UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Membership”

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State1

secret
  • Subject:
  • US Plan for Non-Member Participation in UNGA.

Reactions in New York to our proposal for non-member participation in the General Assembly, both from UN Members and from the qualified applicants, have been largely negative. Nevertheless, because we wish to do everything we can to end the membership deadlock, we would like to approach other Delegations in New York with the following alternative plan:

1.
Japan has expressed definite interest in non-member participation; Italy has indicated readiness to reconsider its negative position if there is a real and impelling reason (Tab A).2 We would suggest to these two states, as Key applicants whose position would strongly affect Assembly reactions, that they renew their standing applications, as other applicants have done, and in the same communication state that, in line with their desire to accept the obligations of the Charter and play their part in the UN, they would, if the GA sees fit, be willing to participate as non-members to the extent such participation would be consistent with GA procedures and Charter provisions. We might then similarly approach the other qualified applicants.
2.
Assuming Japan, Italy and possibly others respond favorably, the GA would (1) note the declarations and extend to the states involved the privileges discussed in our earlier proposal (Tab B);2 and [Page 1050] (2) arrange for granting the same status to other qualified applicants as they choose to request it.
3.
Because many Members, particularly the UK, strongly oppose non-member participation on legal grounds, they may propose reference of the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. If the majority favors this step, we would acquiesce. We believe chances for a favorable Court opinion are good. Whatever the Court’s view might be, the operation as a whole would put us in a relatively good position vis-à-vis the applicants and the Charter Review Conference and would keep the membership issue alive.
4.
It is possible that Japan, Italy, and the bulk of the UN membership would not go along with this new variant of our plan. In that case, we might have to limit our action at this session to a description of our proposal in a speech in the Committee, stating we were presenting it for further consideration by governments in the event that the membership deadlock continued.
5.
The above proposal has been discussed with FE, EUR, and NEA, and those three bureaus have cleared the attached draft telegram (Tab C) to the Delegation in New York, subject to your decision.

Recommendation

That you authorize the Department to instruct the US Delegation to pursue the foregoing course of action.

[Attachment—Tab C—Draft Telegram]
secret

Re: Delga 75. While we think it impractical and politically undesirable to single out Japan, we suggest following plan for your consideration and possible action:

1.
We note Japan definitely willing go forward with non-member participation and as reported Rome’s 1412 possibly Italy also if we make clear we attach importance its participation. We believe there would be great advantages for UN in providing non-member participation status these two states and have little doubt many other applicants would also come along once non-member status established for Italy and Japan. We have focused on Italy and Japan on basis their population, resources, importance in Europe and Far East respectively, potential contribution to UN and present broad participation various activities UN system (e.g. Italy in TC, regional economic agencies, specialized agencies, etc.). We see disadvantages in distinguishing Japan and Italy as ex-enemy states for this purpose both because it would give Communists propaganda ammunition and because it could undermine US position re: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.
2.
We would suggest Italy and Japan renew standing applications for UN membership in new messages to Secretary General as other applicants have done, and in same communication state that in line with desire to accept obligations of Charter and play part in UN they [Page 1051] would, if GA sess [sees?] fit, be willing participate in GA in non-member status. In order avoid possible affront their prestige and dignity exact language should be carefully worked out, perhaps along some such line as a statement that if it seems likely affirmative action on their applications will be indefinitely delayed, they would be willing, in interest making more effective contribution to attainment UN objectives, to give serious consideration to possibility participating in Assembly to extent such participation would be consistent with Assembly procedures and Charter provisions.
3.
Assuming Japan and Italy agree, we might formally approach all 14 qualified applicants to see whether interested in making similar declaration. Purpose this procedure would be to enable ROK and other applicants interested in non-member participation to act at same time as Japan and Italy if they wish. It would be understood if they preferred to delay response way would be clear for them to make decision any time. In view Australian item Laos and Cambodia these two states might wish withhold response until committee action completed that item.
4.
GA in turn would: (1) note these declarations and extend to Japan and Italy (as well as others making such declarations) privileges set forth in Gadel 1 and (2) state that if any other applicants found qualified for admission desire make similar declaration, Secretary General authorized extend same privileges to them. Alternatively, if other delegations consider that (2) constitutes improper delegation authority in important matter relating to membership, GA could simply declare willingness consider favorably granting similar status other qualified applicants.
5.
If UK and others insist any such arrangement illegal and propose reference to ICJ for advisory opinion, we would state our belief that such an arrangement constitutes healthy development of Charter, like Uniting for Peace Program, and that we see nothing in Charter precluding it. However, if GA insists on ICJ reference, arrangements could perhaps be made for Court to deal with matter through summary proceedings before current GA adjourns. We feel good chance ICJ would rule favorably and consider in any event risk Court reference worth taking since even if negative opinion, it would put US in relatively good position vis-à-vis applicants and Charter Review Conference.
6.
Suggest you discuss situation on basis above with key delegations in New York starting with UK, and with Japan and Italy. In discussion with latter Gadel should indicate our feeling that if they go along, prospect reasonably good for favorable GA action and little question widespread support for ICJ reference if we decide follow that course. In your conversation with UK made clear US cannot accept extreme views given Gadel by Lloyd and remains convinced, as I [Page 1052] said in general debate, power and influence UN will progressively decline unless ways found bring all peace-loving states into organization. US cannot believe Lloyd’s remarks represent considered UK judgment. We feel strongly UN cannot satisfactorily fulfill its important tasks when qualified states continue to be excluded from its activities and cannot agree to indefinite passive acquiescence present deadlock. On contrary we believe must actively explore every proper method solve problem or minimize its destructive consequences.
7.
We appreciate difficulty of persuading British and other Europeans in light their rather strong reactions as reported urtels. However, we are inclined to proceed with this approach notwithstanding their hesitancy. We consider this an organizational question on which honest differences of opinion may be threshed out in Committee discussions and on which we should be willing calmly to accept GA verdict.

  1. Drafted by Brown (UNP) and the Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs (Popper).
  2. Tabs A and B were not attached to source text.
  3. Tabs A and B were not attached to source text.