Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

IO files, SD/A/333

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly

confidential

[Washington,] September 15, 1954.

Question of Chinese Representation

the problem

The Soviet Union has sought unsuccessfully since the Fifth Session of the General Assembly in 1950 to have the Chinese Communist regime seated in place of the Government of the Republic of China. In order to maintain the largest possible majority in opposition to these proposals, the United States has taken the initiative in formulating procedural motions under which the substance of the question was not put to the vote and the Assembly decided instead not to take any action on the matter. These procedural tactics made it possible for a large majority of the member states, including several of the free world members which have recognized the Communist regime, to vote with the United States on this issue.

It is anticipated that the issue will be raised again at the Ninth Session, probably on the initiative of the USSR and possibly also by India. In order to achieve its dual objective of preventing any change in the representation of China and at the same time maintaining the greatest possible degree of free world unity on this issue, the United States Delegation will have to exercise strong leadership, working in close cooperation with friendly delegations.

united states position

1. If the issue of Chinese representation is raised, the United States Delegation, working in concert with the United Kingdom and other friendly delegations, should propose a motion under which the General Assembly would decide not to consider, at its Ninth Session during the current year, any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. The United States should take the necessary steps to ensure that this procedural motion is put to the vote before the substantive proposal and, upon its adoption, that the substantive proposal is not put to the vote.

2. In the unlikely event that the procedural action suggested above is not successful and the substance of the Chinese representation question is put to the vote, the United States Delegation should actively oppose and vote against any proposal to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat representatives of the Communist regime, and should make every effort to persuade the largest possible majority of other delegations to vote with us on this issue.

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The primary objective of the United States with regard to the question of Chinese representation is to prevent the seating of the representatives of the Communist regime or any other action which would in any way impair the right of representatives of the Government of the Republic of China to represent that country in the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies. It is important to the attainment of this objective that the tactics we employ should command the support of the largest possible majority, and in particular of the United Kingdom, whose lead on this issue is followed by a number of states. The support of the largest possible majority is important as a demonstration of continued free world solidarity on this issue, which might otherwise take on the appearance of a contest primarily between the United States and the Communist governments. It also tends to restrain a number of governments from recognizing the Communist regime.

While, for the present, we could continue to count on the the necessary majority to achieve our objective in the General Assembly and in the plenipotentiary bodies of the Specialized Agencies even without the support of the United Kingdom and of the governments which follow its lead, it is essential that we retain their support if we are to continue to achieve this objective in certain smaller organs of the United Nations and in Specialized Agency bodies, some of which include a majority or a near majority of states which have recognized the Communist regime.

To achieve our objective with maximum free world support it is necessary to utilize the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure to avoid a vote on the substance of the representation question. This makes it possible for the United Kingdom and most of the governments which have recognized the Communist regime to vote with us on this issue. The United Kingdom has agreed since June 1951 to a “moratorium arrangement” under which United Kingdom and United States representatives have jointly supported in all United Nations and Specialized Agency bodies procedural action which has avoided a vote on substance and resulted in the continued seating of representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and the exclusion of the Chinese Communists. This arrangement has been supported by a large majority of states.

In the course of recent consultations, the United Kingdom has again emphasized the need to handle the representation issue by an extension of this “moratorium arrangement” and has agreed to support the procedural motion which is set forth below. In consultations with most free world members of the United Nations we have also sought assurance of their support on the understanding that we would again employ the procedural action which has been successful in past sessions.

In the past, the Chinese representation issue has been raised by the Soviet Union and India in various ways: (a) At the Fifth Session by a motion at the outset of the opening plenary meeting to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to invite representatives of the Communist regime; (b) At the Sixth session by a request for the inclusion of the question of the representation of China on the Assembly’s agenda; (c) At the Seventh Session by a proposal in the Credentials Committee calling upon the General Assembly to declare invalid the credentials of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China; and (d) At the Eighth Session by a proposal at the outset of the opening plenary declaring that the Assembly considers it necessary that China be represented in the United Nations by the Communist regime, followed by a motion in the Credentials Committee to declare invalid the credentials of the Representatives of the Government of the Republic of China.

It is necessary, therefore, to devise procedural actions for various contingencies:

1. If the question is raised during the plenary meetings at the opening of the session, the United States representative should move as follows:

“The General Assembly,

“Decides not to consider, at its Ninth Session during the current year, any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China.”

The United States should ensure that this motion is put to the vote before the substantive proposal and, upon its adoption, that the substantive proposal is not put to the vote. The latter could be done by a ruling of the Chair. Alternatively, the United States or another delegation would formally so move under Rule 93.^*

2. If the question is raised in the form of a request that a new item on the question of the representation of China be included in the Assembly’s agenda, the United States would move in the General Committee as follows:

“The General Assembly,

• “1. Recommends that the General Assembly decide to reject the request of the [Soviet Union]¹ for the inclusion in the agenda of its Ninth regular session of the additional item entitled ____________; and
• “2. Recommends that the General Assembly decide not to consider, at its Ninth Session during the current year, any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China”.

3. If the question is raised initially in the Credentials Committee in the form of a proposal that the Chinese credentials be declared invalid, the United States should move as follows:

“The Credentials Committee.

• “1. Recommends that the General Assembly decide not to consider, at its Ninth Session during the current year, any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China; and
• “2. Finds that the credentials of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China conform with the provisions of Rule 27 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure.”

Note: For technical legal reasons the United Kingdom would insist that the above clauses be numbered in the order indicated.

It is possible that a proposal may be made to refer the Chinese representation question to the Credentials Committee (see also separate position paper entitled “Appointment of the Credentials Committee”). The United States Delegation should oppose such a suggestion on the ground that there is no need to refer to that Committee a question which can more easily and quickly be settled in plenary session. The United States Delegation should also point out that the Chinese representation issue constitutes an important political question and not simply a question of proper credentials. This was recognized in Resolution 396 (V) in which the General Assembly declared inter alia that this type of issue “should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter”.

The procedures set forth above assume that we would not ourselves take the initiative in moving any of the suggested motions in the absence of proposals to the contrary, but would move the “moratorium formula” immediately after the China issue is raised by others. Consultations with other friendly delegations may indicate the possibility of the United States taking the initiative on this matter in an early plenary meeting even if the issue is not raised by others. Since this would constitute a departure from the moratorium understanding and might, therefore, reduce the size of the majority in favor of our motion, the United States should not take this course of action unless it has the support of a large number of delegations and, in particular, of the United Kingdom.

The United States position on the Chinese representation question is based on a number of important considerations, which may be summarized as follows:

(1) Communist China is an aggressor against the United Nations in Korea. The General Assembly resolution which found Communist China guilty of aggression still stands. (Resolution 498 (V)).

(2) Through its military dominance of North Korea, Communist China has continued to defy the General Assembly’s resolution 376 (V) which established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

(3) At the Geneva Conference the representatives of the Chinese Communist regime treated the United Nations with utmost contempt, repudiating its past actions with respect to Korea and denying its competence to seek the unification of Korea.

(4) Communist China actively supported the Viet Minh aggression of the Ho-Chi-Minh regime in Indochina.

(5) The conduct of the Chinese Communist regime, far from justifying its seating in the United Nations, is of a nature which, under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter, would subject a Member State to suspension of membership rights or even expulsion from the Organization.

(6) The Chinese Communist regime has not conformed to accepted standards of international law and practice, but has demonstrated a callous disregard of legal and moral standards.

(7) This question constitutes a precedent of utmost importance since it is the first time that conflicting claims have been made for the seat of a country. The way this issue is handled can have important future consequences in other cases.

(8) The Charter does not provide for “universality”, however desirable this principle may be, but specifies that membership is open to peace-loving states which both accept its obligations and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

1. Rule 93 reads as follows: “If two or more proposals relate to the same Question, the General Assembly shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. The GA may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal”. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. Brackets are in the source text.