State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417, “Jan–June, 1953”
Memorandum of Discussion of State–Mutual Security Agency–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held at the Pentagon Building, January 28, 1953, 10:30 p.m.1
Present:
- Mr. Dulles
- General Smith
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Stassen
- General Bradley
- General Hull
- Admiral Fechteler
- General Twining
- General Lemnitzer
- Admiral Duncan
- General White2
- Admiral Lalor
- Colonel Cams
- Admiral Davis
- General Gerhart
- General Rogers
- General Fox
- Admiral Boone
- Mr. Frank Nash
General Bradley: I understand that Mr. Dulles wishes to discuss possible alternatives to EDC. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee has been studying this matter and has prepared a paper which has not yet, however, been coordinated for distribution.
From the military viewpoint, EDC presents a solution to the problem of German participation and it is thus desired by the military. If this is not possible, the military would prefer full German participation in NATO.
The French have come a long way in the last two years in moving toward German participation. Two years ago Moch was in favor of German privates being recruited into French squads. Since that time they have accepted the idea of larger units.
Our military finally came to the position that EDC would be an acceptable solution, although not as good as German full membership in NATO.
Eisenhower recommended that we push the EDC. The real problem is that of getting German participation. Anything which does not accomplish that doesn’t mean very much. In hearings before the Congress, I have always had to face the question as to when we were going to get German help in defending Europe. It would be difficult [Page 712] to justify Congressional appropriations for Europe if there were no such prospect. If this is not possible, the only alternative would be to fall way back. We would be surrendering many important things which would likely get us into great difficulties.
The military are worried about the general attitude in Europe. There has been a let up on the ground that the threat is not as great as it was assumed to be. From our viewpoint the USSR’s capability is still there. We have no way of knowing what Soviet intentions are. Initially, our problem was one of encouragement and of laying out the general outline of a plan for European defense. Now considerable progress has been made, and Ridgway has had to move into a different field—that of pointing out where deficiencies are and urging the European countries to come up to scratch. They then complain that Ridgway isn’t doing a good job.
Mr. Dulles: I’m surprised at your statement that you consider full membership in NATO to be better than the EDC.
General Bradley: We have been concerned about the strings on German production which the French are pressing for in connection with EDC. As a full member in NATO, Germany would not be under such restrictions.
Mr. Dulles: From the political standpoint, EDC is much to be preferred. It would serve to combine Germany and France in a manner more trustworthy than a treaty relationship. The problem in Europe has been the recurrent conflicts between France and Germany leading to recurrent wars. Unless these conflicts are buried, difficulties between them are apt to reappear. We may find that treaty relationships, like the German-USSR alliance,3 will be torn up.
General Bradley: We realize that a political alliance would be better than a treaty. The French, however, have protocols to the EDC drawn up which contain very bad restrictions from our standpoint.
Mr. Dulles: We kept all restrictions out of the Japanese Treaty.4 I say this not to boast, but merely to indicate that I agree that restrictions are a bad thing.
General Bradley: We realize that rotation of officers may be necessary, but some of the French protocols would seem to make it impossible to get anything effective in the way of EDC forces.
Mr. Dulles: If you can’t get EDC, wouldn’t you have to give up the conception of continental defense? Wouldn’t you have to think of a defense based on Spain, Turkey, and various islands.
General Bradley: We have given much thought to that conception. From our standpoint, it isn’t very good.
[Page 713]Mr. Dulles: From the negotiations standpoint, it is useful to have alternatives. If the French and Germans should come to see that the military position would be tolerable for us if we could hold Turkey, Spain, etc. that would create pressures on them which would not exist if they think we are so committed that we must carry the entire load in the area.
General Bradley: If one looks at the alternative, however, and contemplates going back onto the continent after having lost it, all the people we now know would be gone.
Mr. Dulles: We need something that is within our own control. The alternative may not be nice, but otherwise we are dependent upon the Europeans, We are not thinking of how to give up the EDC; the question is how to get the EDC. An alternative is necessary if we are to get it.
General Bradley: If we were to give up the concept of defending Germany, the Iron Curtain might move to the Rhine which would give us a very serious military problem. There would also be political problems.
Mr. Nitze: Mr. Secretary, last fall we prepared a paper on the alternatives to EDC5 on the assumption that EDC ratification was delayed so long as to be tantamount to rejection and that full German participation in NATO was impossible. The best alternatives we could come up with did not look very good. Even if one went to a peripheral defense it would probably still be necessary to maintain considerable forces in Europe to avoid losing Europe in the cold war. These forces would be in a militarily unfavorable position.
General Bradley: I think our position is generally in agreement with that paper.
Admiral Fechteler: Maybe we should go to an Anglo-German-US alliance. If one talks of moving back to Spain, the Scandinavian countries would probably drop out of the alliance. If you give up Germany, the Dutch would probably drop out.
General Hull: It seems to me that what we are discussing are the results of a failure to get EDC rather than an alternative to EDC.
General Smith: Isn’t it true that Churchill does not believe in the EDC?
General Bradley: Our experience in Korea has shown that people will fight pretty well for a principle and under the U.N. flag.
Mr. Dulles: Churchill himself feels that one can only fight for a nation and, therefore, feels that other people react the same way. He may very well be wrong about this.
[Page 714]Mr. Stassen: How much time have we got to get German contribution? If it were to take two years, would we be taking an awful chance?
General Bradley: Our intelligence estimate was that the period 1954–55 would be the most dangerous, and that by that time we should be able to get forces up to such a state that an attack would be less probable. The British think the danger has already become less and the French tend to agree with them. We on the other hand feel that the Soviets have the necessary capabilities and that some miscalculation might cause them to move. We find it difficult to judge Soviet intentions. What is your view, General Smith?
General Smith: I can only agree with your analysis.
Mr. Stassen: Couldn’t we, with the use of atomic weapons, slow up any Russian advance?
General Bradley: We think we could even now with atomic weapons slow them up, but they have built up their forward stockpiles and have increased their mobility. They have motorized a number of divisions. While our stockpile has gone up, they have also increased their capabilities.
Mr. Stassen: What are the chances of trouble behind their lines?
General Smith: Not great until it looks as though the pendulum were about to swing against them. There would be some opposition even while the Russians were advancing, but it would not be much or very effective until the people realized that it was only a matter of time until the Russians would have to withdraw. In France, the Maquis were not effective until the pendulum had clearly begun to swing. Our intelligence reports are extremely disappointing as to any effective underground behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Stassen: Combining everything, does it add up that we can’t contemplate holding the center of Europe without German troops?
General Bradley: We need enough to make them concentrated. We don’t have enough atomic weapons to plaster all of Europe. Twelve German divisions would put a completely different picture on the situation. It would force them to a considerable build-up before they could attack. German participation would make it certain that we were given warning.
Mr. Matthews: Returning to Admiral Fechteler’s suggestion, I do not think the British would go along with a German-British-US alliance.
Admiral Fechteler: A British admiral told me that their mistake was in fighting the Germans and not the French.
General Bradley: The JCS realizes that the EDC may lead to unity in Europe. They feel this would be fine. German membership in [Page 715] NATO would be better only if EDC results in too many restrictions being put on the Germans.
Mr. Stassen: If France went Communist, would German troops be of any use?
General Bradley: It would be pretty tough having commies on one’s line of communication.
General Hull: If France were allied with the Russians, we would be in a completely untenable position in Germany.
General Bradley: If we were to lose Germany and were reduced to the possibility of holding on the Rhine, it would become very difficult to decide whether to invest more of our resources in attempting to hold there.
Mr. Stassen: How important is Europe from the air standpoint? General Twining: Europe doesn’t make too much difference to SAC.
Mr. Nitze: Wouldn’t the defense of the UK be more difficult if the commies were on the English Channel?
General Twining: It wouldn’t have too much bearing on the defense of the U.K.
Mr. Dulles: What would happen in North Africa if France were to go commie?
General Bradley: This would be serious. Our problem is that we are faced with more and more demands from the French. Maybe what we should do is to tell them that they will receive nothing more until they do something about ratifying the EDC.
Mr. Stassen: I am worried as to what would happen in the meantime. Suppose they were to drop Indochina?
General Bradley: This would be very bad.
Mr. Stassen: If Japan got stronger, how bad would it be if Indochina were lost?
General Bradley: It would still be bad. It would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia.
Mr. Dulles: If Southeast Asia were lost, this would lead to the loss of Japan. The situation of the Japanese is hard enough with China being commie. You would not lose Japan immediately, but from there on out the Japs would be thinking on how to get on the other side.
Mr. Stassen: How anxious are the French to hold Indochina?
Mr. Dulles: They have no desire to hold Indochina except for the effect that the loss of Indochina would have in North Africa.
Mr. Matthews: They feel North Africa is vital; otherwise they would become a country like Belgium.
Mr. Stassen: It is possible to hold a beachhead in Indochina?
General Bradley: Our present capabilities are not enough.
[Page 716]Mr. Stassen: If you were to hold a nubbin, wouldn’t that be of psychological importance?
Mr. Dulles: What should our answer be if the French put it up to us that they are going to withdraw from Indochina?
General Bradley: We studied the Indochinese situation in five-power discussions with the French, British, Australians and New Zealanders. We were considering the question of what we could do if the Chinese moved overtly into Indochina. We did not consider French withdrawal in these discussions because the French were participating in them. We are quite clear that we would have to react against China itself. The French and British are leery about blockades, etc.
Mr. Stassen: Unless the Chinese were prepared to accept retaliation by our air, etc., it is doubtful whether they would move into Indochina. But if one were to assume that the French weakened their position in Indochina, might not the Chinese move in some way unless they thought we were prepared to hold at least a beachhead?
General Bradley: We think the Vietnam [ese] could hold the Vietminh if they knew what their future status would be and if the necessary forces could be trained.
Mr. Stassen: Have we no training mission in Indochina?
General Bradley: The French are touchy about training missions for non-commissioned officers. They never took advantage of our offer to have them inspect our Korean training operation.
Mr. Stassen: Should we tie their acceptance of a training mission to any additional help for Indochina?
General Bradley: That might lead them to say that we should take the whole thing. If they would adopt a training system similar to that we use in Korea that might be enough and might obviate a U.S. training mission.
Mr. Dulles: As I gather it, you would not see anything seriously wrong with the deGaullist point of view.
General Bradley: Yes we do. Isn’t deGaulle opposed to arming the Germans at all.
Mr. Matthews: He is a little fuzzy on what he wants.
Mr. MacArthur: The deGaullists are not opposed to German forces in NATO, but they indicate that this should only be done after French forces are built up to 22 divisions. They don’t really come clean as to what it is they propose, but they certainly don’t propose going ahead with German participation right away.
Mr. Dulles: How soon could you get a German army?
General Hull: This depends largely on equipment. Certain types of equipment will be in short supply as long as the Korean build-up continues and the build-up of our own forces. Some items will be critical for some time.
[Page 717]Mr. Dulles: By some time do you mean two years?
General Hull: One to two years.
General Bradley: We have been hoping that the Germans could produce many of the necessary items themselves.
General Hull: The NATO build-up is a year behind because of Korea. Korea has been supported out of existing means. Then these are replaced as funds are made available, 105 mm howitzers, which constitute the divisional artillery support, are the real problem in expanding forces.
Mr. Matthews: Would you have enough for German training purposes?
General Hull: Yes.
General Bradley: In some items of equipment, such as F–84’s, we have more than the European are ready to accept.
Mr. Stassen: Are we using F–84’s in our own forces?
General Twining: These are our best fighter bombers, and we will have eight wings of F–84’s.
Mr. Stassen: I take it the critical items are artillery, radar, and ammunition.
General Hull: The equipping of German forces could probably be accomplished about as rapidly as the training, etc. could be done.
General Bradley: The Germans still have a reservoir of trained noncommissioned officers and officers. Cadres could rapidly be built from these men. Later they could be filled up with younger men.
General Twining: One further point. The air force is much pleased with the progress being made in negotiations with Spain.6 It hopes these negotiations will continue with the new Administration’s full support.
The meeting then adjourned.
- There is no indication on the source text as to who drafted this memorandum. It was prepared by the Department of State.↩
- Presumably Lt. Gen. Thomas D. White, USAF.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.↩
- Reference is to the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.↩
- See editorial note, p. 693.↩
- Documentation on relations with Spain is presented in volume VI.↩