740.5/5–1152: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State 1
6966. Re Embtel 6958, May 10.2 With initialing of EDC treaty,3 bearish comment on prospects of its ratification, which has been [Page 655] recently noticeable in official circles, is being reflected in press. Some of it is bitterly cynical with implications EDC is being forced upon a reluctant France by a US interested only in rearming Ger.
Maurice Schumann and Alphand have told us privately that a majority for ratification cld not be obtained in the Assembly at this time, that it is not planned to submit treaty to Assembly before October and that final action is not anticipated until after US elections. Harvey states Robert Schuman has spoken to him along similar lines. We have heard suggestions that chances of French ratification wld be better if treaty were presented immediately after signature in present relatively calm political atmosphere and with maximum US influence added to momentum of signature. On this question however, Robert Schuman is presumably best judge.
We have been concentrating until now on obtaining early signature and will continue to do so until treaty has been signed. Once it has been, we wld hope change from present pessimistic tone wld set in in view of greater difficulty of repudiating treaty concluded on French initiative.
There is no point at this time in trying to count noses other than in broadest terms. At same time we shld recognize and seek to deal with various adverse factors affecting French opinion. These factors cut across party lines. Unless they are satisfactorily dealt with there may well be not only Socialist hostility (Embtel 6872, May 7,)4 but also abstentions or negative votes from members of govt parties in numbers sufficient to prevent ratification.
These factors are numerous and varied. There is basic one of reluctance to take plunge into supernational experiment with relinquishment of national army and national [garble] of defense. There is almost equally basic Fr reluctance to see Germany rearmed under any circumstance which is motivated behind many other adverse arguments. There is fear of Ger preponderance in EDC accentuated by Indochina situation5 which prevents French from unfolding its maximum potential in EDC. There is desire to postpone day of decision both from practical point of view of wishing to maintain as long as [Page 656] possible Fr lead over Germany in receipt of US end item aid and from visionary feeling that need for decision might be avoided through East-West agreement on Ger unification. There is fear that resurgent isolationism might bring US withdrawal from Eur. Finally there is inevitable public and parliamentary preoccupation with domestic problems and inertia toward foreign experiments, at present reflected here in relative indifference of Pinay toward foreign affairs which makes it questionable that he wld personally make an all-out fight for ratification.
Some of the foregoing factors may change before fall. Fact of signature will help, as will degree of British association with EDC which British now appear willing to accept, and Anglo-American declaration. Maurice Schumann states that while it is difficult to foretell how that declaration will be received by parliamentarians, FonOff considers it all that cld be expected.
It is clear that French ratification cannot be taken for granted and that Schumann will need maximum help from British and US. Even now there is some tendency to regard EDC not as French initiative supported by US but as something forced upon France by US pressure. Problem is of course one for French Govt to convince Fr Public and parliament that this French project is preferable to any visible alternative. Possibilities of recreation of Wehrmacht with full American support or American withdrawal from Europe are of course far less attractive to French but they must make up their own minds as to relative prospects of any of these courses without any action by us which they cld interpret as threats or pressure.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩
- Not printed; it summarized press comment on initialing of European Defense Treaty, observing inter alia that emphasis “lies for most part on difficulties which lie ahead, particularly in its ratification by national parliaments” (740.5/5–1052).↩
- Acheson was briefed by Jessup on the afternoon of May 9, and told that while the initialing of the EDC Treaty would be that day, the date of the EDC Ministers meeting had not yet been set because the question of the German financial contribution remained outstanding, and if it remained so, it might be necessary for the Secretary to go to Bonn for discussions. Jessup then asked whether Acheson agreed “that regardless of whether it began to appear that the signing dates were slipping later and later, we should still keep pressure on the EDC conference to complete their work as soon as possible. The Secretary emphatically agreed with this and said that there should be no cessation of activity until agreement was reached.” Later in the briefing, Acheson noted Lester Pearson’s stated interest in holding a North Atlantic Council meeting in conjunction with the signing ceremonies specifically in order “to get into some kind of TCC discussion.” Acheson “believed that this was a mistake, however, and that preparation for such discussion might cause some confusion between Mr. Harriman’s staff and Defense”. (740.5/5–952) Documentation on the Temporary Council Committee is presented in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 272 ff., and pp. 203 ff. herein.↩
- Not printed; it reported that Mollet had called on Pleven on May 2 and had indicated that the trend in the Socialist Party was moving against the EDC Treaty in its present form (740.5/5–752).↩
- Documentation on Indochina is presented in volume xiii .↩