The Foreign Minister inquired if he was not right that in American opinion the EDC was a goal in itself and there would be keen disappointment if it failed. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said EDC had become a symbol and that it was difficult to find a substitute for the plan. While the Secretary himself said he did not like it in every respect, in December prior to assuming office, it had to be decided what course to take as that was the time either to make a fresh start or throw our weight behind the EDC. It was not an easy decision, as the Republican Congress might have liked a fresh start better, but it would not be easy to retrace the steps. The possibility of getting Germany into NATO had been discussed. Maybe the Dutch were right to be concerned but to the U.S. people, EDC was the symbol that France and Germany had buried the hatchet, and the possibility of ending the feud had caught the imagination of the American people who had been frightened and worried about French-German friction over the years. We would give the Dutch every support on their desire for economic as well as political integration but we felt the EDC was necessary.

Luns replied that the Dutch Government had not only left nothing undone but would continue to do everything to help EDC. He emphasized that the protocol question had not delayed ratification, although Parliament would want to know what the protocols meant.

Referring to the reorganization of the NATO High Command, the Foreign Minister said he did not have much to add to what had been said to the President and the Under Secretary, but the Dutch did have misgivings of a grave political and psychological nature. As a result of his talk here, the Foreign Minister understood that the proposed plan would be discussed in the Standing Group and the NAC, and he realized that Juin had been chosen as he was the best man for the job and not because he was French. He also understood, contrary to his previous understanding, that a new command with a French general under Marshall Juin is not planned and that they will not see a chain of command from Ridgway to Juin to a French general. Mr. Luns said that the Under Secretary had agreed to check this understanding with General Bradley when he returned from abroad.

With reference to the recent flood, the Foreign Minister said the Dutch Cabinet had decided the military budget would not be affected and the military appropriations would not be used for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The Foreign Minister then referred to immigration bills pending before Congress and said he would appreciate the Secretary giving sympathetic consideration to them when the time comes as the flood victims would benefit by an opportunity to emigrate. Ambassador Van Roijen said he hoped the wording of the bills could be altered so that other Dutch subjects and not only flood victims could immigrate. He added the flood victims could benefit indirectly as well as directly through increased emigration.

The Foreign Minister stated he had gone into the New Guinea question³ at length with the Under Secretary and he merely wished to point out that NNG is not the only territory in the world under dispute and mentioned Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Sudan and others. Therefore, the Netherlands did not claim to be in any special category but he would be grateful if the U.S. made no more endeavors to have the Netherlands and Indonesia resume talks as the resumption of these talks would only widen the gap. The Secretary said he was not familiar with the question. Van Roijen referred to the “ice box” policy and Mr. Bonbright remarked that we have endeavored to keep the question “on ice”. The Foreign Minister said as soon as the Indonesian political and economic position became more stable, the Indonesians would no longer need a foreign issue to foster unity at home.

The Foreign Minister then mentioned the Dutch desire to participate in the five-power talks in the Pacific⁴ particularly on questions of concern to them. The Secretary asked if Mr. Bonbright was familiar with the question and when Mr. Bonbright replied in the affirmative, the Secretary asked him to give it his attention.

1. Regarding the Netherlands note of Feb. 14, 1953 on European political and economic integration, see despatch 920, Feb. 18, from The Hague, printed in volume vi .
2. Documentation on the attitude of the United States toward European agricultural integration is presented ibid .
3. Documentation on New Guinea is presented in volume xii .
4. Documentation on security matters affecting the Pacific region is presented ibid .