CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, “Churchill–Eden Visit”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
CEV MC–6
- Subject:
- Churchill–Eden Visit—“Seating of Communist China in the US.”
Participants:
- United States
- Secretary
- General Smith
- Mr. Merchant
- Amb. Aldrich
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Sturm
- Mr. Gilman
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Amb. Makins
- Sir H. Caccia
- Mr. Allen
- Mr. Scott
- Mr. Joy
After coming to agreement on certain language changes in the minutes on Germany, Southeast Asia and Egypt, and the reply to the French Government on Indochina, the following discussion took place.
Mr. Eden said he realized that this subject was dynamite for the United States but at the same time it would be extremely difficult for the British Government to hold out against the popular opinion in that country. He said that he could not give an unequivocal pledge that the question would not come up but that he would do everything possible to keep it from becoming a problem for us.
Mr. Dulles replied that admission of Communist China into the United Nations at this time was an impossibility for us. Trade also was a bad problem but it did not have the same degree of gravity as [Page 734] U.N. admission. If Communist China were admitted to the UN Mr. Dulles made it clear that it would probably be impossible to keep Congress from demanding U.S. withdrawal, including U.S. financial support. He said he did not think he could exaggerate the difficulties for us inherent in such a proposal. He noted that although it had been attributed to him, he had never said that this was our policy under all conditions at all times. However, the Security of the Pacific Ocean was of vital national importance. The Chinese Communists are constantly challenging that position. So long as the Chinese Communist regime continues its campaign of venom against the United States, we would have to oppose any policy that would add to its power. If and when the Chinese Communists became decent and respectable in deeds, not just in words, then it would be time for us to take another look at the situation.
Mr. Dulles said that he had often thought of the desirability of altering the structure of the United Nations so that permanent members of the Security Council could be changed from time to time. Although the US originated the idea of China becoming one of the permanent members, Mr. Dulles believed this concept was ill-advised. Certainly under present conditions a country like India would be a more suitable permanent member than China. Prime Minister Churchill had said to Mr. Dulles that he could well understand that the US was not prepared to abandon Nationalist China, which had long been their loyal ally. The Prime Minister had indicated that consideration might be given to the possibility of having two Chinas in the General Assembly. He did not feel that the Nationalist Government rated membership in the Security Council.
Mr. Eden stated that the U.K. and some of the Commonwealth and European countries felt that the longer Red China was kept out of the United Nations the more difficult the world situation would be.
The Secretary suggested that Mr. Eden let his imagination play upon the problem of how the United Nations Charter could be revised, changing conditions for membership in the Security [Council]. The Secretary felt that perhaps the organization should have no permanent members or at least not permanent in the sense of perpetuity. Both Mr. Eden and the Secretary thought Russia would be opposed to any change.
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The meeting took place at 5 p.m. on June 27 at Secretary Dulles’ house.
The subject-title of the memorandum was “Seating of Communist China in the UN”. On the previous day, Saturday, June 26, at a meeting in the President’s office, Eisenhower and Churchill had exchanged views about Communist China:
↩“They discussed Red China. Of admittance to the UN, Churchill said, “My line about recognition is that there has got to be peace first.” The President said that if they would withdraw to their own borders, release our prisoners, and say they would observe propriety in international relationships, he would consider using his influence to obtain recognition.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, “Whitman Diary, Saturday, June 26, 1954”)