310.2/9–954: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State
priority
217. For the Secretary. Re: Chinese representation and Cyprus. Pursuant to our conversation before your departure for Manila and your memorandum of August 311 I conferred with Dixon.
I said that I understood that Scott of the British Embassy had called at the State Department and in the course of his visit had brought up both the matter of Cyprus and also Chinese representation. Bearing in mind your caution not to do anything which savored of “crudity”, I asked him whether he would have any objection to discussing these two subjects concurrently.
[Page 780]He laughed and said that he was glad I had asked that question because it so happened he had instructions from Eden not to “link” the two topics. He said, however, that it was an obvious fact that the two were linked and that that fact could not be gainsaid.
I said that I had hoped that he and I could reach an agreement which could then be referred to Dulles and Eden for final approval but that in view of what he reported from Eden it was hard to see how an agreement between us could be reached.
I said, however, that I did wish in any event to expound to him our position on the Chinese representation question. I said that if the United States delegation were to be totally responsive to United States public opinion we would vote no on the susbtantive question itself. We realized, of course, that this was not a question which was in accordance with British policy and in the interests of Anglo-American harmony. We hoped that they could at the least agree to a simple declaration that the General Assembly would not consider the question. In our judgment, this was far preferable to use of the word “postpone” which implied that the matter would come up at a future time regardless of any change in the behaviour of the Chinese Communists. Naturally, no one in the United States Government had ever used the word “never” or the word “irrevocable”. But by the same token we did not think it was right to give the implication that we favored automatically having the question come up at some future date regardless of any change in the Chinese Communist behavior.
He appeared greatly interested in this idea. He said that there apparently was a disposition on the part of the British to agree to a postponement similar to the arrangement which was reached last year, but the postponement would only carry over through the balance of the calendar year. I pointed out that this would not take care of situations in which the matter might come up in the next calendar year in the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council or any one of a number of subsidiary bodies and that the proper thing was to have it agreed not to discuss the matter for the period ending when the next General Assembly comes in, in September, 1955.
He said that he would report all this to Mr. Eden. He gave me a long talk about the matter of Cyprus, bringing up arguments with all of which I am sure you are familiar. When he asked me for my view I said that I felt that the Greek claim to Cyprus was not a good one and deplored the matter being brought up at all. I felt that it was a pity to try to divert the United Nations from its principal function of preventing war into a device to effectuate all kinds of internal changes.
When he asked me how we would vote I said that I could not speak officially on the subject, that I knew it had always been our policy to vote in favor of inscribing items on the Agenda in the interests of free speech, but that I believed we were not in favor of voting to inscribe [Page 781] this item on the Agenda. We could thus either abstain or we could vote “no” or we could vote “no” and lobby our friends. Those were three possible alternatives. But whatever position we might take, our information indicated that the item might well get on the Agenda. What our decision would finally be I could not possibly tell.
He said that if we abstained they would surely lose, that if we voted “no” they might win, although it would be close, and that if we voted “no” and lobbied, they would surely win.
He added that it looked to him as though the United States would not define its position on Cyprus until the UK had made itself clear on Chinese representation. I said nothing.
My guess is that this deal will have to be made between you and Eden and that in getting the facts developed on both items I have accomplished all that can be accomplished at this time. Going on to other matters, he said he wished to tell me that he felt that the British policy had been “doctrinaire” on the matter of Guatemala and that he had sent many strong telegrams objecting very much to the Whitehall attitude on this question. Selwyn Lloyd had been particularly obdurate.2