The enclosed memorandum deals with the subject of admission of new members to
the United Nations which has plagued us since 1946 and on which there has
been an absolute stalemate since 1950.
I am convinced that this stalemate cannot be broken unless we are prepared to
acquiesce in a basket arrangement for the admission of a large number of
states. As you know, we are under terrific pressure from Italy and FE and UNA
attach very great importance to the early admission of Japan. I believe that
the time has come when we should seriously consider whether we could
acquiesce in an arrangement to blanket-in countries mentioned on page 3 of
the enclosed memorandum. I should, therefore, be grateful if you would call
a meeting early next week in order that we could discuss this problem.
It is my feeling that we should not, at this time, reach a final decision on
this matter but that I should be authorized to begin consultation with our
principal allies and tell them that although we have not reached a decision,
we are giving the idea serious consideration. I would like to consult
initially with the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, and following
consultation with these three, with China, in view of her position on Outer
Mongolia. Depending upon how our consultations with these countries go, I
should then like to consult with the remaining friendly members of the
Security Council—Brazil, Chile, Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, and
Pakistan.
[Enclosure]
Admission of New Members to the United
Nations
This paper presents the principal background factors regarding the
possibility of an omnibus arrangement to resolve the long-standing
stalemate over United Nations membership, and recommends that the
Department begin consultations on this matter with its principal
allies.
background of membership stalemate
Article 3 of the Charter provides that the original members of the United
Nations are the states which, having participated in the San Francisco
Conference or having signed the Declaration by United Nations of January
1, 1942, signed and ratified the Charter. There are fifty-one original
members. These include the Soviet bloc of five.
The qualifications for new members and the procedures for their admission
are governed by article 4, which reads as follows:
- 1.
- Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in
the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
- 2.
- The admission of any such state to membership in the United
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The International Court of Justice has given two advisory opinions on
article 4. In the first, it stated that a Member cannot subject its
consent to the admission of a state to the condition that other states
be admitted simultaneously. In the second, the Court stated that the
General Assembly cannot admit a state in the absence of a Security
Council recommendation. It has been understood from the beginning that a
recommendation for the admission of a new member is a substantive
question subject to the veto.
Only nine states have been admitted as new members since the founding of
the Organization. These nine are: Afghanistan, Burma, Iceland,
Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, and Yemen. The last time
that a state was admitted was in 1950, when Indonesia was accepted.
Fourteen others have been voted upon separately but have been rejected.
The Soviet Union has used its veto 23 times to block the admission of
nine of the fourteen (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,
Republic of Korea, Nepal and Portugal). The remaining five, all of which
are Soviet-sponsored (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Outer
Mongolia),* have
never received the seven
[Page 819]
votes
required for a Security Council recommendation. In addition, there are
four other applicants which have not been voted upon separately. These
are Libya and Vietnam, which applied late last year, and Japan and
Cambodia, which have just applied. It seems evident that the Soviet
Union would veto these four if each were put to a separate vote.
The Soviet Union has for some time proposed the simultaneous admission of
most (but not all) of the non-Soviet applicants and of the five Soviet
candidates, always making clear, however, that it would continue to use
its veto to block the admission of the non-Soviet applicants unless its
own candidates were also admitted. Thus far the majority on the Security
Council, including the United States, have not accepted this package
deal. The membership question has therefore remained deadlocked, the
Soviet Union vetoing the non-Soviet applicants and the majority
rejecting the Soviet candidates or a package deal.
The large majority of Members have become increasingly concerned over
this stalemate. At the last session of the General Assembly, a Soviet
proposal which in effect recommended that the Security Council take
favorable action on fourteen candidates (the Soviet five and Austria,
Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal) but
which omitted the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, received, over the
strong opposition of the United States, a vote of 21 in favor to 12
opposed with 25 abstentions in the Committee. It obtained a vote of 22
in favor to 21 opposed with 16 abstentions in the Plenary vote and was
rejected only because the Assembly, upon the request of the United
States, determined the matter to be an important question requiring a
two-thirds majority. While this same Soviet package proposal was
defeated in the Security Council on February 6 of this year, the vote on
the Soviet resolution in the Assembly shows that a large number of
Members are probably willing to compromise to break the deadlock.
The Soviet Union on June 14 of this year resubmitted its package proposal
to the Security Council without including the Republic of Korea and
Vietnam. Since it submitted the proposal, Japan and Cambodia have
applied.
Our position is to postpone consideration of this proposal until shortly
before the next General Assembly. We have taken this position because we
wish to reconsider the possibility of an omnibus arrangement but do not
want to make a decision now.
discussion of omnibus arrangement
It seems clear that the only way to break the membership stalemate is
through an omnibus arrangement along the lines of the Soviet proposal.
Obviously, such an arrangement should preferably include all
[Page 820]
of the non-Soviet applicants
(Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Republic of Korea, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Vietnam) and also the
states which have not yet applied (Federal Republic of Germany, Spain
and Laos). However, it appears certain that the Soviet Union would not
accept a list which includes the Republic of Korea, the three Indo-China
states, and the Federal Republic of Germany. At present, we have no way
of knowing whether it would accept Japan or Spain, if it applies. It is
believed that under no circumstances could the United States acquiesce
in an arrangement which omits Japan and that we should also desire the
inclusion of Spain if it should submit an application. The issue to be
resolved is whether we could consider an arrangement which includes all
the states we favor except the Republic of Korea, the Indo-China states
and the Federal Republic of Germany and which includes the five Soviet
candidates.
Some of the arguments which can be advanced to justify our acquiescence
in such an arrangement are the following:
- 1.
- In 1946 the United States itself waived certain doubts
regarding Albania and Outer Mongolia and proposed the en bloc admission of all the then eight
applicants: Afghanistan, Albania, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan,
Outer Mongolia, Portugal and Sweden. (This proposal was
withdrawn when it became evident that the Soviet Union would not
accept it.)
- 2.
- At the last session of the General Assembly many Members
appeared ready to accept a package proposal. It is expected that
there will be stronger pressure in this direction at the next
session.
- 3.
- Admission to the United Nations is a matter of political
importance to many of the non-Soviet applicants, particularly
Italy and Japan. Their admission is also important from the
standpoint of our own relations with these countries. We are
under continuing and heavy pressure from Italy to get her
admitted.
- 4.
- Perhaps a greater moral influence could be exercised over the
Soviet satellites if they were inside rather than outside the
United Nations.
- 5.
- The Soviet applicants are no worse than some present United
Nations Members—i.e., the Soviet five.
- 6.
- United Nations membership, by furnishing an additional method
of contact with the free world, tends to offset exclusive
Cominform control over the satellite countries and might
somewhat strengthen the position of elements therein opposed to
Moscow domination.
- 7.
- The admission of a large number of countries would in all
likelihood result in a reduction of the United States financial
contribution to the United Nations to the one-third goal. We are
under constant pressure from Congress to reduce our contribution
to one-third and have with some difficulty defeated House moves
the last two years to cut our appropriations arbitrarily to that
level.
However, there are a number of arguments which can be cited against an
omnibus arrangement including the following:
[Page 821]
- 1.
- Since 1946, the United States has maintained that article 4
requires that each applicant must be considered on its own
merits and that the Soviet candidates do not meet the Charter
qualifications. At the same time, the conduct of the Soviet
applicants has become progressively worse.
- 2.
- The admission of Soviet applicants might dignify the puppet
regimes, could be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in their
present status, and might have an unfortunate effect upon the
peoples within these states still looking with hope to the
West.
- 3.
- The admission of Outer Mongolia would give some sanction to
the Soviet effort to organize Asia into pseudo-independent
states.
- 4.
- If we accepted an omnibus settlement omitting the Republic of
Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Indo-China
states, the U.S.S.R. would be
even less likely to agree to their admission later. It would be
difficult to omit the Republic of Korea, particularly at a time
when the United Nations is taking action to defend it against
Communist aggression.
- 5.
- Even though the questions of membership and representation are
technically unrelated, willingness to admit the Soviet
satellites might make it more difficult to obtain support for
our position on Chinese representation.
- 6.
- Whereas the Soviet bloc now comprises only ¹⁄₁₂th of the total
membership, it would represent between ¹⁄₇th and ⅛th of this
total if the five Soviet applicants were admitted along with 11
non-Soviet applicants. This would increase Soviet obstructive
capabilities. Further, on many issues we could not count on the
votes of all eleven non-Soviet applicants.
- 7.
- An increase in the number of Soviet satellites in the
Organization would correspondingly increase the scope of our
internal security problem in New York.
On balance it is believed that some of the difficulties and disadvantages
to an omnibus settlement could be overcome if the matter is handled
carefully, and that the advantages of obtaining membership for Italy,
Japan and others might make it worthwhile for the United States to
acquiesce in such a settlement. We could not vote for an omnibus
arrangement ourselves because of our strong objections to the satellite
candidates. Nevertheless, if the other Members wish to accept the
arrangement, and in view of our own deep interest in the admission of
the non-Soviet candidates, we might indicate that we are prepared to see
the plan carried out, making absolutely clear, however, that our
attitude towards the Soviet candidates has not changed in any way and
that we ourselves cannot vote for the proposal but will abstain.
The working levels of the Department have seriously considered this
question during the past months. Although there are a number of
differences as to details, there exists a general feeling that while an
omnibus arrangement is in many respects distasteful, the need for some
solution to the membership problem is urgent and that, subject to
certain conditions, the United States could probably acquiesce in a
package proposal.
[Page 822]
immediate action recommended
It is not believed that the United States should decide now whether to
acquiesce in a package proposal or that it should decide the many
questions of tactics and procedure that would be involved. Before doing
so, it would be desirable to begin consultations with our principal
allies in order to obtain their views. Such consultations would assist
the United States in determining its own position.
During these consultations we would, of course, make it perfectly clear
that we have not reached a decision with respect to an omnibus
settlement but we would indicate that we are giving the idea serious
consideration.
Since it is not known how long the membership question can be postponed
in the Security Council, and in view of the considerable time that will
be required to work out details if we should decide to acquiesce, it is
believed that consultations should be undertaken as soon as
possible.
