310.2/8–3054

Memorandum by the Deputy Legal Adviser (Cowles) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (O’Connor)

secret

In response to your memorandum of August 25, we have assembled, jointly with UNA [ IO] and FE, the documentation referred to in the draft “Communist China in the U.N.” and have appended this documentation to a redraft of the original draft you sent to us in the hope that the redraft will be useful to the Secretary.1 There is also attached a list of “Four Additional Charges”.

The redraft, in addition to suggested elaborations of the argument at various points, contains some small suggested changes. These will be readily apparent by reference to the copy of the original draft submitted to L.

The documents have been tabbed from “A” through “L”. References to these tabs appear in the text of the redraft and (except for “A”, “B” and “C” which are new items) in the margin of the draft as submitted to this office.

Documentation will be supplied separately on the four additional charges set out on the attached list.

Re paragraphs 7 and 8: FE suggests that in subsequent redrafting, account should be taken of the fact that the Chinese Nationalist Government is far more representative of the Chinese people than is the Communist regime, and that representation by the Communist regime would mean less, not more, “universality”.

[Page 768]
[Attachment]

Communist China in the United Nations2

i.

Arguments Against Seating

1. It is an aggressor against the United Nations in Korea, so found by resolution 498 (V) of February 1, 1951 which still stands.

In resolution 396 (V) of December 14, 1950 (copy attached—Tab A) the General Assembly recommended that “whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member state in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case”. The Chinese Communist regime has consistently acted in callous contempt of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

In resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950 (copies attached—Tabs B and C) the Security Council called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea; called upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw their forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; called upon all Members to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities; recommended that Members furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

The Chinese Communist authorities, in contempt of the United Nations, despatched their troops to fight against the forces of the United Nations. On February 1, 1951 the General Assembly found that the Chinese Communist regime “by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression” (copy of resolution 498 (V) of February 1, 1951 attached—Tab D).

The same resolution goes on to call upon the Chinese Communist regime to “cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea”. Although the Armistice Agreement signed at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953 brought about a complete cessation of hostilities pending negotiation of a final peaceful settlement, no such settlement has been reached and forces and nationals of the Chinese Communist regime have not withdrawn from Korea. By its continued direct aid and assistance to these forces and nationals and to others who were already committing aggression in Korea, the so-called Central People’s Government must [Page 769] be considered still to be engaged in aggression in Korea within the meaning of General Assembly resolution 498 (V).

2. At the Geneva Conference the Chinese Communist regime treated the United Nations with the utmost contempt and refused to admit the validity of any of its actions with reference to Korea.

[The text of the statement by Chou En-Lai on May 3, 1954 at the sixth plenary session of the Geneva Conference is attached (Tab E).]3

The following, among others, are illustrations of the official Chinese Communist attitude toward the United Nations and its action regarding Korea:

“… The Delegates of the United States and certain other countries … endeavor to use, as before, the illegal resolutions of the United Nations for insisting on interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and in preventing the Korean people from solving their own problems themselves”. (p. 127)

“… Those member nations of the United Nations which followed the lead of the United States … went so far as to discredit the just action of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in resisting aggression and aiding Korea, and slandered the People’s Republic of China as an aggressor”. (p. 128)

3. It continues to defy the UN Resolution of 1950 establishing a United Nations Commission for Korea, although that Resolution stands and the Commission is today in South Korea.

General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of October 7, 1950, among other things, established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). The Commission convened at Tokyo on November 20, 1950, and is still in operation. The text of this resolution is attached, together with an account of the establishment of UNCURK from the President’s Report for 1950 (Tab F).

4. It actively supported the Viet Minh aggression of Ho Chi-Minh against Laos and Cambodia. While these two countries refrained from bringing their case to the United Nations, the facts are demonstrable. (For documentation on Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh see Tab K.) Thailand was threatened and showed its alarm by appealing to the Security Council for a Peace Observation Commission, their appeal being vetoed by the Soviet Union (Thai resolution attached—Tab G).

5. The conduct of the Chinese Communist regime is exactly the kind of conduct which, under Article 5 and 6 of the Charter, should subject a member to suspension of membership rights or even expulsion from the Organization. Article 5 authorizes suspension of a Member whose conduct is such as to warrant the application of preventive or enforcement action against it, and Article 6 authorizes the expulsion of a [Page 770] member which has persistently violated the Principles of the Charter. The Communist regime is one against which the Member States of the United Nations were authorized to take, and against which they did in fact take, preventive and enforcement action, both military and economic. It seems senseless to seat in the United Nations a regime whose conduct is unmistakably the kind of conduct which calls for suspension or expulsion.

6. The China case represents a precedent of the utmost importance. It is the first time that conflicting claims have been made for the seat of a country and the way this is handled can have important future consequences in other cases.

The National Government is the Government which signed the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, which qualified China under subsequent agreements for original membership in the United Nations Organization. It is in control of a part of what both sides claim to be “China”. It is recognized by a large majority of members of the United Nations—only 15 Members (excluding Byelorussia and the Ukraine) recognize the Communist regime—and the Soviet Union, by its note of August 14, 1945, agreed in substance to recognize it for thirty years (the life of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945, of which the note was agreed to form a part). (Text of Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 attached—Tab G!) It may be noted that, by resolution 505 (VI) of February 1, 1952 (text attached—Tab H) the General Assembly determined “that the USSR, in its relations with China since the surrender of Japan, has failed to carry out the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the USSR of 14 August 1945”. Soviet recognition of the Communist regime is consistent with its other violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

It is true that the Communist regime exercise de facto control over the greater part of China and the greater number of Chinese. However, de facto control is not a conclusive test for purposes of recognition, and even less so for purposes of representation under the Charter. Even the Chinese Communist regime fails to apply the test to recognition, since it recognizes the Communist regime of East Germany and the Communist regime of North Korea as the Governments of Germany and Korea, respectively, and has refused to recognize the Governments headed by Chancellor Adenauer and President Rhee, although these Governments freely rule the greater part of Germany and the Germans, and of Korea and the Koreans. [For facts on Communist recognition of East Germany and North Korea see Tab L.]

The Chinese Communist regime does not conform to accepted standards of international law and practice. It is an aggressor against the United Nations. Its general conduct in other instances has shown a similar disregard of legality and morality. For example: [Page 771]

(a)
After the killing and wounding of American citizens in a British civilian plane, it has refused even to receive U.S. notes calling for indemnification and for punishment of offenders, the guilt of which was not denied. (Documentation available in L and FE. Text of U.S. note of August 4, 1954 attached—Tab I)
(b)
It holds in prison 30 American citizens without trial, without a statement of charges, and often under intolerable physical conditions. (See attached document—Tab J—entitled “Mistreatment of Foreign Nationals and Interests in Communist China”.

7. The Charter does not provide for “universality” but for the membership of peace-loving states which both accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

While it is true that the Charter talks in terms of “states” and not “governments”, the reality is that states only act through governments and states cannot carry out their obligations except through governments. Therefore, the character of a government is necessarily decisive. The important point is, however, that Article 4 conclusively does away with argument that the Chinese Communist regime should be admitted on the ground that the Charter contemplates “universality”.

The point has even greater weight when dealing with a government which would take its seat on the Security Council. The Charter makes clear (Article 23) that membership on the Security Council should reflect “the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security”. The Security Council has (Article 24) “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. In view of these provisions, it is the height of folly to seat a regime condemned of violating by armed force international peace and security.

8. Those who argue for the admission of Communist China in the interest of “universality” not only ignore the Charter language which rejects this principle but they also ignore the fact that the Soviet Union, by exercising the veto power, has prevented the admission of some fourteen nations, against whose record there is no blemish whatsoever, unless it be that their governments are non-Communist: Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Nepal, Ceylon, Libya, Republic of Korea, Japan, Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. It is perfectly clear that the USSR would also veto Germany and Spain if they applied. The states rejected through the Soviet veto thus include German, Italy and Japan, and represent much human population and power in the world. Thus, the argument which we so often hear, that the UN is being “bypassed” because of the absence of Communist China, is too one-sided to be convincing. It disregards the fact that the absence of these many nations which play a major part in international affairs has for years, while the Soviet Union was vetoing their [Page 772] admission, made it necessary for the United Nations to be “bypassed” in many essential respects.

Those who want “universality” should not concentrate upon the absence of one single government of dubious status and reputation, but rather upon the absence of the many. Unless the Soviet Union alters its position with respect to vetoing the admission of those obviously qualified for membership, the whole matter should perhaps be reserved for consideration at the prospective Charter Review Conference.

Four Additional Charges

The CPG has:

1.
failed to accept China’s recognized treaty obligations;
2.
supported the Communist side in Korea in the commission of atrocities and, more recently, in violating the Armistice Agreement by frustrating the work of the NNSC;
3.
maliciously collaborated in developing and publicizing false evidence in support of spurious germ warfare charges;
4.
systematically suppressed human rights at home.

  1. With reference to the documents mentioned in this first sentence: the O’Connor covering memorandum of Aug. 25 has not been found in the Department of State files; the S draft entitled “Communist China in the U.N.” was attached to the instant memorandum by Cowles, but is not printed here since the attachment below constituting the joint LIOFE memorandum is an amplification of it; the assembled documentation, tabbed from “A” through “L” is not printed and is located in the “Confidential Bulky Files” of the Department of State; the “redraft”, as noted above, follows immediately. A notation on the original S draft indicates that the information was being compiled for exposition in the Secretary of State’s forthcoming general debate speech at the opening of the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly at New York in September.

    There is evidence that there was a connection between this project and an exercise conducted from mid-July by a working group of the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council, in developing information briefs for the use of Ambassador Lodge as evidence supporting the exclusion of Communist China from the United Nations. Documentation regarding this matter is in CA files, lot 59 D 110, “Chinese Representation at UN, 1954”.

  2. Prepared jointly by the Legal Adviser, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
  3. Brackets are in the source text.